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ABSTRACT 
Author: Michael Hanke 
Title: Trends in air transportation between the USA 
and the Asia/Pacific region with particular 
consideration of United Airlines' acquisition 
of the Pan Am Pacific Division 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Business Administration in Aviation 
Year: 1990 
This study deals with the development of scheduled passenger 
traffic between the USA and selected countries in the ICAO 
Asia/Pacific region from 1977 to 1987. Among the significant 
trends are the growth in scheduled passenger traffic volume 
and the increase in both the percentage share of US citizens 
and foreign flag carriers. This study focuses on United 
Airlines' acquisition of Pan Am's Pacific Division in 1985. 
An analysis of selected Pan Am transpacific services in 
terms of market share and quality of service before 1985 
shows a general declining trend. The main reasons for this 
development include Pan Am's poor financial performance and 
increased competition due to multiple carrier designation. 
United Airlines' impact on US - Pacific markets was modest. 
In 1987, United Airlines improved its market share 
positions over those of Pan Am in 1985 by 2 to 8 percent. 
This suggests that United Airlines was unable to turn its 
domestic feeder system and US market dominating APOLLO CRS 
into a competitive advantage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis deals with the transportation of scheduled 
passengers from the USA to selected countries in the Asia/ 
Pacific region. This topic is especially important because 
the Asia/Pacific region has developed into a significant 
market for aviation services in recent years and is 
expected to continue growing at rates exceeding those of 
other ICAO regions. 
The objectives of this study are to identify overall 
market trends, to evaluate Pan Am's transpacific services, 
to compare the performance of United Airlines' replacement 
service with that of Pan Am, and to relate any significant 
changes to United Airlines' extensive domestic route network 
and well established APOLLO computer reservation system. 
Chapter I introduces the Asia/Pacific region and 
elaborates on social, political, economic, and demographic 
factors exercising an influence on air transportation. 
Chapter II analyzes overall market trends in 
scheduled passenger traffic between the USA and selected 
Pacific rim countries from 1977 to 1987. The chapter 
presents an evaluation of the magnitude and direction of 
changes in the scheduled passenger volumes and in the 
scheduled passenger market shares of US/non-US citizens 
1 
2 
and US/non-US flag carriers. 
An analysis of the development in the number of inter-
national transpacific carriers and Asia/Pacific 
destinations served from US gateways is also presented in 
this chapter. Finally, supply and demand trends at US 
gateways, measured in terms of passenger seats available 
and revenue passengers carried, are investigated. 
Chapter III focuses on Pan Am's scheduled passenger 
services in nine selected transpacific markets. Pan Am's 
performance in these markets is analyzed in terms of 
passenger market share and quality of air service. The 
quality of air service is measured using a quality service 
index (QSI) which was originally developed by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the late 1960s. 
Pan Am's services are compared with those of United 
Airlines which acquired Pan Am's Pacific Division in 1985. 
The researcher determined how market shares and the QSI on 
the transpacific routes have changed since United Airlines 
replaced Pan Am. The impact of United Airlines' large 
domestic network and feeder potential, and the well 
established APOLLO computer reservation system on market 
share changes is discussed. 
A correlation analysis was used to test whether there is 
a significant linear relation between QSI and market share. 
Finally, Chapter IV summarizes the findings and 
conclusions, and gives recommendations for future studies 
dealing with topics discussed in this thesis. 
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND TO AIR TRANSPORT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 
Definition of the Region and its Relative 
Position in the World 
According to the definition of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Asia/Pacific region 
comprises 34 countries (of which 30 are ICAO contracting 
TABLE 1.1 
NATIONS AND TERRITORIES IN THE ICAO ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 
WESTERN CENTRAL NORTHEASTERN SOUTHEASTERN 
Nations: . 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Burma 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Nations: 
Brunei 
Kampuchea 
Indonesia 
Lao PDR 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
Nations: 
China 
North Korea 
Japan 
Mongolia 
South Korea 
Territories: 
Hong Kong 
Macau 
Nations: 
Australia 
Fiji 
Nauru 
New Zealand 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa 
Solomon Is. 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Territories: 
American Samoa 
Cook Is. 
Guam 
Hew Caledonia 
Niue 
Norfolk Is. 
Tahiti 
Trust Territory 
of Pacific Is. 
Uallis&Futuna 
SOURCE: ICAO,International Air Passenger And Freight 
Transport: Asia and PacificfMontreal:ICAO. September 
1986), 119. 
3 
Figure l . l 
Soutec: The ICAO Asia-Pacific Region 
NawaL K. Tancja, 
The International Airline Industry, (i Lexington,Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1900), 124. 
•£> 
5 
states) and 9 territories of Australia, France, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Great Britain and the United States. 
The position of the Asia/Pacific region in terms of 
demographic, geographic, and economic factors relative to 
other ICAO regions in the world (Africa, Europe, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East, and America) 
becomes evident in Table 1.2 and 1.3. In 1983, the Asia/ 
Pacific region had 2.58 billion inhabitants which was 
equivalent to 55 percent of the world population. The gross 
national product (GNP) amounted to US $2,285 trillion which 
was 22 percent of the world's total. In terms of world trade 
by value, the region accounted for US $707,116 billion or 
38.2 percent. Comparing traffic information of 1977/78 
versus 1983/84, the region's share has grown in the areas 
of total passenger and total air freight transportation 
which increased from 13.4 percent and 15.6 percent to 16.4 
percent and 23.2 percent, respectively. Figure 1.2 which 
shows a ten-year development of total ton-kilometers 
performed not only confirms this growth trend but also 
clearly indicates that the Asia/Pacific region outperforms 
other ICAO regions. The following section lists the factors 
primarily responsible for this exceptional development. 
TAIII.K I .2 
A COMPAUJGON OP DEMOGRAPHIC9 CIKOGKAMUC, AND KCONOMtC INDICATORS 
OF ALL ICAO REGIONS FOR 1976 and 1977 
Indicator 
Population (1977) 
Area 
Population Denelty 
Croaa National Product 3/ (1977) 
CNP Per Capita 
International trade (1977) 
- laporta 
- Liporta 
Air freight - Total (1978) 
- International 
- Do»eetlc 
Air PaaaenRere - total (1978) 
- International 
- Doveetlc 
Unite 
• 11 Hone ^  
• III, lot.* 
pop./In.' 
thoua. alii. USf 
,usf 
•III. us$ 
•111. USf 
•111. TUP 
•III. TKP 
sill, ncp 
• 111. PeR-Rai 
•III. Paa-Ra 
• 111. Paa-iaj ! 
Aala 
and 
Pacific. 
2 2)8 
JO.O 
75 
1.334 
S66 
181 847 
170 090 
4 037 
3 348 
309 
114 932 
17 654-
47 298 
• 
Africa 
428 
30.3 
14 
211 
493 
• 
33 873. 
34 4)8* 
8)8 
37) 
83 
24 100* 
18 779 
' 3 )2l • 
Europe £ft 
780 
30.3. 
28 
.3 363 
4-318 
r 
809 924 
362 741 
9 639 
7 281 
2 378f 
321 238 : 
163 296 ' 
137 942 
Latin 
Aaerlca 
and 
Caribbean 
342 
20.6 
17 
417 
1 278 
63 784 
58 971 
1 467 
1 111 
336 • 
46 470 
23 822 • 
211 648 
H Iridic 
Eaet-
61 
5.4 
13 
200 
2 469 
58 4)9 
107 248 
1 112 
1 085 
27 
25 5)8 
20 6)0 
4 908 
North 
Anerlta 
260 
' ,19.3 
12 
2 091 
6 71) 
.
 % 
199 986 ' 
162 329 
» 
9 017 
; j ' w i , ' 
3 686 
393.171 
78 240 • 
314 9)1 
World 
J4 12/ 
1)5.9 
30 
{7*858 
1 904 
1 149 85) 
1 116 017 
25 9)0 
16 929 
9 001 
9)3-469 
)84.421 
551 048 
Aala 
and 
Pacific 
Share (1) 
54.7 
22.1 
-
19.8 
-
14.1 
15.2 
15.6 
21.0 
5.7 
l).4 
20.2 
8.6 
Noteat 1/ Regional a, roup Inge art thoee adopted ay^lCAO'for atat let lcal purpoec. 
7 / Intludea USSR. , 
1 / CNP data for Iran, Uganda and Viet*Naa art for 1976. 
Sourceat - International Sank for Reconstruction and De«elopuaot'v VorlA Dank AtLi*t 1979. (Population and CNP) 
- United Nation*. Monthly BulUtin of-Stntiitia*. Aprl|t l980. (Inttrnattonal Tr4de) 
- ICAO, CiOil Aviation StatUtio* of tht'VorM, 1976, .Dot. 9180/4.' ' (Air freight land Air Paeeengtr? 
SOURCE: ICAO, International Air Passenger And Freight Transport:; Asia and Pacific 
(Montreal:ICAO, September 1977), 6. 
a. 
T A I H . E 1 . 1 
Indicator 
f'tiptilalion 
Area 
Population density 
Gross' national product 
GNP per capita 
International trade 
— Imports 
— lixporls 
Air freight — total 
— International 
— Dome J lie 
Air Passengers — lolal 
— International 
— Domestic 
A COMPARISON OF DF.MOGRAPIIIC, GEOGRAPHIC, AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
OF AM. ICAO REGIONS TOR 1*303 AND 19114 
Units 
(1983) Millions 
Mill . sq. km. 
Pop. sq. km. 
Thous. mill. U.S.S 
U.S.S 
(1983) 
(1984) 
(1984) 
Mil l . U.S.S 
Mil l . U.S.S 
Mi l l : T K P * 
TKP/capllg 
Mill . TKP 
TKP/capiln 
Mil l . TKP 
TKP/caplla 
Mil l , paxkm 
Pax km/capita 
Mill , pax kin 
Pax-km/capita 
Mil l , paxkm 
Pax'km/ca'pita 
Asia 
and 
Pacific 
2 579 
30.0 
86 
2 283*. 
925 
351 628 • 
355 488* 
•9 152 
3.5 
8 221 
3.2 
925 
0.4 
707 932 
81 
141 606 
.:55 
66 326 
126. 
Africa 
324 
30.3 
17 
374* 
754 
88 462 
70 563 
1 153 
2.2 
1 057 
2.0 
96 
0.2 
35 961 
69 
27 610 
53 
8 331 
16 
Europe1 
809 
30.3 
27 
3 227» 
7 438 
VI6 223 
81* 150 
14 013 
17.3 
II 242 
I 13.9 
2 771 
3.4 
407 711 
504 
199 944 
' 247 
207 767 
257 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
368 
20.6 
18. 
7131 
1 912. 
86 243 
106 411 
2 008 
5.5 
1 4V 
.4.0 
541 
1.5 
64 003 
174 
34 406 
:93 
29 397 
80 
Middle 
East 
102 
5.4 
19 
248' 
5 911 
113 428 
121 274 
2 074 
20.3 
1 991 
19.5 
83 
0.* 
41 222 
404. 
32 562' 
319 
8 660 
85 
North 
America 
259 
19.3 
13 
3 593 
13 873 
331 211 
274 051 
11079 
42.8* 
4 921 
19.0 
6 158 
23.8 
513 700 
• 1 983 
118 064 
456 
395 636 
1 528 
World 
4 641 
135.9 
34 
10 442 
-
1 887 189 
1 812 930 
39 479 
8.5 
28 905 
6.2 
10 574.3 
2.3 
1 270 529 
274 
554 192 
119 
7|6*337 
154 
Asia and 
Pacific 
Share (%) 
55.5 
22.1 
-
21.9 
-
18.6 
19.6 
23.2 
» 
28.5 ' 
-
8.7 
-
16.4 
-
25.6 
• 
9.3 
-
1. Regional groupings arc those adopted by ICAO for slalislkarpurposcs. 
2. Includes USSR. 
3. GNP and GNP per capita excludes data for Afghanistan. Bhutan, Cook Islands. Dcmocrallc Kampuchea. Dcmocrallc People's Republic of Korea, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic. Maldives. Mongolia. Nlue. Totclau, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. Vict NamLWaMi and Futuna, and Western Samoa. 
4. GNP and GNP per capita cicludci data for Angola.'Chad, Comoros/Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique. 
5. GNP and GtfP per capita excludes data for Albania, Bulgaria.' Czechoslovak la* German Democratic Republic, P.oland.' Romania and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
6. GNP and GNP per'capita excludes data for Cuba', French Guiana* Guadeloupe and Netherlands Antilles. 
7. GNP and GNP per capita excludes dala for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. 
8. I'iiures differ from.those in Appendix 2 due |o inclusion here,of estimates for non-reporting Stales. 6o\jRC!E: ICAO, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r 
Sources.— International Hank for Reconstruction and Development, World Dank Alios, (Population and GNP). 
United Nations. Monihlf DuUttin of SMbtks. December 1915. (International Trade). 
ICAO. Civil Amotion Stotitllcs of the World, (Air Freight and Air Passenger). 
Passenger And Freight Transport: 
Asia and Pacific (Montreal: ICAO, 
September 1906), 7. 
FIGURE 1.2 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF TON KILOMETERS PERFORMED (PERCENTAGE) 
IN EACH ICAO REGION FROM 1977 TO 1987 
(1977 = 100) 
PERCENT 
80 81 82 83 
YEAR 
84 85 86 87 
Europe 
Asia & Pacific 
Africa 
North America 
Middle East 
Latin America 
SOURCE: Calculations based on ICAO.Civil Aviation 
Statistics of the World(Montreal;ICAO. August 1977-1987), 
5. 
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Factors Influencing the Development 
of Air Transportation 
Geographic Factors 
The foremost characteristic of the Asia/Pacific region 
is its great geographic size. It covers over half of the 
circumference of the globe. The distance from Kabul in 
the north-west to Papeete in the south-east, for example, 
is about 16,000 kilometers, while the distance between 
Tokyo in the north and Sydney in the south is 7,800 
kilometers. Distances to other regions such as Europe 
and North America are even greater and in the case of 
Singapore-London and Singapore-San Francisco could be 
as long as 10,900 km and 16,000 km, respectively. 
Five states in the region (Afghanistan, Bhutan, 
Lao's People's Republic, Mongolia, and Nepal) are 
landlocked which implies several disadvantages when 
it comes to routing surface shipments through other 
countries. Major disadvantages include increased 
shipping cost due to transit charges, absence of 
control over transport tariffs, and priority of 
movement could be subordinated to the needs of the 
transit country. 
Almost half of the states and almost all of the 
territories are islands or archipelago states. The 
islands, in particular, are relatively isolated and 
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receive only infrequent ocean shipping service (1). 
Demographic Factors 
Between 1977 and 1983, the region's population 
grew from 2.258 billion at an average annual rate of 
2.1 percent to 2.579 billion inhabitants. In the same time 
frame, the world population grew at a lower rate of 1.8 
percent from 4.127 billion to 4.641 billion. The 
population in the year 2000 is expected to be 
approximately 3.340 billion - still an impressive 
55 percent of the world's population. 
The volume and pattern of migration to, from, and 
within the region is also a major contributor to 
air transport in the region. In particular, 
emigration from Europe to Australia and New Zealand 
after 1945 established the basis for visiting friends 
and relatives (VFR) travel. However, this pattern is 
changing due to the fact that more immigrants are 
now coming from countries in the region. In the case 
of Australia, for example, between 30 and 40 percent of 
the immigrants are from Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, 
and India. New Zealand also faces a growing number 
of immigrants from South Pacific islands such as 
the Cook Islands, Samoa, and Fiji. 
(1) ICAO.International Air Passenger and Freight Transport: 
Asia and Pacific(Montreal: ICAO, September 1986), 3. 
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The existence of ethnic communities both inside and 
outside the region further contribute to VFR traffic. 
In particular, Chinese communities in Thailand, Singapore, 
and Indonesia, as well as various Asian communities in 
Western Europe and the USA are referred to in this respect. 
Finally, the phenomenon of "guest workers" from Asian 
countries working in the Gulf States in the construction 
industry provides another basis for air transport. The 
increase in oil prices in 1974 and 1979 enabled OPEC 
countries to engage in large-scale construction projects 
creating a strong demand for construction and service 
personnel which no longer could be met from within the 
Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, an increasing 
number of people were hired from Pakistan, India, South 
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. Estimates for the 
years 1982-1983 for some of the countries involved include 
2 million workers from Pakistan engaged in the Middle East, 
800,000 from India, 400,000 from the Philippines, and 
280,000 from Thailand (2). 
Economic Factors 
As shown in Table 1.2, the region's 1983 GNP per 
capita of US $925 was the second lowest in the world 
and far below that of Europe ($7,438) and that of 
North America ($13,873). The low GNP, however, does not 
(2) Ibid., 5. 
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reveal the extreme contrasts one finds in the region. On 
the one hand, there are countries and territories whose 
GNP per capita is between $7,000 - $16,000 while other 
countries range between $150 - $160, the lowest in the 
world. Table 1.4 displays several of the countries 
involved. The differences in GNP per capita not only 
indicate the various developmental stages of the countries' 
and territories' economies but also the potential of people 
in these very countries to travel by air. 
TABLE 1.4 
COMPARISON OF GNP PER CAPITA OF SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 
THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION IN 1987 
COUNTRY GNP PER CAPITA (US $) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Australia 
Bhutan 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Lao PDR 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
7,687 
150 
8,070 
15,760 
170 
160 
7,750 
SOURCE: World Bank.World Bank Development Report 
1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
164-165. 
In terms of level of development, the Asia/Pacific 
region's countries and territories could be grouped as 
follows: 
13 
(i) the three developed market economies of 
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand; 
(ii) the semi-industrialized market economies of 
Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, and 
Thailand; 
(iii) the developing economies of the Western 
subregion, socialist countries, and island 
states in the Southeastern subregion; 
(iv) China which, although considered a developing 
country, has such aggregate resources in 
human resources and economic terms that 
it engages in industrial and commercial 
activities comparable to that of developed 
countries. 
The wealth of the region is concentrated in only 
four countries: Japan, China, India, and Australia, 
which together account for 82 percent of the region's 
GNP. Japan alone represented over 50 percent of the total 
in 1983 (3). However, despite the economic dominance 
of countries like Japan and Australia, the high growth 
economies are found in developing countries as shown in 
Table 1.5. 
Of importance to air transportation was the emphasis, 
by an increasing number of these countries, on export-
oriented strategies. Air transportation has enabled 
developing countries to gain a large share of the 
international markets for goods such as consumer 
electronics, semiconductor devices, textiles and clothing, 
and electrical equipment. A list of these items exported 
by the region to the USA in 1984 is shown in Table 1.6. 
(3)Ibid., 6. 
TABLE 1.5 
GROWTH OF PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE 
ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (PERCENT) 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
COUNTRY 
1. Australia 
2. Japan 
3. Hong Kong 
4. Malaysia 
5. Thailand 
6. Singapore 
SOURCE: World 
1965-80 
4.2 
6.3 
8.6 
7.4 
7.2 
10.1 
1980-87 
3.2 
3.8 
5.8 
4.5 
5.6 
5.4 
1989, 166-167. 
These countries1 economies seem to be more recession-
resistant than those of other regions partially because 
demand in North America and Europe for goods produced in 
the Asia/Pacific region grew even during the early 1980s (4) 
(4)Ibid., 6. 
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TABLE 1.6 
GOODS SHIPPED BY AIR FROM THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION TO 
THE USA IN 1983 
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION 
Integrated circuits I transistors 
Textiles & garments 
Data processing S. office equipment & parts 
Telecommunications equipment 
Pearls, diamonds $ precious £. semi-
precious stones 
Electrical equipment & parts 
Electrical machinery & apparatus 
Clocks L watches 
ftrtsunrk i, jewelry 
Special transactions 
Photographic apparatus & equipment 
Toys 
Electric instruments, non-medical 
Optical goods 
Fabrics 
Aircraft, spacecraft & associated equipment 
Footwear 
Leather goods 
Organic chemicals & related products 
Fish Cincl. shellfish) 
Carpets 
Pumps for liquids & parts 
Medical instruments & appliances 
Luggage 
Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 
] 
Value < 
(000$) 
6,555,687 
2,676,043 
1,717,677 
1,507,566 
969,096 
728,958 
721,518 
689,629 
566,702 
516,696 
438,170 
241,801 
199,769 
193,546 
170,170 
103,773 
99,539 
96,282 
77,417 
52,369 
41,195 
31,870 
19,030 
12,290 
9,941 
Percent of total 
sxports shipped 
by air 
% 
26 
60 
30 
91 
39 
40 
72 
79 
57 
59 
12 
57 
59 
15 
89 
4 
49 
15 
7 
52 
74 
90 
12 
95 
Total exports by air 18,436,734 20 
SOURCE: ICAO.International Air Passenger and Freight 
Transport; Asia and Pacific(Montreal:ICAO, September 1986), 
48. 
CHAPTER II 
AIR TRANSPORTATION TRENDS BETWEEN THE USA 
AND THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 
Method 
The researcher applied a historical research method to 
analyze air transportation trends between the USA and the 
Asia/Pacific region. By applying this method, it is possible 
to gain a historical perspective of developments in trans-
pacific air transportation. The trend analysis is based on 
a period of ten years from 1977 to 1987. This time frame 
was chosen because the researcher wants (a) to analyze 
various level of service trends in a market place while it 
was served by Pan Am and (b) to trace the changes that took 
place when United Airlines replaced Pan Am in 1986. Time 
series and trend analysis data allow the researcher to 
quantitatively evaluate those changes. Also, two important 
events affecting air transportation across the Pacific 
fall into this period: the International Air Transportation 
Competition Act (IATCA) of 1979 by the USA and the second 
oil crisis of 1979 resulting in a worldwide recession in 
the early 1980s. 
The transpacific analysis is restricted to international 
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scheduled passenger traffic. Due to the different data 
sources used, international scheduled passenger traffic is 
measured in terms of origin/destination traffic and revenue 
passenger traffic carried between selected US origin and 
Asia/Pacific destination points. 
An analysis of air cargo is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Also, in 1984, international charter passenger 
traffic made up only 1 percent of the region's inter-
national passenger traffic and was, therefore, excluded 
from the analysis. 
Due to the volume of the data, the trend analysis will 
be one-directional. This means that only international 
scheduled traffic originating in the USA and ending in 
the Asia/Pacific region is evaluated. Generally, passengers 
return on the same carrier to their point of origin because 
of the fare economics associated with staying on the same 
carrier. Therefore, the characteristics of the USA - Asia/ 
Pacific traffic should also apply to the reverse direction. 
The Western ICAO subregion is excluded from this study 
since there was no significant direct scheduled service 
between this part of the Asia/Pacific region and the USA 
across the Pacific from 1977 to 1987 (carriers offering 
service to the Western subregion from the USA did and do 
so by flying across the North Atlantic). 
In the remaining three subregions, the countries 
listed in Table 2.1 are included in the analysis. The 
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researcher chose these countries according to their 
political and economic importance to the Asia/Pacific 
region and the USA. In order to account for the widely 
dispersed island nations in the Southeastern subregion, 
whose economies rely for the most part on the tourist 
industry, the islands of Fiji and Tahiti were chosen. 
TABLE 2.1 
DESTINATION COUNTRIES OF STUDY IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 
NORTHEASTERN CENTRAL SOUTHEASTERN 
Hong Kong * Indonesia Australia 
Japan Malaysia Fiji 
PR China Philippines New Zealand 
South Korea Singapore Papua New Guinea 
Taiwan Thailand Tahiti * 
* These destinations points are not sovereign 
states but territories 
The origin points of US - Asia/Pacific scheduled 
passenger service were taken from the ICAO publication 
"Traffic by Flight Stage" and are listed in Table 2.2. 
TABLE 2.2 
US ORIGIN POINTS OF STUDY 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
Minneapolis 
New York 
Portland 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
SOURCE: ICAO.Traffic by Flight 
Stage(Montreal:ICAO, 1987). 
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Data Sources 
Bilateral Agreements between the USA and Asia/Pacific 
Countries 
Bilateral agreements form the legal framework of the 
aviation services offered between two countries. Generally, 
they consist of three parts which are the bilateral, the 
annex to the bilateral, and one or more memoranda of under-
standing (MOU). While the bilateral contains regulations 
regarding tariffs and capacity, the annex specifies the 
routes to be operated by the designated airline of each 
state. MOU are often confidential and amplify particular 
aspects of the basic air services agreement (1). 
The applicable bilateral agreements are an important 
data source for this thesis because they include rules and 
regulations regarding service and tariffs which can strongly 
influence trends in air transportation - in this context 
between the USA and selected Asia/Pacific rim countries. 
An analysis of all the bilaterals was not necessary 
due to a summary transpacific study published by Boberg and 
Collison in 1989 (2). This thesis will rely on the authors1 
study which examined the bilaterals and their amendments 
with respect to the following service provisions: capacity, 
frequency, number of carriers, and routes/points of service. 
(l)Rigas Doganis,Flying Off Course(London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1985), 26-27. 
(2)Kevin B. Boberg and Frederick M. Collison,"International 
Trends in the Pacific Basin", Transportation Journal, 
Vol.28, No.3 (Spring 1989), 26. 
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It also analyzed bilateral provisions regarding the approval 
procedure for fares/rates, notification, and protest periods, 
the role of the International Air Transportation Association 
(IATA), and the resolution of disputes to evaluate fares. 
ICAO's Traffic by Flight Stage 
The publication "Traffic by Flight Stage" (3) is 
published by ICAO and is used in this study as a source of 
both supply and demand data. Supply is measured in terms of 
passenger seats available on each flight stage while demand 
is measured in terms of revenue passengers carried on each 
flight stage. It must be noted that traffic by flight stage 
is not the same as origin and destination traffic for which 
passengers are counted at points where they clear customs 
and immigration. According to ICAO, a flight stage is the 
operation of an aircraft from take-off to its next landing. 
"Traffic by Flight Stage" merely shows the number of 
passenger seats available and the actual number of 
revenue passengers carried on a flight stage between 
some US origin and Asia/Pacific destination point which 
are connected by a nonstop air service. 
Until 1981, "Traffic by Flight Stage" was published 
by ICAO four times a year for the months of March, June, 
September, and December. From 1982, "Traffic by Flight 
(3)ICAO, Traffic by Flight Stage(Montreal: ICAO, 
1977-1987). 
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Stage" was published only once a year and contained annual 
traffic data. 
In order to estimate the annual volume of passenger seats 
available and revenue passengers carried from 1977 to 1981, 
the researcher used the month of June to represent the peak 
summer traffic and December to represent the low winter 
traffic in the northern hemisphere. Data for both months 
are added, divided by two and multiplied by twelve to 
estimate the annual volume of passenger seats available 
and number of revenue passengers carried. The researcher 
believes this procedure gives a satisfactory indication of 
the development of the travel volume on selected trans-
pacific flight stages on an annual basis. 
The use of "Traffic by Flight Stage" as a demand and 
supply data source has some inherent limitations. Carriers 
offering services on certain flight stages are not obliged 
to report their traffic data to ICAO. Mostly for 
competitive reasons, they do not disclose the number of 
seats available or the number of revenue passengers 
carried on selected flight stages. Therefore, the actual 
traffic volume is greater than recorded. The discrepancy 
between actual and recorded traffic varies from flight stage 
to flight stage since it is at the carrier's discretion to 
decide each year for what flight stage to release data. 
Another source of discrepancy stems from the fact that 
some carriers did not report their traffic data to ICAO on 
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time. It was not possible to estimate the magnitude of the 
discrepancy in a way that is relatively consistent over the 
time period studied. However, the researcher believes that 
the flight stage traffic data published were sufficient to 
indicate supply and demand trends in the market place. 
European airlines carrying traffic between Europe and 
the Asia/Pacific region transiting Anchorage are excluded 
from this study since these carriers have no fifth freedom 
right (4) between Anchorage and points in the Asia/Pacific 
region. 
US International Air Travel Statistics 
US International Air Travel Statistics are published 
annually by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
compiled by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS). This publication was used as a demand data source 
to evaluate the development of international scheduled 
origin/destination passenger traffic in terms of US/non-US 
citizenship and usage of US/non-US flag carrier. 
The INS figures are a by-product of an administrative 
process and need some adjustments since they include Europe 
-Asia/Pacific passengers transiting Anchorage, Los Angeles, 
and Honolulu, and traffic in and out Guam. Although 
(4)The fifth freedom right allows an airline to carry 
traffic between two points outside its country of registry 
as long as the flight originates or terminates in the 
country of registry. 
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the magnitude of this traffic is not known, its volume is 
insignificant since Europe-Asia/Pacific passengers usually 
travel on airlines flying through the Middle East region or 
using the transsiberian route (5). The INS data also include 
non-revenue traffic such as airline employees and passengers 
on frequent flyer awards. The magnitude of this traffic 
usually is about 5 percent (6). 
Reasons for Using DOT and ICAO Traffic Data 
There were several reasons for using two passenger 
traffic data sources. First, the previous discussion of 
the data sources reveals that neither of the two sources 
singly included all data needed for this study of demand 
and supply trends in international transpacific scheduled 
passenger traffic. The data sources complemented each 
other. 
Second, the use of two data sets allowed the researcher 
to cross-check the number of passengers carried between 
some US origin and Asia/Pacific destination points. This 
was possible in situations when markets were served on a 
nonstop basis since origin and destination passengers 
could be considered as flight stage passengers. These 
two sets of data therefore supported each other. 
(5)Marjorie Saccoccio, Reports Officer at the DOT'S Center 
for Transportation, interview by researcher, Telephone 
interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 15 May 1990. 
(6)"The Magical Allure of the Orient", Avmark Aviaation 
Economist(November 1986), 15. 
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Air Transportation Trend Analysis 
Bilateral Agreements 
With the enactment of IATCA in 1979, the USA has 
specified goals it would pursue in future bilateral 
negotiations. These goals, which parallel those stated in 
the domestic Deregulation Act of 1978, include among other 
things: 
"(1) freedom of air carriers and foreign air carriers to 
offer fares and rates which correspond with consumer 
demand; 
(2) the maximum degree of multiple and permissive 
international authority for US carriers so that they 
will be able to respond quickly to shifts in market 
demands; 
(3) the elimination of operational and marketing 
restrictions to the greatest extent possible; 
(4) an increase in the number of nonstop US gateway cities; 
(5) the elimination of discrimination and unfair 
competitive practices faced by the US airlines in foreign 
transportation, including excessive landing and user fees, 
unreasonable ground handling requirements, undue 
restrictions on operations, prohibitions against change of 
gauge, and similar restrictive practices" (7). 
An analysis of several Asia/Pacific countries' 
bilateral agreements by Boberg and Collison (8) shows that 
the US did not enjoy uniform success when it came to 
"exporting" its economic deregulation in the form of "Open 
Skies" policies to the rest of the world. 
(7)US Congress, House, The International Air Transportation 
Competition Act of 1979. Pub. L., 17 December 1979, 15 Feb. 
1980, 94 Stat. 42. 
(8)Boberg and Collison, "International Trends in the Pacific 
Basin". 
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They differentiated countries in the Asia/Pacific region 
by qualitatively evaluating the degree of restrictiveness 
in terms of service and fares. The results of this are 
exhibited in Table 2.3. The presumption of economic 
deregulation is that competition will provide a more 
efficient and effective air transportation. 
As a result, according to Boberg and Collison, one 
should expect service and traffic growth to be greater than 
the market average for Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Countries with more restrictive agreements such as Japan 
should experience inhibited growth, despite the fact that 
it may increase in absolute terms. 
However, this discussion neglects the fact that traffic 
growth between two countries depends on a variety of 
factors. The degree of restrictiveness in bilateral 
agreements is only one factor. Despite a restrictive 
bilateral with Japan, for example, the growth of air 
traffic still might be very high due to Japan's large and 
powerful economy which maintains substantial trade links to 
the USA. 
The following sections will discuss whether or not the 
IATCA had an effect on transpacific passenger service. 
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TABLE 2.3 
ESTIMATES OF DEGREE OF RESTRICTIVENESS IN US BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS IN ASIA/PACIFIC * 
Degree of Restrictiveness 
Liberal Moderate Restrictive Regulation 
Service Korea 
Singapore 
Taiwan ** 
Fares Korea 
Singapore 
Taiwan ** 
Australia 
Fiji 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Tahiti 
Fiji 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
PR China 
Tahiti 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
PR China 
Australia 
Japan 
* The analysis is based on published bilateral 
agreements and amendments. 
** Estimate according to Boberg and Collison. 
SOURCE: Kevin B. Boberg and Frederick M. Collison, 
International Trends in the Pacific Basin, 
Transportation Journal, Vol.28, No.3 (Spring 1989), 26. 
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Transpacific Passsenger Volume and Structure 
Table 2.4 reveals that all three ICAO Asia/Pacific 
subregions have three trends in common. First, despite 
differences in volumes and growth rates, the total number 
of passengers grew in all three subregions. The USA-North-
eastern region was the largest passenger market and grew 
between 1979 and 1987 by an average annual rate of 13.9 
percent. The USA - Central region was the smallest market 
and showed an average annual growth rate of 8.7 percent. 
Finally, the USA - Southeastern region had an average 
annual growth rate of 10.4 percent. 
A second trend common to all the regions is that the 
share of US citizens measured as a percentage of the total 
number of passengers traveled to Asia/Pacific destinations 
also increased. It is interesting to note that the USA-South-
eastern region as the second largest transpacific market 
showed the largest increase in the US citizen share which 
grew by 14 percentage points from 41 percent in 1979 to 55 
percent in 1987. Second in US citizen share growth was the 
USA - Central region market which increased by 11 percentage 
points from 58 percent to 69 percent. The USA-Northeastern 
market as the largest transpacific markets exhibited the 
smallest increase in the US citizen share. It grew by 8 
percentage points from 27 percent to 35 percent. 
The third major trend is the continuous increase of the 
share of passengers traveling on non-US flag carriers. 
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TABLE 2 . 4 
AIR PASSENGER TRAFFIC CARRIED BETWEEN THE USA AND 
ASIA/PACIFIC SUBREGIONS BY CITIZENSHIP AND FLAG CARRIER 
( 1 9 7 9 , 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 5 , and 1 9 8 7 ) 
US - Northeastern Subregion 
US citizen 
Non-US citizen 
33SS3SX33SXXXXBX: 
Total 
US flag 
Non-US flag 
1979 
Passenger 
502,274 
1,358,000 
BXSSXXXXXXS3333 
1,860,274 
CSESSXSXSSSSSS; 
837,124 
1,023,150 
Percent 
27% 
73% 
SXXKXXXXSS33X3 
100% 
B=XS==X======= 
45% 
55% 
- 1982 
Passenger 
683,782 
1,595,490 
2,279,273 
33SSXBS3SXXXXXSSX: 
888,917 
1,390,356 
Percent 
30% 
70% 
BBSSXXXXXSXSS 
100% 
B3SBX333X333X 
39% 
61% 
1985 
Passenger 
1,304,501 
2,040,499 
SB33S33S3XXSSSSSS: 
3,345,000 
1,471,835 
1,873,245 
Percent 
39% 
61% 
100% 
44% 
66% 
1987^ 
Passenger 
1,377,599 
2,550,399 
3,935,998 
1,635,119 
2,282,879 
Percent 
35% 
65% 
100% 
42% 
58% 
US - Central Subregion 
US citizen 
Non-US citizen 
:Z::I::I::::::::: 
Total 
333333333333=333: 
US flag 
Non-US flag 
1979 
Passenger 
85,978 
62,261 
:=============== 
148,239 
:33X333333333SSS 
65,225 
83,014 
Percent 
58% 
42% 
3X3S3S3S33S: 
100% 
sxxxasxxxxx: 
44% 
56% 
1982 
Passenger 
130,020 
115,567 
:SS3 = 3X33BS3SSSXXS3: 
245,887 
Percent 
53% 
47% 
:SS33BSXSCSX: 
100% 
:SXB3S333XXXSXSSSXS3XX3X3=3S3SS3 
78,683 
167,204 
32% 
68% 
1985 
Passenger 
147,867 
93,387 
ESXXBXX3X3X3S3S33X3 
239,454 
E================== 
64,653 
174,081 
Percent 
61% 
39% 
100% 
============== 
27% 
73% 
1987 
Passenger 
173,278 
77,849 
£333X3333333333: 
251,127 
================ 
52,737 
198,390 
Percent 
69% 
31% 
============ 
100% 
============ 
21% 
79% 
US - Southeastern Subregion 
1979 
Passenger 
US citizen 102,499 
Non-US citizen 262,621 
============================== 
Total 445,120 
============================== 
US flag 163,694 
Non-US flag 200,426 
SOURCE: Cal 
1982 
Percent Passenger 
41% 207,540 
59% 311,310 
================================ 
100% 518,850 
================================ 
37% 155,655 
63% 363,195 
culations based 
Percent 
40% 
60% 
S3S3XSXSX3X 
100% 
=33=3333=3= 
30% 
70% 
on US 
Transportation's International 
1985 
Passenger 
266,160 
312,450 
X3SSXBBXXXXSS33XX33SS: 
578,610 
====================== 
173,583 
405,027 
Percent 
46% 
54% 
:=========== 
100% 
============ 
30% 
70% 
Department of 
Air Travel 
1987 
Passenger 
448,416 
366,885 
================: 
815,301 
======33=333=3==: 
293,509 
521,792 
S t a t i s t i c s 
Percent 
55% 
45% 
============== 
100% 
==3333======= 
36% 
64% 
(Cambr idge ,Massachuse t t s : 1979-1987) 
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The market with the largest increase is the USA-Central 
subregion where there was an impressive 23 percentage 
point increase from 56 percent in 1979 to 79 percent in 
1987. The share of non-US flag carriers in the USA -
Northeastern and USA - Southeastern markets was much less 
dramatic and grew by 3 percentage points and 1 percentage 
point, respectively. 
The brief discussion of developments in passenger volume, 
US citizen share, and non-US flag carrier share, reveals 
a rather diverse picture when all three transpacific 
markets are compared with each other. The following 
section tries to account for these trends in each of the 
transpacific markets. 
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US - Northeastern Passenger Traffic 
In 1979, a total of 2,454,717 passengers traveled 
from the USA to all three ICAO subregions. With 1,860,274 
or 79 percent of this total, the Northeastern subregion ' 
accounted for the largest share (Figure 2.1). 
FIGURE 2.1 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDIVIDUAL SUBREGIONS OF TOTAL 
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS CARRIED BETWEEN THE USA AND 
ALL THREE SUBREGIONS FOR 1979 AND 1987 
1979 1987 
Total - 2,454,717 Total • 5,002,426 
Northeastern 
78.7% 
Northeastern 
75.8% 
Southeastern 
16.3% 
Central 
5.0% 
Central 
6.1% 
Southeastern 
18.1% 
SOURCE: Calculations based on US Department of 
Transportation, US International Air Travel Statistics 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1979-1987). 
Since demand for air transportation is derived from 
factors such as economic activities, it can be assumed that 
the growing trade volume between the USA and countries in 
FIGURE 2.2 
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US TRADE WITH COUNTRIES OF THE NORTHEASTERN SUBREGION 
IN 1979 AND 1987 (In Millions of Dollars) 
1979 -I987 
IMPORTS TO USA FROM 
Total • $46,454 Total - $136,035 
Japan 
66.1% 
Japan 
62.2% 
Taiwan 
14.8% 
Hong Kong 
10.2% 
S. Korea 
8.9% 
Hong Kong 
7.2% 
Taiwan 
18.1% 
S. Korea 
12.5% 
1979 1987 
EXPORTS FROM USA TO 
Total - $32,498 Total • $47,744 
Japan 
64.0% 
Japan 
59.2% 
Taiwan 
13.3% 
Hong Kong 
8.3% S. Korea 14.4% 
Hong Kong 
8.3% 
Taiwan 
15.5% 
S. Korea 
17.0% 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the USA, 
1984 and 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office 1984 and 1988), 788-791. 
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the Northeastern subregion certainly contributed to an 
increase in passenger traffic, in particular business 
related traffic. The major market is Japan to which 
approximately 81 percent of the 1,860,274 passengers 
traveled (9). This is a reflection of the economic ties 
between the USA and Japan which was by far the largest 
trading partner of the USA in the Northeastern subregion 
(Figure 2.2). However, the trade with other countries in 
the Northeastern subregion gained importance. The trade 
volume with Taiwan and South Korea, for example, grew from 
1979 to 1987 by some 250 percent and 205 percent, 
respectively. The trade volume with Japan in the same time 
frame increased by around 150 percent (Table 2.5). 
Since the growth in trade volume between the USA and 
Taiwan and South Korea outstripped that between the USA 
and Japan, one might also expect a higher growth rate in 
the passenger volume to these very countries. Indeed, 
as indicated in Table 2.5, US-Japan passenger growth lags 
behind that of other US-Northeastern subregion markets. 
Consequently, Japan's share of the 3,935,998 US-North-
eastern subregion passenger traffic declined to 74 
percent in 1987 (10). 
It should be pointed out that the growth in passenger 
(9)Calculations based on Department of Transportation, 
US International Air Travel Statistics(Cambridge. 
Massachusetts 1977 and 1987). 
(10)Calculations based on US International Air Travel 
Statistics. 
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TABLE 2.5 
PERCENTAGE GROWTH OF TRADE AND PASSENGER VOLUME 
BETWEEN THE USA AND COUNTRIES IN THE NORTH-
EASTERN SUBREGION FROM 1979 TO 1987 
(1979 = 100) 
Country 
Japan 
Taiwan 
S.Korea 
Hongk. 
Trade($) 
Passenger 
Trade($) 
Passenger 
Trade($) 
Passenger 
Trade($) 
Passenger 
1979 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1982 
134 
118 
145 
145 
136 
157 
256 
112 
1985 
209 
149 
229 
220 
193 
248 
358 
187 
1987 
257 
194 
349 
282 
305 
341 
443 
212 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the USA 
1985 and 1988 (Washington D.C.:Government Printing 1985 
and 1988 ), 788-791, and US Department of Transportation, 
US Air Travel Statistics(Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
1979-1987). 
volume to markets other than Japan was also the result of 
the fact that an increasing number of airlines bypass 
Tokyo and directly serve markets in the Northeastern and 
Central subregion. Flights bypassing Tokyo were the result 
of frequency limitations imposed on foreign airlines by 
Japanese authorities. 
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Although this helped relieve congestion at Tokyo's 
Narita Airport,it also suggested to passengers that flights 
to points in the Northeastern/Central subregion could be 
easier than the Tokyo connection. First, passengers avoid 
Narita which acquired some of the negative image experienced 
by large US hubs (11). Crowded terminals, lost baggages, and 
delayed flights are probably the key words in this respect. 
Second, passengers realize that total travel time can be 
shorter which is particularly important to business 
travelers who want to arrive at their destination in the 
shortest possible time. However, numerous airline industry 
officials think that Japan, despite the introduction of new 
long-range aircraft such as the B747-4 00 and the MD 11, 
continues to serve as a main hub in Asia, making therefore 
the issue of fifth freedom traffic through Japan still 
important (12) . A major reason could be the fact that yields 
per kilometer on US - Japan routes are higher than on other 
US-Northeastern/Central routes as exemplified by Figure 2.3. 
A considerable proportion of passenger traffic moving 
from the USA to the Northeastern subregion consists of 
visiting friends and relatives traffic and certainly 
contributed to the continuously high share of non-US 
citizens in this market. It can make up more than 50 
percent of the passenger volume and is therefore "large 
(ll)"The Magical Allure of the Orient11, 17. 
(12)Mark W. Lyon, "Pacific Rim Carriers Meet The Threat 
Of Protectionism".Airline Executive, December 1989, 27. 
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FIGURE 2.3 
TRANSPACIFIC YIELDS BY SELECTED MARKETS 
SOURCE: Mark W. Lyon, "Pacific Rim Carriers Meet Threat Of 
Protectionism".Airline Executive. December 1989, 28. 
enough to make a difference to every airline in the market", 
according to Frederick Dow, vice president International 
Marketing at Northwest Airlines (13). 
The large Asian communities in the USA, in particular in 
New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are the reason for 
the visiting friends and relatives traffic. There are around 
800,000 Koreans in New York and Los Angeles and a sizable 
Chinese community in San Francisco and Los Angeles which 
generate visiting friends and relatives traffic to South 
Korea and mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 
respectively (14). 
The share of US citizens was 27 percent in 1979 and 
(13)Ibid., 19. 
(14)Perry Flint,"Korean Air:Riding The Tiger", Air 
Transport World. October 1987, 26. 
FIGURE 2.4 
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DEVELOPMENT OF US/NON-US CITIZEN AND US/NON-US FLAG CARRIER 
TRAFFIC AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL US-NORTHEASTERN TRAFFIC 
FOR THE YEARS 1979, 1982, 1985, AND 1987 
PERCENT 
YEAR 
US CITIZEN 
US FLAG CARRIER 
NON-US CITIZEN 
NON-US FLAG CARRIER 
SOURCE: Calculations based on US International Air Travel 
Statistics. 1979-1987. 
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interest among US tourists to visit this part of the world. 
Countries like Japan, however, benefited only to a 
limited extent from this growing tourist since its currency 
was in the past much stronger than the US dollar,therefore, 
not offering strong purchasing power to US tourists. In 
contrast, South Korea experienced a major surge of foreign 
visitors with the share of US visitors steadily increasing 
and being the second largest after the Japanese in 1984 
as exhibited in Figure 2.5. 
FIGURE 2.5 
VISITOR ARRIVALS IN SOUTH KOREA BY MAJOR MARKETS IN 1984 
700 
Total = 1,124,076 
Number of Visitors (Thousands) 
Japan USA TW/HQKMal/Phlllp. U.K. W.Germany Canada Others 
TW-Taiwan; HKQ-Hong Kong; Mai-Malaysia; 
SOURCE:"South Korea - A new market opportunity".Llovdfs 
Aviation Economist, April 1986, 17. 
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The fact that approximately 64 percent of the total of 
1,124,076 visitors arriving in South Korea in 1984 were 
leisure travelers emphasizes the country's growing 
importance to US leisure travelers. 
Besides South Korea, China also developed into a country 
of growing importance to US leisure travelers. In 1986, 
1,264,482 tourists visited China. Of this total, US tourists 
constituted with 291,779 or 23 percent the second largest 
group after Japanese tourists. In 1987, the number of US 
visitors grew by 8 percent to 315,238 (15). With respect to 
the future development of the share of US citizens on routes 
to the Northeastern subregion, the researcher expects a 
decline due to an increase in the number of Asian travelers 
between the USA and the Northeastern subregion. This trend 
will be mainly the result of growing disposable incomes 
combined with a relaxation of overseas travel restrictions, 
especially in countries like South Korea and Taiwan. 
The announcement by the Japanese government in 1986 to 
stimulate Japanese leisure and business travel spending and 
to increase the number of Japanese overseas travelers to 
10 million by 1992 as a means of reducing the country's 
trade deficit will also contribute to a larger share of 
Asians on US - Northeastern routes (16). 
The share of non-US flag carriers to destinations in the 
(15)"The Tianamen fall-out",Aymark Aviation Economist, 
September 1989, 14. 
(16)Ian Rodger,"The Mighty Yen",Airline Business, 
May 1989, 35. 
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Northeastern subregion was 55 percent in 1979 and increased 
to 58 percent in 1987. There are several reasons which 
could be responsible for making the majority of passengers 
fly on non-US flag carriers. First, Asian carriers are known 
for their high level of service which is particularly 
attractive to the full fare business class and first class 
passenger. High quality of inflight meals, the provision of 
inflight amenities, and a low passenger flight attendant 
ratio are are just a few among multiple areas in which 
Asian airlines excel compared to their American competitors. 
Second, Asians have a stronger sense of flag carrier 
loyalty. This loyalty is not only the result of peer and 
cultural pressures but also of culture and language 
differences. It should be kept in mind that in the case of 
Japan, for example, in 1987, only around 4.2 percent of the 
Japanese population ever traveled abroad. Although the 
percentage increased to 7.7 percent in 1989, it still pales 
in significance when compared to countries like Great 
Britain and West Germany where the percentage of the 
population which traveled abroad was 44.4 percent and 34.7 
percent, respectively (17). Therefore, the relative in-
experience in international travel and the lack of know-
ledge of the English language (or the lack of knowledge 
of the respective Asian language among cabin crew members) 
are also factors which favor the "home airline" when 
(17)Ibid., 54. 
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traveling abroad. 
Additionally, surveys indicate that flag carrier loyalty 
in Japan seems to grow with age (around 70 percent of middle-
aged Japanese travelers ,e.g., express a preference for 
Japan Airlines) which will have an even greater impact in 
the future when one considers that by 1995 approximately one 
third of the Japanese population will be 50 years old and 
older (18). 
Third, the distribution channels through which airline 
tickets are sold in the Asia/Pacific region seem to favor 
Asian airlines. Around 90 percent of all bookings in Japan, 
for example, are made through travel agents (19). Adequate 
access to these travel agents is therefore crucial for any 
American carrier in order to attract a higher percentage of 
Asian travelers. Although both United Airlines and American 
Airlines were allowed to install their computer reservation 
systems (CRS) in Japan, their market penetration was 
limited due to the fact that the systems used the English 
language instead of traditional calligraphy or "kanji"(20). 
Also, both systems are not permitted to issue Japan 
Airlines tickets. Considering the fact that around 60 
percent of travelers between the USA and Japan originate in 
Japan and Japan Airlines carries on an average 40 percent of 
all traffic between the USA and Japan, this indicates the 
(18)Ibid., 55. 
(19)Ibid., 55. 
(20)Nabuko Hara, "Home first, the world later",Airline 
Business, November 1987, 41. 
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competitive disadvantage of American carriers. Other 
countries are even more restrictive when it comes to 
the installation of American CRSs. South Korea still 
resists the access of CRSs such as Apollo and Sabre to 
its country (21). 
Another important reason why Asian and also American 
travel agents might favor non-US flag carriers in their 
bookings could be because these foreign carriers pay 
higher commissions. Although the official IATA rate is 8 
percent, it is known that commissions, particularly in the 
price sensitive visiting friends and relatives market, can 
exceed 35 percent and may be as high as 65 percent in 
selected markets (22). 
Fifth, frequent flyer programs are illegal in Japan and 
therefore do not offer American carriers the possibility, 
unlike the practice in the USA, to attract passengers 
because of discount or free travel based on the 
accumulation of mileage credits with a particular carrier 
(23). 
(21)Trevor French, "Seoul Searching", Airline Business. 
December 1989, 27. 
(22)Mark Lyon,"Rapid Capacity Growth On Pacific Routes 
Could Reduce Yields".Airline Executive,January 1988, 7. 
(23)Ibid., 8. 
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US - Central Passenger Traffic 
In 1979, a total of 149,323 passengers traveled to the 
Central subregion. By 1987, this volume grew to 251,127 
passengers (Table 2.4). Figure 2.1 indicates that this 
subregion is the smallest transpacific market because it 
accounted only for 6.1 and 5 percent of the total trans-
pacific passenger volume in 1979 and 1987, respectively. 
The small size of the Central subregion is also a 
reflection of the much less significant economic ties the 
USA maintains with the countries of this subregion. Not 
only is the trade volume much smaller when compared with 
countries in other subregions, but also, except for 
Singapore which increased its exports to the USA by an 
annual average of 28 percent, it is even declining, notably 
in the case of Indonesia (Table 2.6). It can be assumed 
that business related traffic to this subregion is of much 
smaller volume than that to the Northeastern subregion. 
There are several reasons why visiting friends and 
relatives traffic seems to account for a major proportion 
of the total traffic to this subregion. First, one should 
consider that the Philippines generated a large number 
of legally immigrated Asians to the USA. Between 1981 and 
1985, 230,542 Filipinos immigrated to the USA, making it the 
second largest group after Mexicans with 335,563 for the 
FIGURE 2.6 
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US TRADE WITH COUNTRIES OF THE CENTRAL REGION IN 
1979 AND 1987 (In Millions of Dollars) 
1979 1987 
IMPORTS TO USA FROM 
Total • $12,262 
lalaysia 
20.6% 
Phil ippines 
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42.8% 
Thai land 
6.7% 
Singapore 
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Total • $17,000 
Malaysia 
17.2% 
Phil ippines 
13.3% 
Singapore 
36.5% 
Indonesia 
20.0% 
Thai land 
13.1% 
1979 1987 
EXPORTS FROM USA TO 
Total • $9,177 
i i l ippines 
21.8% 
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33.1% 
Malaysia 
14.6% 
ndonesia 
16.8% 
Thai land 
13.8% 
Total • $9,860 
Phil ippines 
16 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
41.1% 
Indonesia 
7.8% 
Thai land 
15.7% 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Statistical Abstract of 
the USA, 1984 and 1985. 
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TABLE 2.6 
CHANGES OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BETWEEN THE USA AND 
COUNTRIES IN THE CENTRAL SUBREGION FROM 1979 TO 1987 
(In Millions of Dollars, Except Percent) 
Exports Imports 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philipp. 
Singapore 
Thailand 
1979 
1,545 
1,337 
1,999 
3,033 
1,263 
1987 
767 
1,897 
1,599 
4,053 
1,544 
(% change)* 
- 6.3 
+ 5.3 
- 2.5 
+ 4.2 
+ 2.7 
1979 
5,217 
2,517 
1,731 
1,921 
816 
1987 1 
3,394 
2,921 
2,264 
6,201 
2,220 
(% change)* 
- 4.4 
+ 2.0 
+ 3.8 
+ 27.9 
+ 21.2 
* Annual average percentage change. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Statistical Abstract of 
the USA, 1984 and 1987. 
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same time frame (24). These immigrants certainly not only 
include Filipinos who married US citizens stationed on US 
bases but also Filipinos who got married to US citizens 
through "mail order bride" agencies in the USA. These 
people probably also infrequently return to the 
Philippines to see their relatives and friends. 
An analysis of the passenger structure in the USA-
Central subregion market reveals that the percentage share 
of US citizens traveling from the USA to the Central sub-
region in 1979 and 1987 was 58 percent and 69 percent, 
respectively. These percentage shares are the highest in 
all three subregions and might be attributed to three 
factors. First, business related traffic is dominated 
by US citizens. This also includes military related 
business when one takes into account that the USA has a 
substantial military presence in this subregion. Clark Air 
Force Base in the Philippines with around 12,000 people is 
one of the largest foreign US bases in the world (25). 
Second, visiting friends and relatives traffic seems to 
be dominated by travelers who either acquired their US 
citizenship upon marrying a US citizen or by being a US 
resident for a certain length of time. Another source of 
visiting friends and relatives traffic could be Americans 
who visit their friends and relatives stationed on US bases. 
(24)USA By Number(Washington, D.C.:Zero Population 
Growth Inc., 1988), 39 
(25)Dan Gragg,The Guide to Military Installations 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Gale Inc., 1983), 440-443. 
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FIGURE 2.7 
DEVELOPMENT OF US/NON-US CITIZEN AND US/NON-US FLAG 
CARRIER TRAFFIC AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL US-CENTRAL 
TRAFFIC FOR THE YEARS 1979, 1982, 1985, AND 1987 
PERCENT 
100 i 
O l — 1 1 1 
79 82 85 87 
YEAR 
US CITIZEN -•— NON-US CITIZEN 
- * - US FLAG CARRIER - e - NON-US FLAG CARRIER 
SOURCE: Calculations based on US International Air Travel 
Statistics. 1979-1987. 
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Third, traffic to this subregion consists of US military 
personnel traveling on charter flights. It is surprising 
to note that the high share of US citizens does not translate 
into a correspondingly high share for the US flag carriers. 
Actually, while non-US flag carriers already dominated the 
market in 1979 with 56 percent share, their share increased 
to 79 percent in 1987. This trend suggests two things. First, 
US business travelers largely prefer Asian airlines for 
their trip to the Central subregion. This might be under-
standable when one takes into account that this region has 
high-quality service carriers such as Singapore Airlines, 
Thai International, and Malaysian. In particular Singapore 
Airlines, which started flying to the USA in 1979, made out-
standing gains and captured 9 percent of the US citizen 
share to the North/Central Pacific region (26). It should 
be emphasized that Singapore Airlines would not have been 
able to build up its market share on transpacific routes if 
it had not enjoyed the maximum marketing and operational 
freedom which was guaranteed under the very liberal 
bilateral agreement signed between the USA and Singapore in 
1979. Garuda of Indonesia most likely had minimal impact on 
the market since it did not start serving the USA until 
1986. Philippine Airlines (PAL) as opposed to other 
carriers from the Central subregion did not acquire the 
reputation of a high quality airline. 
(26)"The Magical Allure of the Orient", 12. 
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Low staff morale, an obsolescent fleet, low on-time records, 
and poor reputation among worldwide customers (PAL at one 
time was synonymous with "Plane Always Late") were main 
reasons for the poor reputation which certainly helped 
carriers like Singapore Airlines to build up their market 
share (27). 
Singapore Airlines, Thai International, and Malaysian 
are also known for their involvement in promoting tourism 
to the area. Nevertheless, one can assume that US tourism 
to the Central subregion is negligible primarily due to 
high cost and long distances. Other factors which 
contributed to the high share of non-US flag carriers were 
already mentioned in the discussion of the Northeastern 
subregion and certainly include the issues of travel agent 
commissions, CRSs, and flag carrier loyalty. 
(27)Dee Mosteller, "Philippine Airlines gains slow, steady 
turnaround,Air Transport World, March 1983, 61. 
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US - Southeastern Passenger Traffic 
Traffic to the Southeastern subregion grew from 445,120 
at an annual average rate of 10.4 percent to 815,301 in 
1987. Largely responsible for this growth is most likely the 
increase of the US citizen share which was the largest of 
all three subregions. It increased by 14 percentage points 
to 55 percent in 1987. Since the trade volume remained 
almost stationary (Figure 2.8) one can assume that the 
surge in passenger volume is not primarily business or 
trade related. 
The region's growing attractiveness among US tourists 
probably played a major role in the passenger increase. 
In particular Australia went through a boom of inbound 
tourism and was declared by the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1986 and 1987 as the 
fastest growing tourist destination in the developed 
world (28). Figure 2.9 exhibits this exceptional 
development. 
US travelers who are supposed to account for 18 percent 
of total arrivals by the year 2000 (29) gained interest 
in Australia for several reasons. 
First, special events like the America's Cup and the 
World Trade Exposition in 1987, coupled with aggressive 
overseas promotion by Qantas and the Australian Tourist 
(28)Tony Harrington, "Global Hubbing", Airline Business. 
June 1989, 13. 
(29)"Capitalizing on boom in tourism, Avmark Aviation 
Economist, September 1988, 14. 
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FIGURE 2.8 
US TRADE WITH COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHEASTERN SUBREGION 
IN 1979 AND 1987 (In Millions of Dollars) 
1979 1987 
IMPORTS TO USA FROM 
Total • $3,372 Total - $3,376 
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SOURCE: Calculations based on Statistical Abstract of 
the USA, 1984 and 1987. 
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FIGURE 2.9 
INTERNATIONAL ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA FROM 1978 TO 1987 
(In Millions) 
NUMBER OF VISITORS 
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YEARS 
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Estimates are from 1988 to 2000 
SOURCE: Heini Nuutinen, "Capitalizing on boom in inbound 
tourism",Avmark Aviation Economist", September 1988, 
14. 
Office (ATC) increased the awareness of US leisure travelers 
for Australia as a tourist destination. However, industry 
officials agree that the movie 'Crocodile Dundee' starring 
Paul Hogan contributed more to the country's tourist image 
than any campaign. It is estimated the movie made around 
1.5 million Americans ask about visiting Australia (30). 
A second reason for the growing interest of US tourists 
in Australia was most likely the weak Australian dollar 
(30)Ibid., 14. 
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making Australia a value-for-money destination. 
Finally, a third reason was that Western Europe in the 
wake of the Chernobyl accident and terrorist acts against 
US property and citizens in 1986 was not attractive to US 
tourists who therefore focused on countries across the 
Pacific (31). 
New Zealand also proved to be a popular tourist 
attraction. Of the 1.2 million passengers the national 
airline Air New Zealand carried in 1987, 800,000 began 
their trip outside New Zealand. Also important is the 
fact that approximately 80 percent of Air New Zealand's 
passengers were leisure travelers (32). The USA generated 
the second largest number of inbound tourists, and although 
the volume was still fairly small (around 67,300 passengers 
in 1984), it grew at an annual rate of 20 percent (33). 
This trend most likely also added to the growing share of 
US citizens to the Southeastern subregion. 
Tahiti and Fiji in the past benefited from the so-called 
"fuel stop tourism". This was the result of the limited 
range of aircraft which had to make a refueling stop on 
their flights between the USA and South Pacific 
destinations. The advent of new long range aircraft meant 
that airlines started overflying traditional stopover 
(31)David Learmount, "Qantas - safety & monopoly", 
Flight International, December 1987, 23. 
(32)James P. Woolsey, Air New Zealand facing new challenges 
at home", Air Transport World, June 1987, 58. 
(33)Ibid., 60. 
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points which in turn resulted in a decline of inbound 
tourism. Tahiti and Fiji were therefore required to promote 
themselves as source markets instead of fuel stops. 
Figure 2.10 shows that the number of people traveling to 
Fiji and Tahiti continuously increased from 1979 to 1987. 
It can be assumed that these islands' transition to source 
markets was therefore successful. The drop in visitors to 
Fiji from 102,178 in 1985 to 75,231 in 1987 is probably 
attributable to two military coups in 1986. 
FIGURE 2.10 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF U S - F I J I / T A H I T I TRAFFIC 
FROM 1979 TO 1987 
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The share distribution of flag carriers was almost 
stationary and changed only by one percent. As Figure 2.11 
shows, US flag carriers decreased their share from 37 
percent in 1979 to 36 percent in 1987 although it was 
as low as 30 percent in both 1982 and 1985. Non-US flag 
carriers on the other hand had a continuously high share 
with 63 percent and 64 percent in 1979 and 1987, 
respectively. Considering the fact that the passenger 
volume almost doubled within 8 years, it can be assumed 
that the growth which as noted earlier primarily stems 
from the increase of the US citizen share was mainly 
carried by non US flag carriers such as Qantas, Air New 
Zealand, the French Airline Union de Transports Aeriens 
(UTA), and finally Canadian Pacific of Canada which has 
fifth freedom rights between Honolulu and various points 
in the South Pacific. Table 2.7 indicates that all non-US 
flag carriers had a share of the US citizen traffic of 
around 50 percent with the exception of Canadian Pacific 
whose total traffic in and out of Honolulu consisted of 
almost 75 percent US citizens. This development is even 
more surprising when one takes into account the addition 
of supposedly aggressive Continental Airlines to the South-
eastern market in 1979. 
FIGURE 2.11 
DEVELOPMENT OF US/NON-US CITIZEN AND US/NON-US FLAG 
CARRIER TRAFFIC AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL US-SOUTHEASTERN 
TRAFFIC FOR THE YEARS 1979, 1982, 1985, AND 1987 
PERCENT 
YEAR 
US CITIZEN 
US FLAG CARRIER 
NON-US CITIZEN 
NON-US FLAG CARRIER 
SOURCE: Calculations based on "US international Travel 
Statistics. 1977-1987. 
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TABLE 2 . 7 
US-SOUTHEASTERN PASSENGER TRAFFIC BY CITIZENSHIP 
AND FLAG CARRIER IN 1 9 8 5 
(000sJ 
US ci t izens Non-US ci t izens Total passengers US ci t izens 
Non-US flags Number Share Number Share Number Share as % of total 
Australia 208 33.8% 178 29.9% 386 31.8% 53.9%/ 
Nau Zealand 146 23.7% 162 27.2% 308 25.5% 47.4% 
France 52 8.5% 50 8.4% 102 8.4% 51% 
Canada 30 4.9% 11 1.9% 41 3.4% 73.2% 
Sub-Total 
US flag 
436 
179 
70.9% 
29.1% 
401 
194 
67.4% 
32.6% 
837 
373 
69.2% 
30.8% 
52% 
73.2% 
Total 615 100% 595 100% 1210 100% 50.8% 
SOURCE: "The Magical A l l u r e o f t h e Or ient" , 14 . 
The dominance of non US flag carriers in the US-
Southeastern market suggests three things. First, non-US 
flag airlines offered to the price sensitive leisure 
travelers lower fares or a wider variety of special fares 
than their American counterparts. Qantas, for example, 
matched heavily discounted fares by US competitors and had 
US west coast - Australia fares for as low as $896 in 1987 
(34). Earlier introduced promotional fares such as the so-
called "Nipper Tripper" and "Qantas Circle Four" fares 
proved to be attractive to US travelers (35). Similarly 
(34)Qantas.Qantas Annual Report 1987-1988, 8. 
(35)Qantas.Qantas Annual Report 1983-1984. 8. 
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successful was an introductory fare of $499 from the USA 
to Cairns in North Queensland to stimulate tourism to the 
northern territories. Around 6,600 passengers traveled on 
this fare (36). 
Air New Zealand's increased promotion of New Zealand in 
the USA, combined with a simplification and rationalization 
of fares between the USA and the South Pacific certainly 
added to the growing number of US citizens traveling on Air 
New Zealand (37). 
A second reason for the dominance of non-US flag 
carriers could be the very fact that they are government 
owned airlines. Generally speaking, they are not only 
viewed as instruments of transportation, but also as 
instruments of economic policy, domestic and foreign 
political policy, and national defense (38). 
These carriers, therefore, most often enjoy some kind of 
government protection against market forces, notably 
against privately owned, profit oriented carriers. 
Australia demonstrated this kind of protection in fare 
related issues. In 1982, Pan Am and Continental offered 
credits to passengers who fly on their transpacific 
services to the USA. These credits once accumulated to a 
certain number of miles entitled the passenger to discount 
(36)Qantas, Qantas Annual Report 1984-1985, 9. 
(37)Air New Zealand, Air New Zealand Annual Report 1984. 
7. 
(38)Betsy Gidwitz.The Politics in International Air 
Transport (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & 
Company,1980), 36. 
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benefits such as free tickets for travel in the USA and 
Mexico, free accommodation and car rental. The Australian 
Department of Aviation (DOA) became concerned with these 
travel packages because Qantas could not compete with them 
for a variety of reasons. The main one was the lack of 
access to interior points in the USA, therefore excluding 
Qantas from offering inexpensive air travel within the USA. 
After a close examination, the Australian DOA advised the 
US airlines to withdraw their travel schemes (39). 
This point puts Qantas' aforementioned ability to 
attract passengers mainly through innovative low-priced 
air fares certainly into perspective. Nevertheless, it 
should be kept in mind that Qantas and Air New Zealand 
are the national airlines of geographically isolated 
countries with small populations of approximately 16 
million and 3.3 million people, respectively. Both 
airlines substantially contribute to their countries' 
economies which increasingly rely on tourism. In the 
case of Australia which attempts to shift away from 
primary industries and mineral exports to become more 
dependent on service industries, tourism yields some 
12 billion dollars a year, employs around 375,000 people, 
and contributes between 5 and 6 percent to the gross 
domestic product (40). 
(39)Praveen Singh, "Some aspects of Australia's air service 
agreements (Part three)".Air Law. Vol.10, No. 2, 1985, 
72-74. 
(40)Ibid., 79. 
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Similarly important are the national airlines' 
involvements in community affairs which is also responsible 
for their exceptionally high public profile. Qantas' 
wide support ranges from allocating money to programs 
that will help Australians to learn Asian language skills, 
funds for research in cancer treatment, diabetes, and drug 
rehabilitation (41). 
Air New Zealand also is the sponsor of numerous sports 
and cultural activities but particularly prides itself on 
the so-called Christmas joy flights which take disabled 
children on rides in a B747 (42). This high degree of 
community involvement might also be responsible for 
some flag carrier loyalty among non-US citizens. 
(41)Qantas.Qantas Annual Report 1987-1988. 14-15. 
(42)Air New Zealand.Air New Zealand Annual Report 1988. 
16. 
60 
US Gateway Airports 
Table 2.8 displays the origin and destination 
points of study analyzed in order to determine: 
1. the number of transpacific carriers offering service 
from the gateways; 
2. the number of Asia/Pacific destinations served by each 
gateway; 
3. the supply of air service measured in terms of passenger 
seats available; 
4. the demand for air service measured in terms of revenue 
passengers carried between gateways and destination 
points. 
Table 2.8 differs from Table 2.1 because it includes all 
destination points which are listed in ICAO's "Traffic by 
Flight Stage" and connected to US gateways through a 
non-stop service. Table 2.1 on the other hand includes 
countries which are listed in the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) "US International Air Travel 
Statistics" and receive direct service. 
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TABLE 2.8 
US GATEWAY AND ASIA/PACIFIC DESTINATION POINTS OF STUDY 
US Gateways Asia /Pacific Destination Points 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
Minneapolis 
New York 
Portland 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
Central Region 
Manila 
Northeastern Region 
Fukuoka, Japan 
Hong Kong 
Kaoshiung, Taiwan 
Osaka, Japan 
Seoul, S.Korea 
Taipei, Taiwan 
Tokyo, Japan 
Nagoya, Japan 
Okinawa, Japan 
Shanghai, PR China 
Southeastern Region 
Auckland, New Zealand 
Brisbane, Australia 
Cairns, Australia 
Guam 
Christchurch, New Zealand 
llajuro, Marshall Is. 
Melbourne, Australia 
Nandi, Fiji 
Noumea, New Caledonia 
Papeete, Tahiti 
Port Moresby, 
Papua New Guinea 
Rarotonga, Cook Is. 
Sydney, Australia 
Townsville, Australia 
SOURCE: ICAP.Traf f i c bv F l i g h t S t a g e (Montreal:ICAO, 
J u l y , 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 7 ) . 
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The Number of International Scheduled Passenger Airlines 
Table 2.9 shows that the number of international 
scheduled carriers flying between the USA and the Asia/ 
Pacific region has doubled over the ten year period 1977' 
to 1987- While 11 airlines offered scheduled passenger 
services in 1977, this number increased to 22 by 1987. 
This development suggests several things. First, the 
air passenger transpacific market is a high growth market 
due to the increasing number of people traveling between 
the USA and the Asia/Pacific region. The increase in turn 
is caused by previously discussed factors such as fast 
growing economies in the Pacific rim, a rising popularity 
of Asia/Pacific countries as tourist destinations, 
the relaxation of overseas travel restrictions, and 
political stability. 
Second, according to economic theory/ suppliers of 
products and services are only attracted to competitive 
markets where they can realize a profit in the long run. 
The growing number of airlines seems to indicate that the 
transpacific passenger market is profitable or perceived to 
be profitable. However, this statement has to be put into 
perspective since several of the non-US transpacific 
carriers are partially or fully owned by their respective 
governments which support their national flag carriers to 
varying degrees. Therefore, profitability for these 
TABLE 2.9 
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NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED AIRLINES ON 
SELECTED TRANSPACIFIC ROUTES FROM 1977 TO 1987 
US GatewayXYear 
=====================: 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
Minneapolis 
New York 
Portland 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
77 
========= 
2 
1 
10 
5 
0 
1 
0 
5 
1 
78 
:========== 
1 
1 
9 
4 
0 
1 
0 
3 
1 
79 
======== 
5 
1 
13 
5 
0 
1 
0 
3 
3 
80 
========= 
4 
1 
12 
7 
0 
1 
0 
3 
3 
81 
========== 
4 
1 
12 
10 
0 
1 
0 
4 
4 
82 
========== 
4 
1 
13 
10 
0 
2 
0 
4 
4 
83 
:========: 
4 
1 
14 
10 
1 
3 
1 
6 
6 
84 
========: 
14 
10 
85 
========= 
6 
1 
14 
11 
1 
3 
2 
5 
7 
86 
=========== 
5« 
2 
14* 
13* 
1 
3* 
1 
5* 
5* 
87 
:= = = ==: 
46 
3 
14 
14 
1 
3 
2 
5 
5 
Total ** 11 11 14 14 16 16 18 19 18 20 22 
* The researcher considered United Airlines and Pan Am 
as one carrier since the former replaced the latter 
on all international transpacific routes in 1986. 
Correspondingly, the number of different carriers as 
listed in ICAO's publication was reduced by one carrier, 
** The total is not the column total but the total number 
of different carriers offering scheduled passenger 
service across the Pacific. 
SOURCE: ICAO,Traffic bv Flight Stage (Montreal:ICAO, 
1977-1987). 
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airlines not necessarily a main corporate objective. 
Up to what extent the market can absorb airlines operating 
at a profitable level remains to be seen. Critics are 
concerned about the recent capacity increases which are 
likely to outstrip demand creating pressure on yield. Peter 
Sutch, Chief Executive Officer of Cathay Pacific of Hong 
Kong, refers to the Pacific as the future "graveyard against 
which the North Atlantic will look like a picnic" (43). 
Honolulu was served by the largest number of airlines 
putting it way ahead of other US airports and affirming its 
importance as the major gateway to countries in the Asia/ 
Pacific region. Since Honolulu does not have a large 
population base (an estimated 1,054,000 people lived in 
Hawaii in 1985)(44) and is not a center of major industrial 
or commercial activities, there must be other reasons for 
Honolulu's dominance as a US gateway. 
One reason for Honolulu's dominance is the fact that 
most transpacific airlines use it as a technical stop. 
Responsible for this is the trade-off between payload 
and range. The range an airplane can fly is a function of 
among other factors, payload. Airplanes like the B707 and 
the DC-8 and early versions of aircraft such as the B747, 
DC 10, and L1011-500 which originate their flights in the 
(43)Norm Lynn, "US carriers too aggressive in Pacific 
Rim?".Airline Executive, August 1987, 22. 
(44)Cities of the USA (the West)"(Detroit, Michigan: 
Gale Research Inc., 1988), 157. 
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continental USA with full payload of passengers and/or 
cargo cannot fly nonstop across the Pacific due to the 
fact that they do not have full fuel tanks. One exception 
is the B747 Special Performance (SP) which first flew in 
1974. This airplane was designed for extremely long haul 
routes and could fly up to 7,658 miles with 276 passengers. 
If an airplane tried to take off with full fuel tanks and 
its maximum payload, the airplane would be structurally 
damaged because the sum of the two weights would exceed the 
maximum structural take-off weight. To fly between points 
in the continental USA and Asia/Pacific regions nonstop, 
an airplane would have to add fuel which in turn is only 
possible by sacrificing payload. Since sacrificing payload 
means losing revenues, airlines most often opt for making a 
fuel stop - in this case in Honolulu. 
A second reason for Honolulu's dominance in terms of 
number of carriers might be its popularity as a tourist 
destination among Asian leisure travelers, particularly 
Japanese. This travel market certainly attracted 
additional airlines; among them fifth freedom airlines. 
Although the researcher did not analyze individual 
bilateral agreements, there are Asian airlines 
which are allowed to carry traffic between Honolulu 
and points in the Asia/Pacific region other than their 
country of registry. Examples are Singapore Airlines 
flying between the Honolulu and Hong Kong, and Korean 
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Airlines flying between Honolulu and Tokyo. 
However, while Honolulu's status as the principal 
gateway was undisputed in 1977 when 10 airlines 
offered service to the Asia/Pacific region, it is 
obvious that other airports have been served by an 
increasing number of airlines thus underlining their 
growing importance as gateway airports. In particular 
Los Angeles, although only served by five airlines in 
1977, gained rapidly over the years and showed 14 
airlines in 1987 which was the same number of airlines 
serving Honolulu. 
While Anchorage and Seattle increased their number of 
airlines on a much smaller scale, Chicago and New York 
displayed no change until 1985 and 1982, respectively. 
Minneapolis and Portland did not start until 1983 to 
serve as gateway airports - and then only with one carrier 
each. San Francisco is the only airport whose number of 
airlines in 1977, when compared with that in 1987, 
remained unchanged. 
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Number of Asia/Pacific Region Destinations Served from 
US Gateways 
Table 2.10 reveals a growth trend in the number of Asia/ 
Pacific destinations served from US gateways. Although the 
number of destinations served decreased at most airports in 
1979 and 1980 - probably as a partial result of the 1979 
oil crisis and the following worldwide recession - the 
total ten year period shows an increase from 10 
destinations in 1977 to 16 destinations in 1987. 
When Table 2.10 is compared with Table 2.9 which 
displays the number of international airlines serving US 
gateways, it is interesting to note that by 1987 the number 
of carriers outgrew the number of destinations served. 
Although IATCA specifically states the opening of new US 
gateways as a major goal to establish a higher degree of 
competition, the above-described trend suggests that the 
USA's attempt to liberalize international airline services 
through the enactment of IATCA in 1979 had more success in 
increasing multiple carrier designations than increasing the 
number of gateways. Correspondingly, transpacific airline 
service actually became more competitive through multiple 
carrier designation as evidenced in the case of Los Angeles 
International Airport (Table 2.11). 
One reason why IATCA was not successful in increasing 
competition among airlines by opening a large number of 
new gateways could be the lack of US cities with 
characteristics which would make them gateways for direct 
TABLE 2.10 
NUMBER OF ASIA/PACIFIC DESTINATIONS SERVED BY 
INDIVIDUAL US GATEWAY AIRPORTS FROM 1977 TO 1987* 
US GateuiavNYear 
===================: 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
Minneapolis 
New York 
Portland 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
77 
1 
1 
9 
5 
0 
1 
0 
4 
1 
78 
========== 
1 
1 
12 
5 
0 
1 
0 
5 
1 
79 
======== 
3 
1 
13 
6 
0 
1 
0 
2 
2 
80 
======== 
2 
1 
11 
6 
0 
1 
0 
3 
2 
81 
======= 
2 
1 
13 
5 
0 
1 
0 
4 
2 
82 
========== 
2 
1 
13 
8 
0 
1 
0 
6 
2 
83 
========== 
2 
2 
14 
8 
1 
1 
1 
6 
2 
84 
:========: 
3 
2 
14 
7 
1 
2 
1 
5 
3 
85 
:========= 
4 
2 
16 
9 
1 
1 
1 
5 
3 
86 87 
=============== 
3 4 
2 2 
16 14 
8 7 
1 1 
1 1 
1 2 
7 7 
4 5 
Total »« 10 15 16 14 15 16 17 18 19 
* Destinations to which US gateways have a nonstop 
service between 1977 and 1987 are listed in the 
Appendix. 
** Total is not column total but the total number of 
different destinations served. 
16 16 
SOURCE: ICAP.Traffic by Flight Stage (Montreal:ICAO, 
July, 1977-1987). 
TABLE 2.11 
A 1977 VERSUS 1987 COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF AIRLINES 
AND DESTINATIONS SERVED IN THE CASE OF LOS ANGELES 
1977 1987 
Number of 
Destinations 
=============== 
Auckland 
Papeete 
Seoul 
Taipei 
Tokyo 
Number of 
Airlines 
==================== 
Pan Am 
Air Neui 
Zealand 
Pan Am 
UTA 
Korean Air 
China Airlines 
Pan Am 
Number of 
Destinations 
================= 
Auckland 
Nandi 
Papeete 
Sydney 
Taipei 
Tokyo 
Number of 
Airlines 
================== 
Air Neui 
Zealand 
United 
United 
Continental 
UTA 
Air France 
Qantas 
Qantas 
United 
China Airlines 
All Nippon 
United 
Japan Airlines 
Singapore 
Northujest 
ha1ayslan 
Vang 
14 
SOURCE: Traffic by Flight Stage. 1977 and 1987, 
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air services to destinations in the Asia/Pacific region. 
These characteristics include a business community 
maintaining commercial and political relationships with 
people in Asia/Pacific countries, an ethnic community 
generating visiting friends and relatives traffic, and 
finally tourist attractions which are of primary interest 
to the leisure traveler. It is obvious that not too many 
US cities combine the aforementioned characteristics with 
a large enough population base to justify a nonstop airline 
service between them and points in the Asia/Pacific region. 
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Supply of and Demand for Air Service on the Transpacific 
Routes between US Gateways and Asia/Pacific Destinations 
Table 2.12 confirms Honolulu's status as the principal 
gateway to the Asia/Pacific region. It also comes to the fore 
when one analyzes the supply of capacity measured in seats 
offered by airlines out of Honolulu. In 1977, transpacific 
airlines offered a total of 1,343,718 seats out of Honolulu 
which was equivalent to 53 percent of the transpacific 
total. However, a ten-year review reveals that Honolulu's 
dominance declined. In 1987, as shown in Table 2.13, its 
share of the total seats available decreased to less than 
30 percent in 1987. Honolulu's demand developed similarly. 
Its share of the total passengers carried declined from 56 
percent in 1977 to 35 percent in 1987. A major contributor 
to this declining trend could be the development of long-
range aircraft which increasingly made technical stopovers 
of flights originating on the US mainland unnecessary. 
Anchorage was the only other gateway airport whose share 
of seats supplied was less in 1987 than that in 1977. Its 
share of the total capacity supplied was 13 percent the 
highest after Honolulu has continuously decreased and was 
only 6 percent in 1987. Its passenger growth was moderate 
and increased by an annual average of 2.4 percent to 
236,641 passengers. The reason for this trend seems to be 
the same as already cited for Honolulu, namely the 
introduction of new, long-range aircraft. 
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TABLE 2.12 
CHANGE IN PASSENGER SEATS AVAILABLE FROM US GATEWAYS 
TO ASIA/PACIFIC DESTINATIONS FROM 1977 TO 1987* 
Gateway** 1977 1987 Average Annual 
Percent Change 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
New York 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
Total 
1 
2 
335,964 
43,950 
,343,718 
266,658 
95,736 
324,450 
127,980 
,538,456 
313,912 
198,482 
2,433,718 
1,213,012 
362,848 
724,448 
577,774 
5,824,194 
- 0.7 
+ 35.2 
+ 8.1 
+ 35.5 
+ 27.9 
+ 12.3 
+ 35.2 
+ 12.9 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
* The number of passenger seats available from 
1978 through 1986 are in the Appendix. 
** Minneapolis and Portland are not listed in 
Table 2.12 since they did not have airlines 
operating nonstop to the Asia/Pacific region 
in 1977. Minneapolis and Portland became 
gateways in 1982 and 1983 and airlines offered 
a total of 1,038 and 15,048 passenger seats, 
respectively. Minneapolis' passenger seats 
available declined to 732 in 1987 and fell by an 
average percentage rate of 8 %. Portland's passenger 
seats available increased to 63,966 in 1987 and 
had an average percentage growth of 136 %. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1977-1987. 
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TABLE 2.13 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDIVIDUAL GATEWAYS OF TOTAL 
TRANSPACIFIC SEATS AVAILABLE FROM 1977 TO 1987 
Gateway 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
Minneapolis 
New York 
Portland 
Seattle 
Total** 
1977 
13.2 % 
1.7 % 
53.0 % 
10.5 % 
0 % 
3.8 % 
0 % 
5.0 % 
100 % 
1987 
6.6 
4.2 
26.6 
25.8 
0 % 
7.7 
1.4 
12.3 
% 
% 
% 
% 
* 
% 
% 
% 
100 % 
Percent Change 
- 6.6 
+ 2.5 
- 26.4 
+ 10.3 
0 % 
+ 3.9 
+ 1.4 
+ 7.3 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
* Minneapolis' share is not listed because it 
is less than one tenth of 1 percent. 
** Total does not equal 100 % due to rounding. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage. 
1977-1987. 
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Additionally, Anchorage probably was also affected by the 
opening of new and more attractive gateways such as Portland. 
The third most important gateway in 1977 was San Francisco 
which had a 12 percent share of both the total supply and 
demand. San Francisco's supply of capacity more than 
doubled within the ten years - from 324,450 passenger seats 
in 1977 to 724,448 passenger seats in 1987 - but its share of 
the total supply remained relatively constant. From 1986 to 
1987, its total share increased by 4 percent to 16 percent 
which could be a reflection of United Airlines' beginning of 
transpacific flights from its San Francisco hub in the wake 
of the Pan Am Pacific network sale to United Airlines in 
late 1985. 
Los Angeles, the fourth largest gateway in 1977 which 
accounted for 9 percent and 10 percent of the total 
supply and demand, respectively, turned out to be one of 
the largest gainers. While its supply increased from 
266,658 seats in 1977 to 1,213,012 seats in 1987 - an 
average annual growth of 35 percent - its demand grew by 
an annual average of 51 percent from 135,814 passengers to 
828,443 passengers. It seems that part of this growth stems 
from carriers which - with their new long-range equipment -
bypassed Honolulu and started directly serving the US 
mainland. This was an important development for business 
travelers who have always been concerned with the shortest 
possible flight time. Also, besides Honolulu, Los Angeles 
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TABLE 2.14 
CHANGE IN REVENUE PASSENGERS CARRIED FROM US GATEWAYS 
TO ASIA/PACIFIC DESTINATIONS FROM 1977 TO 1987* 
Gateway** 1977 1987 Average Annual 
Percent Change 
Anchorage 190,632 236,641 + 2.4 % 
Chicago 24,246 126,315 + 42.1 % 
Honolulu 784,074 1,215,464 + 5.5 % 
Los Angeles 135,814 828,443 + 51.0 % 
New York 44,172 250,020 + 46.6 % 
San Francisco 171,540 469,982 + 17.4 % 
Seattle 54,654 341,636 + 52.5 % 
Total 1,405,132 3,468,501 + 14.7 % 
* The number of revenue passengers carried from 
1978 through 1986 are in the Appendix. 
** Minneapolis and Portland are not listed in 
Table 2.14 since they did not have airlines 
operating nonstop to the Asia/Pacific region 
in 1977. Minneapolis and Portland became 
gateways in 1982 and 1983, and airlines carried 
a total of 433 and of 3,531 passengers to the 
Asia/Pacific region, respectively. Minneapolis' 
number of passengers carried declined to 303 
in 1987 and fell by an average percentage rate 
of 6 %. Portland's number of passengers carried 
grew to 22,724 in 1987 and had an average growth 
rate of 135 %. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1977-1987. 
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TABLE 2.15 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDIVIDUAL GATEWAYS OF TOTAL 
TRANSPACIFIC PASSENGERS CARRIED FROM 1977 TO 1987 
Gateway 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
Minneapolis 
New York 
Portland 
Seattle 
Total** 
1977 
13.7 % 
1.7 % 
55.8 % 
9.7 % 
0 % 
3.1 % 
0 % 
3.9 % 
100 % 
1987 
6.8 
3.6 
34.8 
23.7 
0 % 
7.1 
0.6 
9.8 
% 
% 
% 
% 
* 
% 
% 
% 
100 % 
Percent Change 
- 7.0 
+ 1.9 
- 21.0 
+ 14.0 
0 % 
+ 4.0 
+ 0.6 
+ 5.9 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
* Minneapolis' share is not listed because 
it is less than one tenth of 1 percent. 
** Total does not equal 100 % due to rounding. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1977-1987. 
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was the only airport offering services to the Southeastern 
subregion with its growing tourist attractiveness. Further-
more, the city's large number of Asian communities provided 
demand for visiting friends and relatives and business 
traffic which is also reflected in the high share of 
non-US citizens flying out of Los Angeles. 
Seattle had a growth pattern similar to that experienced 
by Los Angeles. Its supply of available seats had an annual 
average growth of 32 percent and increased from 127,980 to 
577,774 over ten years. Simultaneously, its revenue 
passenger volume increased 45 percent. However, due to 
Seattle's smaller total passenger volume, it accounted 
only for 12 percent of the total supply and 9 percent of 
the total demand in 1987. Seattle's growth goes back 
mainly to its geographic location. By being the northern-
most point on the US west coast, Seattle via the great 
circle route offers the shortest flight time between the 
USA and the Northeastern and Central subregion. The 
distance from Seattle to Tokyo is 4,781 miles while that 
from San Francisco and Los Angeles is 5,135 miles and 5,433 
miles, respectively (45). 
Part of the growth can be attributed to the fact that 
there is a strong community of interest between Seattle 
and Asian countries. Up to 92 percent of Seattle's 
port foreign waterborne trade by value is with countries 
(45)Port of Seattle.Seattle Harbor 1988. 
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in the Asia/Pacific region. Major export items to these 
countries include softwood lumber, hides, and frozen fish, 
while major import items are wearing apparel, data 
processing equipment, motor vehicle parts, and electrical 
and electronic equipment (46). Finally, partially 
responsible for the airport's growth was the fact that 
Seattle was United Airlines' first departure point to 
Tokyo in 1984. 
New York's growth in the past as a transpacific gateway 
was rather constrained due to the payload-range limitations 
of the aircraft flying this route. In most cases a technical 
stop in Anchorage was necessary. Again, with the 
introduction of new long-range aircraft, more nonstop 
flights to the Northeastern subregion destinations such as 
to Tokyo and later Seoul were possible. At the same time, 
New York's importance as a major population, industrial, 
commercial, and tourist center further spurred growth which 
amounted to 250,020 passengers in 1987 and represented an 
annual average growth of 46.6 percent. In terms of New 
York's percentage share of total demand, it accounted 
for 3 percent in 1977 and grew over the years to 7 
percent in 1987 indicating its limited possibilities 
to ever become a major transpacific gateway. 
To date, Chicago played a secondary role as a major 
gateway airport to destinations in Asia/Pacific. In 1987, 
(46)Ibid. 
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its supply share and demand share was 3 percent and 4 
percent, respectively. Nevertheless, the major surge in 
demand which went up by an annual average rate of 42 
percent from 24,246 passengers in 1977 to 126,315 in 1987 
certainly attracted a growing number of carriers. They 
included at first only Northwest but later also comprised 
Japan Airlines and United Airlines. The addition of United 
Airlines in particular played some role in the airport's 
growing passenger volume since United already having an 
established hub obviously started feeding its own trans-
pacific flights out of Chicago rather than diverting 
passengers to other hubs (and therefore other airlines). 
Finally, both Minneapolis and Portland are the 
latest addition to the number of gateway airports. 
Minneapolis which started receiving nonstop transpacific 
service in 1982 experienced very limited success and 
most likely became only a gateway because of Northwest 
Airline's hub in that city. Served by only one carrier 
- Northwest - the airport's small growth rates indicate that 
it had difficulty in attracting feed traffic from cities 
like New York and Chicago once they had established 
their nonstop long range flights to Asia/Pacific. 
At the same time, it can be assumed that the degree of 
community of interest between the city of Minneapolis and 
countries in the Asia/Pacific region is rather low 
due to Minneapolis' focus on manufacturing industries 
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and dairy/food companies which do not spur strong trade 
links. Finally, Minneapolis' relatively small population 
base of an estimated 2,262,000 in 1986 (47) does not 
generate substantial traffic either. 
Portland exhibited strong growth of 135 percent in 
revenue passengers carried and nuitiber of seats available. 
As Seattle, Portland has an important port (the third 
largest on the US west coast) and is heavily involved in 
trade with countries in the Asia/Pacific region. Despite 
Portland's strong growth, its role as a transpacific gate-
way was insignificant. As shown in Table 2.13 and 2.15, 
Portland accounted for around 1 percent of total trans-
pacific passenger seats available and for less than 1 
percent of the total transpacific passengers carried 
between the USA and destinations in the Asia/Pacific 
region. 
(47)Cities of the USA fThe Midwest), 223. 
CHAPTER III 
TRENDS IN MARKET SHARES AND LEVELS OF SERVICE 
OF CARRIERS IN TRANSPACIFIC MARKETS SERVED BY 
PAN AM AND UNITED AIRLINES 
Data Sources 
The data source for determining the market shares of 
individual airlines on selected transpacific routes is the 
ICAO publication "Traffic by Flight Stage" which was 
discussed on page 20 in Chapter II. The worldwide edition 
of the Official Airline Guide (OAG) is used as a data source 
for determining an airline's aircraft equipment, frequency, 
and number of stops in a given city pair market. The 
the OAG has some inherent limitations as a data source 
since there is often a considerable discrepancy between 
the flights listed and those actually flown. 
Method 
The markets for which market shares and quality of air 
service of airlines are analyzed include the following city 
pair markets: 
- Chicago-Tokyo - Honolulu-Hong Kong 
- Honolulu-Tokyo - San Francisco-Hong Kong 
- New York-Tokyo - Honolulu-Sydney 
- Los Angeles-Tokyo - Los Angeles-Sydney 
- San Francisco-Tokyo 
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There are several reasons for choosing these city pairs. 
First, except for Chicago - Tokyo, all these markets were 
served by Pan Am between 1977 and 1985 and by United 
Airlines in 1986 and 1987. It is therefore possible to 
analyze how the replacement of Pan Am by United Airlines 
affected market shares and the quality of air service. 
The researcher decided to include Chicago - Tokyo in 
this analysis in order to have an indication of United 
Airlines' performance in a transpacific market which it did 
not take over from Pan Am but started operating on its own. 
Second, the researcher believes that the analysis of a 
few key markets provides sufficient "insight" into Pan Am's 
and United Airlines' overall performance in transpacific 
markets. Japan is an important market because it is a major 
industrial nation with substantial economic ties to the USA. 
With around 4 million passengers traveling between the USA 
and Japan in 1984, Japan is clearly the largest traffic 
point in the Pacific and the USA's fourth largest foreign 
destination behind Canada, Mexico, and Great Britain (1). 
Hong Kong with its fast growing economy could be considered 
representative for the newly industrialized countries (NIC) 
in the Asia/Pacific region which also include Taiwan and 
South Korea. The growth in trade volume between these 
countries and the USA by far outstripped that between the 
(l)The Pacific Division Transfer Case(CAB Docket no. 
43065, Order 85-11-67), 14,670, quoted in Aviation Law 
Reporter.CAB, DOT, NTSB Cases From 1979 to 1989 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House Inc., 1989). 
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USA and Japan (2). 
Finally, Australia was chosen as a key market due to 
the fact that it is the largest trading partner of the USA 
located in the South Pacific. At the same time, Australia 
developed into a major tourist destination for US leisure 
travelers (3). 
Market shares are found by dividing each transpacific 
airline's revenue passenger volume carried by the total 
revenue passenger volume on selected routes between the 
USA and the Northeastern, Southeastern, and Central sub-
region. 
Level of service is evaluated by using a quality 
service index (QSI). As shown below, the QSI consists 
of the three parameters: aircraft equipment, flight 
frequency, and number of enroute stops. 
The weighting of each parameter is based on the type of 
aircraft equipment, the number of one-way flights per week, 
and the number of enroute stops. 
Observations are taken from the OAG July issue from 1977 
to 1987 to give an indication of the QSI on certain trans-
pacific routes originally served by Pan Am and later on by 
United Airlines. 
Out of the total flights listed for each city pair 
market, the researcher considered only those with a direct 
single plane service. Flights which involved different 
(2)See pages 49-52 in Chapter II. 
(3)Reasons for this trend are listed on page 43 in Chapter 
II. 
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aircraft types were excluded because the QSI does not allow 
the simultaneous measurement of different aircraft types 
used in a given market. This situation occurred only in 
very few cases. 
The researcher chose the QSI as a measurement of 
level of service for several reasons. First, the QSI was 
developed by the US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Until 
its dissolution in 1984 as part of the Airline Deregulation 
Act, the CAB was an important federal agency responsible 
for the economic regulation of aviation. It regulated both 
domestic and international aviation matters involving the 
USA and also undertook extensive research which contributed 
to knowledge in various fields of aviation. The QSI was 
developed by the CAB in the 1960s and applied in many 
studies including a 1969/70 study titled "EFFECT ON TOTAL 
MARKET TRAFFIC OF CHANGE IN QUALITY OF SERVICE IN 292 ONE 
AND TWO-CARRIER MARKETS." The weights used in the QSI are 
given in Table 3.1. 
Second, since the QSI wasused to measure the quality of 
air service in 292 markets, one can assume that it is 
applicable to a large number of markets with different 
characteristics. 
Third, since the primary goal of this chapter is to 
evaluate changes in the service in the transpacific market 
place, the researcher believes that the CAB approach is 
suitable and therefore did not develop a new service index. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Parameter QSI Weight 
Equipment 1.85 for B747 
1.50 for DC-10, L1011 
1.30 for DC-8-61 
1.00 for B707 
Frequency I.OO for each one-way 
flight for each 
day of the week 
scheduled 
Stops 1.00 for nonstop 
0.55 for one-stop 
0.40 for two-stop 
0.03 for three-or-more 
stop 
SOURCE: CAB, Docket 30309.Atlanta-Charleston Competitive 
Nonstop Case(Washington,D.C.: July 8, 1977), 3. 
The QSI, however, has some inherent limitations one 
has to consider when measuring the quality of air 
service of airlines on transpacific routes. First, one 
has to keep in mind that the QSI was developed in the 
1960s and the CAB did not have the staff time or computer 
access to update the QSI weight values (4). Therefore, 
the QSI weights have not been revised since the 1960s. 
The QSI weights assigned to the parameter "equipment" are 
one example. At the time when the QSI was designed, only 
one version of the B747 - the B747-100 - existed. 
Considering the fact that passenger capacity is one element 
in the CAB weighting process of aircraft equipment, the QSI 
does not reflect the different capacities of later versions 
(4)CAB, Docket 30309
 rAtlanta-Charleston Competitive Non-
stop Case (Washington, D.C: July 8, 1977), 3. 
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of the B747 such as the B747 SP, the B747 SC, B747 SUD, or 
the B747-400. To account for these different versions and 
their implications for the quality of air service, it would 
be necessary to introduce a whole class of weights just for 
one aircraft. 
Besides not only ignoring the advent of new aircraft, 
the QSI does not account for the retirement of older 
airplanes such as the DC-8 or the B707 either. It is 
obvious that the elimination of these aircraft would 
certainly change the relative weighting of the different 
aircraft left for evaluation. 
Second, one has to consider that the CAB applied the QSI 
only to one and two-carrier markets. The researcher does 
not know the effect on the measurement of air service if 
the QSI is applied to transpacific markets which in most 
cases are served by more than two carriers. 
Third, the QSI was developed for and applied to domestic 
markets in the USA. Since the economic and technical 
regulatory environment in the USA is different from that in 
international markets, it can be assumed that the QSI is 
not an ideal instrument to measure the quality of air 
service in transpacific markets. 
Finally, the QSI only measures three parameters and 
therefore excludes other important aspects of air service 
such as the quality of inflight service, the price of air 
fares, and safety records. Table 3.2 displays some of the 
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factors which seem to be important to passengers when 
traveling on flights longer than five hours. However, the 
researcher believes that despite these limitations studying 
market changes by using the QSI will be helpful in under-
standing this market. 
Due to the unavailability of a scale by which QSI 
values could be evaluated, the researcher decided to 
to compare the QSI of individual carriers with the 
annual average QSI in the city pair market they served. 
THE MOST IMPORTANT 
Length of Flight 
Convenient schedule 
Frequency of flight 
On-time performance 
Past experience 
Low fares 
Safety record 
Attitude of personnel 
Quality of inflight service 
Aircraft type 
Availability of business class 
Quality of ground service 
National flag carrier 
Quality of food and drinks 
Frequent flyer program 
Others 
================================== 
TABLE 3 
FACTORS 
\ 
67.8 
33.8 
30.7 
27.8 
18 
17.1 
16.8 
15.7 
10.4 
7.8 
6.8 
6.6 
6.5 
3.2 
1 
============== 
.2 
IN CHOOSING 
Under 2 
hours 
1 
= = = = : 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
======= 
2-
AN AIRLINE* 
-5 
hours 
59.9 
13.3 
22 
28.4 
19.1 
18.7 
21.4 
29.5 
14.2 
14.1 
5.8 
4.9 
15.1 
3.8 
0.9 
========== 
Rank 
1 
11 
4 
3 
6 
7 
5 
2 
9 
10 
12 
13 
8 
14 
15 
: = = = = = = = = : 
Over S 
hour 
o, 
44.2 
6.5 
16.1 
29.5 
22 
22.3 
23.6 
38.5 
21.1 
16.2 
4.8 
5.3 
20.5 
4.3 
L.l 
========== 
-
Rank 
1 
11 
10 
3 
6 
5 
4 
I 
1 
9 
13 
12 
8 
14 
IS 
===== 
* These results are based on the findings of a study done 
by the International Airline Passenger Association 
(IAPA) in 1984. Questionnaires were sent to 93,000 
members (mostly high frequency travelers) of which 
some 9,000 responded. 
SOURCE: The most important factors in choosing an airline, 
Avmark Aviation Economist(December 1985), 17. 
88 
This comparison will allow an interpretation of the quality 
air service in terms of "above" or "below" the QSI average. 
The QSI of airlines which served an Asia/Pacific 
destination only for a single year between 1977 and 1987 
was not calculated since the impact of these airlines on 
the QSI in a given city pair market is marginal. However, 
transpacific flights started by airlines in 1987 were 
subject to QSI calculations because these flights might 
have been continued through succeeding years and there-
fore could become part of future research in this field. 
In order to evaluate the performance of United Airlines 
in former Pan Am transpacific markets, the researcher 
compared the market shares and QSI of 1985 - Pan Am's 
last year of international transpacific operations - with 
1987 - United Airlines' first full year of international 
transpacific operations. Particular consideration in this 
analysis is paid to the arguments of US and Asian airlines 
opposing the transfer of the Pan Am Pacific Division to 
United Airlines. They mainly argued that United Airlines 
would gain an unfairly high share of the USA - Asia/Pacific 
passenger market because of its large domestic US network 
and dominant APOLLO computer reservation system (CRS). The 
researcher analyzed the rationale of these arguments and 
compared the theoretical impact of United Airlines' 
domestic network and CRS on its transpacific market shares 
with the actual development. 
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Finally, the researcher discussed the relationship 
between the QSI and market shares. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that market share increases if quality improves. 
The researcher quantitatively showed whether or not this 
positive correlation existed between the QSI and market 
shares of transpacific airlines. 
Pan Am's Transpacific Routes Before the Pacific 
Division Sale in 1985 
A discussion of Pan Am's transpacific service would not 
be complete without mentioning how these services started 
in the first place. By 1985, Pan Am had performed 50 years 
of transpacific airline services. In 1930, Juan Trippe, 
Pan Am's founder and chairman until 1968, unsuccessfully 
attempted to develop a transatlantic route. Because of the 
range limitations of aircraft in service at that time, an 
intermediate stop in a northern country or midatlantic 
island was necessary. This operational problem, however, 
turned into a political one since the governments of several 
European countries refused Pan Am access to these points. 
Discouraged by these obstacles, Juan Trippe shifted his 
focus to the Pacific and Charles Lindbergh who worked as 
a technical advisor for Pan Am, conducted a survey from New 
York to China in 1931. On November 1935, Pan Am inaugurated 
scheduled transpacific mail service from San Francisco to 
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Hong Kong. Since intermediate points such as, Midway Is., 
Wake Is., Guam, and Manila were under US jurisdiction, 
political problems similar to those in the North Atlantic 
did not arise. On October 21, 1936, Pan Am introduced 
scheduled passenger flights on the same route (5). From 
there on, the number of countries served was steadily 
increased and by 1984 included destinations listed in 
Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 
ASIA/PACIFIC DESTINATIONS SERVED BY PAN AM IN 1985 
Northeastern Central Southeastern Western 
Bejing Bangkok Auckland Bombay 
Hong Kong Manila Melbourne Delhi 
Osaka Singapore Sydney Karachi 
Seoul 
Shanghai 
Taipei 
Tokyo 
SOURCE: Pan Am.Pan Am Annual Report 1984. 1. 
(5)R.E.G. Davies, Pan Am - an airline and its aircraft 
(New York: Orion Books, 1988), 125. 
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Market Shares and Quality of Service 
on Selected Transpacific Routes 
Chicago - Tokyo 
This city pair market is characterized by relatively 
stable market shares. From 1977 to 1985, Northwest was 
the only carrier authorized to serve this route on a nonstop 
basis and correspondingly held a market share of 100 percent 
(Figure 3.1). Japan Airlines offered nonstop flights in 
this market in 1986 and captured an initial market share of 
28 percent. However, this gain must be put into perspective 
since Japan Airlines started serving Chicago - Tokyo in 
1983 and therefore most likely already established a market 
presence. Although United Airlines also started flights 
to Tokyo in 1983, its nonstop flights did not begin until 
1987. Its market share was two percent only and was an 
indication of the low market penetration. 
There are several possible explanations for this 
development. By serving the Chicago - Tokyo route some 
years earlier than United Airlines, Northwest and Japan 
Airlines had time to establish market presence and to learn 
about the inherent characteristics of passenger traffic in 
this city pair market. United Airlines' lack of marketing 
expertise in serving international markets in the Asia/ 
Pacific region might have contributed to its low initial 
market share. 
The QSI on this route was the highest for Northwest and 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARES IN THE CHICAGO -
TOKYO MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
120 
PERCENT 
Northwest Japan Airlines United Airlines 
SOURCE: Calculations based on.Traffic b^ Flight 
Stage. 1977-1987. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALITY SERVICE INDEX IN THE 
CHICAGO - TOKYO MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
QSI 
Northwest Japan Airlines - * - United Airlines - e - Average 
SOURCE: Calculations based on OAG. Worldwide Edition. 
(Oak Brook, Illinois: July, 1977-1987). 
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showed minor fluctuations over the 10 year period from 
1977 to 1987. Starting with a QSI of 10.45, Northwest 
increased its quality of air service to an index of 
12.95 and 14.99 in 1978 and 1979, respectively. The 
increase in 1978 stemmed from having 7 nonstop flights 
(versus only 4 in 1977) while the increase in 1979 was the 
result of adding two weekly one-stop flights. In 1982, 
however, Northwest decided to return to a frequency with 
7 nonstop flights a week which in turn resulted in a 
decreased QSI. Except for the years when Northwest was the 
only airline offering nonstop services and therefore had 
a QSI equal to the QSI average, Northwest's service quality 
was significantly above the QSI average from 1982 to 1987. 
The year of 1983 saw the addition of the two formidable 
competitors United Airlines and Japan Airlines. The 
increase in the number of carriers resulted in a decline 
of the average QSI due to the fact that the total QSI was 
divided into three instead of one carrier. 
Japan Airlines' QSI was the lowest of all carriers in 
this market. With a QSI of 3.05 from 1983 through 1985, 
Japan Airlines' QSI was only one third of the QSI average. 
United Airlines did not change its initial QSI of 7.12 
in 1977 and therefore also performed below the QSI 
average. The QSI values of both carriers remained below 
that of Northwest due to a lower frequency and flights 
involving one stop. 
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Honolulu - Tokyo 
The Honolulu - Tokyo market was served on a nonstop 
basis by the two US carriers Northwest and Pan Am and by 
the two Asian carriers Japan Airlines and Korean Air. 
Hawaii is the most attractive overseas vacation 
destination for Japanese leisure travelers and the share of 
non-US citizens in this market is traditionally above 80 
percent. 
Japan Airlines' continuous high market share (54 percent 
and 53 percent in 1977 and 1985, respectively) as shown in 
Table 3.6 is a reflection of the strong flag carrier 
loyalty among Japanese travelers. 
In 1980, the number of passengers traveling to Tokyo 
fell by 39 percent to 392,532 from 642,906 in 1979. A most 
likely explanation for this decline is the oil crisis of 
1979 with a following worldwide recession which in turn 
led to a softening of demand for air transportation. 
Japan Airlines lost market share which fell by 16 
percentage points to 36 percent which suggests - consider-
ing the high flag carrier loyalty among Japanese travelers -
that the decrease in passengers particularly occurred in 
the Japanese travel market. All other carriers stepped up 
their market share to a level which was the highest in 
the entire period analyzed. Pan Am's share grew to 22 
percent while those of Korean Air and Northwest increased 
around 50 percent indicating that the Japanese travel 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARES IN THE HONOLULU -
TOKYO MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
PERCENT 
78 80 81 82 83 
YEAR 
87 
Japan Airlines Northwest Pan Am/United Korean Air 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1977-1987. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALITY SERVICE INDEX IN THE 
HONOLULU - TOKYO MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 
YEAR 
Pan Am/United —•— Northwest - * - Japan Airlines 
-
B
~ Korean Airlines - * - China Airlines - * - Average 
SOURCE: Calculations based on OAG. Worldwide Edition, 
July, 1977-1987. 
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market started recovering. Simultaneously, the market 
share of all other competitors declined to former levels. 
Pan Am's share, for example,decreased to 17 percent. 
The quality of service analysis as shown in Figure 3.4 
displays a picture similar to that of market shares 
suggesting a correlation between QSI and market share. 
When compared with its competitors, Japan Airlines' 
services exhibited the highest QSI which was 38.85 in 1977 
and as high as 48.1 in 1978. Japan Airlines' QSI values 
were significantly above the QSI average in this market. 
Responsible for this fact is the enormously high number 
of flight frequencies (in 1978, Japan Airlines had 26 (!) 
weekly flights between Honolulu and Tokyo). Since all 
flights between Honolulu and Tokyo were nonstop and used 
B747s, changes in the QSI can be clearly attributed to 
changes in flight frequencies. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, both Pan Am (and later United 
Airlines) and Korean Air did not change their flight 
frequencies during the 1977 - 1987 period. While Pan Am 
offered 7 weekly flights, Korean Air maintained a frequency 
of 4 flights. Both carriers' QSI were below the average QSI. 
In 1977, Northwest's QSI 25.9 was the second highest in 
the Honolulu-Tokyo market. Until 1982, this QSI did not 
change. From 1982 to 1986, Northwest decreased its weekly 
flight frequency to 7 and therefore had the same QSI as 
Pan Am. In 1987, Northwest increased its QSI which was 
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16.65 and therefore above the QSI average. The most volatile 
QSI is displayed by China Airlines which continuously 
altered its weekly flight frequencies. 
New York - Tokyo 
This market presents one of the fastest growing trans-
pacific markets. It grew from 44,172 passengers in 1977 to 
211,557 passengers in 1985. There were only three carriers 
offering nonstop services from New York to Tokyo. 
As exhibited in Figure 3.5, from 1977 to 1981, Pan Am 
was the only airline and held a 100 percent market share of 
the nonstop passengers on this route. Pan Am used the B747 
SP which was the only airplane in the 1970s capable of 
flying distances like New York - Tokyo nonstop. Most likely 
due to the restricted payload of that airplane, Northwest 
and Japan Airlines did not use the B747 SP but rather opted 
for aircraft equipment which could carry.a larger payload 
but had to make enroute stops. 
In 1982, Northwest started offering nonstop services and 
captured a market share of 10 percent. While this can be 
considered a modest share, Northwest was able to double 
its share to 20 percent by 1985. 
A similar development was experienced by Japan Airlines. 
Entering the market on a nonstop basis in 1983, it gained an 
immediate share of 26 percent which grew to 38 percent four 
FIGURE 3.5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARES IN THE 
NEW YORK - TOKYO MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
PERCENT 
Pan Am/United Japan Airlines Northwest 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by. Flight Stage. 
1977-1987. 
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years later. 
While Northwest and Japan Airlines improved their market 
share positions, that of Pan Am deteriorated from 100 
percent in 1981 to 55 percent in 1983. The drastic decline 
is an indication that Pan Am's competitive position based 
on factors other than its nonstop capability was rather 
weak and travelers in this market were not particularly 
receptive to Pan Am's service and decided to switch over 
either to Northwest or Japan Airlines as soon as their 
nonstop service became available. 
After taking over the Pacific Division from Pan Am in 
1985, United Airlines was unable to stop the declining 
market share trend. In 1987, United Airlines carried fewer 
passengers than Pan Am in 1985 although the passenger 
volume grew from 211,557 to 250,020 in the same time frame. 
Reasons for this decline which is the largest in all 
markets analyzed, include flight delays and cancellations 
as a result of operational problems and will be discussed 
in more detail in a later section of this chapter. 
The QSI of Pan Am increased substantially over the 1977 -
1985 period. By being the only airline offering nonstop 
services from New York, Pan Am clearly had the highest 
quality of air service as indicated by a QSI of 12.95 in 
in 1977. Since Pan Am continued using B747 equipment, the 
change in its QSI was a direct result of stepping up the 
flight frequencies. In 1985, Pan Am offered 11 weekly 
FIGURE 3.6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALITY OF SERVICE INDEX IN 
THE NEW YORK - TOKYO MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
QSI 
Pan Am/United 
CAAC 
Northwest 
Average 
Japan Airlines 
SOURCE: Calculations based on OAG. Worldwide Edition, 
July 1977-1987 
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flights and had a QSI of 20.35 which was almost 5 units 
higher than the QSI average of 15.41. When United Airlines 
took over the route from Pan Am in 1986, it stepped the 
weekly flight frequency resulting in a QSI of 25.9 which 
was the highest QSI value in this market. 
While Northwest offered a one-stop service on this route 
and had a QSI of 7.12 in 1977, Japan Airlines flew to Tokyo 
with a DC 10 four times a week and a DC 8 three times a week 
and had a QSI of 5.45. The quality of Japan Airlines' air 
service did not improve drastically due to the fact that it 
continued flying the DC 8 until 1980. In 1980, Japan 
Airlines switched completely to DC 10 equipment which 
still had to make an intermediate stop. The QSI slightly 
increased to 5.78 but did not increase until 1983, when 
Japan Airlines used B747 equipment. Since Japan Airlines 
used the B747 only twice a week out of the total of seven 
weekly flights (the five remaining flights were flown with 
a DC 10) the quality of its services was below that of Pan 
Am and Northwest. 
Like in no other market were the QSI differences on the 
New York - Tokyo route mainly the result of the various 
aircraft types used. Responsible was the unavailabilty of 
an airplane able to carry large payloads on distances like 
New York - Tokyo nonstop. Carriers used the DC-8, DC-10, 
B747 SP, and B747-100 until long haul B747 equipment with 
a large enough payload carrying capability became available 
in 1982. 
This city pair market also reveals how small the 
correlation between a carrier's market share and QSI can 
be. Although Pan Am kept on improving its QSI as a result 
of increasing the flight frequencies to Tokyo, the 
development of its passenger market shares shows a 
continuous decline indicating that passengers valued 
service factors other than frequency as more important. 
Northwest's and Japan Airlines' better performance in 
these service factors was likely responsible for their 
market share improvement. 
Los Angeles - Tokyo 
As in the New York - Tokyo market, Pan Am was the 
only carrier offering nonstop services in 1977. According 
to Figure 3.7, it held a 100 percent share of the nonstop 
passenger market in 1977. 
The following year, Japan Airlines entered the market 
on a nonstop basis and captured a market share of 37 
percent. The fact that Japan Airlines had already captured 
market share with its flights making intermediate stops was 
largely responsible for this. Also, the high share of non-
US citizens in this market (traditionally above 50 percent) 
seemed to result in the preference of a flag carrier like 
Japan Airlines. Japan Airlines quickly established market 
105 
dominance and had a share of 58 percent the following year. 
The addition of Singapore Airlines and the Brazilian 
carrier Varig to the Los Angeles - Tokyo market led to a 
decrease of Japan Airlines' share which was 42 percent in 
1980. Singapore Airlines and Varig gained a share of 7 
percent and 5 percent, respectively. While Varig's share 
remained stationary and changed by only 1 percent from 
1978 to 1987, Singapore Airlines increased its market 
share by 10 percent to 17 percent in 1981. Part of this 
gain was certainly its reputation as a high quality carrier. 
Pan Am's share in 1981 was 25 percent down from 4 6 
percent the preceding year. Responsible for this development 
was probably the aforementioned addition of Singapore 
Airlines to the market. 
At the same time, Northwest also entered the market and 
had a market share of 10 percent in 1981. Pan Am did not 
recover from its decline and actually continued losing 
market share to competing airlines. In 1985, Pan Am's was 
19 percent. The replacement of Pan Am by United Airlines 
did not stop the declining market share trend. United 
Airlines claimed 17 and 14 percent in 1986 and 1987, 
respectively. Japan Airlines, however, was not one of the 
airlines which increased their market shares. Its share 
declined further from 48 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 
1987. The clear winner was Northwest which claimed one 
quarter of the market in 1987. Singapore Airlines 
FIGURE 3.7 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARES IN THE 
LOS ANGELES - TOKYO MARKET 
120 
PERCENT 
78 80 81 82 83 
YEAR 
87 
Pan Am/United 
Varig 
Japan Airlines 
Malaysian 
Singapore Airlines 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1977-1987. 
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managed to sustain its share of around 14 percent 
throughout the period. 
As Figure 3.8 shows, the quality of air service of 
Japan Airlines turned out to be the highest between 1981 
and 1985. Japan Airlines started with a QSI of 7.12 in 
1977. The fact that Japan Airlines' seven B747 weekly 
flights made one intermediate stop was responsible for this 
QSI. In 1979, Japan Airlines changed all its seven one-stop 
flights into nonstop flights and therefore received a QSI 
of 12.95. This was the first time when Japan Airlines 
significantly performed above the average QSI. The only 
airline having such a high QSI at that time was Pan Am 
which already had seven nonstop flights in 1977. Japan 
Airlines steadily increased its quality of air service 
by introducing more nonstop flights. In 1986, it had 14 
flights a week between Los Angeles and Tokyo, making it 
the carrier with the highest QSI in the 1977 - 1987 period. 
Pan Am throughout the entire period did not change its 
flight frequencies and therefore had a constant QSI of 
12.95. While Pan Am's, and from 1986 on, United Airlines' 
quality of air service was above the average QSI, the 
difference between Pan Am's QSI and the average QSI 
narrowed over the years. Reason for this development was 
the fact that the average QSI improved due to a general 
increase in flight frequencies and the introduction of more 
nonstop flights. 
Northwest started out with seven weekly B747 flights 
FIGURE 3.8 
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LOS ANGELES - TOKYO MARKET 
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87 
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China Al. 
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Korean Al. 
Singapore Al. 
Japan Al. 
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SOURCE: Calculations based on OAG. Worldwide Edition, 
July, 1977-1987. 
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which all made intermediate stop on their way to Tokyo. This 
did not change until 1982, when Northwest inaugurated nonstop 
flights leading to an increase of the QSI from 7.12 to 12.95. 
Singapore Airlines started its services to Tokyo in 1981 
with three weekly nonstop flights. Continuing with this low 
frequency in 1982, it is interesting to notice that 
Singapore Airlines captured a 17 percent market share as 
discussed before. Again, Singapore Airlines' high quality of 
inflight service and/or a competitive fare structure were 
most likely responsible for this. Singapore Airlines' QSI of 
5.55 did not change until 1985 when the number of weekly 
flights was increased to five. The QSI grew to 9.25 as a 
result of this step and reached a peak in 1987 with a value 
of 12.95. 
The quality of Varig's air service remained relatively 
stable over the entire period. It nevertheless started very 
low - 1.65 in 1977 and 1978 - because of using a B707 for 
the flight. The QSI went up to 3.05 when the B707 was 
replaced by a DC 10 in 1980. The quality of service of 
Varig was significantly below the QSI average in this market. 
Korean Air's QSI remained unchanged at 4.07 except for 
1985 when it went down to 2.04. Korean Air used a B747 
which performed four weekly flights with one stop. The low 
QSI suggests a poor service. 
China Airlines offered three weekly flights making 
one stop. Its QSI was 3.07. In 1982, China Airlines 
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decreased its frequency to two weekly flights. The QSI 
nevertheless increased because these flights were nonstop. 
In 1983, the QSI declined to zero because China Airlines 
discontinued its flights to Tokyo. 
The Los Angeles - Tokyo market is characterized by its 
growth in the number of carriers. While Pan Am was the 
only carrier offering nonstop services in 1977, the 
number of carriers flying on this route increased to nine 
(of which two did not report traffic data to ICAO) by 1987. 
As in other city pair markets, Pan Am's market share 
declined with the addition of new competitors. However, 
nowhere was the decline more drastic as on this route 
where Pan Am's share decreased from 100 percent in 1977 to 
14 percent in 1987. This indicates that the new carriers' 
marketing mix was not only extremely successful in 
attracting new travelers but also existing travelers who 
previously flew on Pan Am. 
It is interesting to note that most of the new carriers 
were able to increase their initial market shares which 
suggests that Los Angeles - Tokyo is a major growth market. 
The average QSI in this market continuously improved as 
several airlines increased their flight frequencies. 
In particular the years 1985 and 1986 saw a significant 
improvement in the average QSI which might be at least 
partially the result of the market entrance of United 
Airlines and its decision to double the number of flights 
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to Tokyo which could have been in turn a signal to compet-
ing carriers that future competition would be carried out 
in terms of frequency. 
San Francisco - Tokyo 
Until 1983, this city pair market was divided between 
the two carriers Pan Am and Japan Airlines. Pan Am's share 
fluctuated between a low of 3 0 percent in 1980 and a high 
of 44 percent in 1983 (Figure 3.9). Japan Airlines 
dominated this market and had market shares above 50 
percent. This was the case until 1983, when Northwest 
entered the market. After an initial low share of .5 
percent, Northwest quickly built up it presence and claimed 
a share of 17 and 25 percent in 1984 and 1985, respectively-
The traffic volume grew by 48,564 passengers from 
201,399 in 1984 to 249,963 in 1985 and it seems that North-
west's increase captured most of this growth since it almost 
doubled its traffic from 33,630 from 1984 to 62,402 in 1985. 
Northwest's long experience as a transpacific carrier 
certainly contributed to relatively quickly capturing a 
substantial portion of the traffic growth in this market. 
Japan Airlines' declining market share from a high of 70 
percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 1987 is mainly a reflection 
of the decreasing share of non-US citizens in this market 
which declined from 62 percent in 1979 to 51 percent in 1987. 
FIGURE 3.9 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARES IN THE SAN FRANCISCO -
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United Airlines was able to step up its market share 
after operating on the San Francisco - Tokyo route for a 
year. While it had a share of 23 percent in 1986, United 
Airlines claimed 34 percent of the traffic volume in 
1987. Considering that United Airlines' lack of inter-
national marketing experience contributed to a declining 
market share in several of the transpacific markets 
analyzed, the increase is most likely attributable to the 
fact that San Francisco is one of United Airlines' main US 
domestic hubs where transpacific passengers could be 
offered a large number of convenient connection flights 
to/from other US cities. 
The QSI of Pan Am in the San Francisco - Tokyo market 
did not change throughout the 1977 - 1985 period and was 
12.95. Pan Am performed above the QSI average. 
Responsible for Pan Am's stable performance was the fact 
that all of its flights were seven weekly nonstop flights 
with a B747. United Airlines replaced Pan Am in 1986 and 
increased the flight frequency which resulted in a higher 
QSI of 17.9 and 23.45 in 1986 and 1987, respectively. 
As already observed in other city pair markets analyzed, 
the increase is obviously a reflection of United Airlines' 
decision to become more competitive by introducing a higher 
flight frequency. 
Japan Airlines also started with a QSI of 12.95 in 1977. 
The following year, however, it decided to offer four 
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additional one-stop flights which led to an increase of the 
QSI by 4.07 to 17.02. In 1983, Japan Airlines increased the 
number of the four one-stop flights to seven thereby 
increasing the QSI to 20.07 which was firmly above the 
average. This did not change until 1984 when Japan Airlines 
cut back on its weekly flight frequency and offered seven 
nonstop flights "only". 
In 1985, Japan Airlines stepped up its weekly flight 
frequency. Like in the New York - Tokyo market, Japan 
Airlines' increase in flight frequency seems to be largely 
a response to United Airlines' increase in weekly flights. 
This in turn could mean that frequency might play a more 
important role in maintaining/improving an airline's 
competitive position in certain markets. 
With 7.12, Northwest had the second lowest QSI after 
China Airlines between 1978 and 1983. Its QSI indicated a 
service quality below average. This situation changed in 
1984 when Northwest not only offered seven one-stop flights 
but also inaugurated five nonstop flights to Tokyo which 
boosted its QSI to 16.37. 
China Airlines' QSI was 3.05 in 1977. Due to a cutback 
in frequency, the quality of air service decreased to 2.04. 
In 1982, the QSI went up to 3.7 because of the conversion 
of the two one-stop flights into nonstop flights. 
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Honolulu - Hong Kong 
As shown in Figure 3.11, in the entire period from 1977 
to 1985, Pan Am served the Honolulu - Hong Kong market on 
a nonstop basis only for one year in 1980. Its market share 
was 3 percent. 
Singapore Airlines was the major competitor in the market 
and accounted for a 97 percent market share in 1980, the 
year when it started offering nonstop flights in this market. 
It is likely that the dominance of the high quality airline 
Singapore Airlines made Pan Am drop its nonstop service 
after one year. From 1981, Singapore Airlines claimed a 100 
percent market share of the nonstop passenger traffic. 
United Airlines entered the market in 1986 and gained a 
modest share of 7 percent which declined to 3 percent in 
1987. 
An analysis of the QSI is shown in Figure 3.12 and 
reveals that Pan Am had a QSI of 3.7 in 1977. In that 
year, Pan Am offered five weekly flights with two stops. 
The following year, Pan Am's QSI was marginally higher 
than the average QSI of 6.96. The quality of air service 
as indicated by the increase of the QSI to 7.12 can be 
attributed to Pan Am's increase of frequency to seven 
flights with only one stop. In 1980, Pan Am stopped 
serving Hong Kong from Honolulu. 
In 1978, Singapore Airlines entered the market with a 
DC 10 which flew four times a week and made one intermediate 
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FIGURE 3.11 
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FIGURE 3.12 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALITY SERVICE INDEX IN THE 
HONOLULU - HONG KONG MARKET FROM 1977 TO 1987 
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July, 1977-1987. 
stop. The QSI that year was 3.3. The carrier then switched 
over to B747 equipment which increased the QSI to 4.07. 
However, the large increase in QSI did not take place 
until 1981 when Singapore Airlines served the route with 
five weekly nonstop flights. The decline from 9.25 to 7.4 
in 1984 went back to a cutback in flight frequencies. 
Northwest began flying to Hong Kong in 1984 with one 
weekly flight making one enroute stop. The following year, 
both Singapore Airlines and Northwest increased their 
weekly flight frequencies resulting in a QSI of 12.95 and 
3.05, respectively. 
United Airlines started serving the Honolulu - Hong Kong 
market in 1986 and had a QSI of 4.5 which was increased to 
7.12 in 1987 because of a higher flight frequency. United 
Airlines' only competitor was Singapore Airlines which had 
a much higher quality service as shown by the QSI values. 
The Honolulu - Hong Kong market is characterized by its 
low number of carriers which is a reflection of the lower 
passenger volume in this market. The lack of community of 
interest between the two cities certainly contributes to 
this. 
However, a low number of carriers does not necessarily 
mean a low QSI as demonstrated in this market. Singapore 
Airlines steadily increased its QSI by converting to B747 
equipment and increasing the number of weekly flights. 
This development could also be an indication of 
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Singapore Airlines' belief that this city pair market is a 
market with future growth potential. 
San Francisco - Hong Kong 
As Figure 3.13 displays, Pan Am was the only carrier 
offering nonstop services between San Francisco and Hong 
Kong. It held a market share of 100 percent of the nonstop 
passenger traffic throughout the 1977 - 1985 period. 
Considering that the passenger volume grew from 9,048 in 
1977 to 48,444 in 1985, it is obvious that Pan Am 
participated in a growth market. 
United Airlines took over the operation of this market 
in 1986 and continued with a 100 percent market share of 
the nonstop passenger traffic. 
An analysis of the QSI reveals that Pan Am had the 
highest quality of air service (Figure 3.14). In 1977, 
it had a QSI of 7.51 which was the result of a total of 14 
weekly flights. The reason for not achieving a higher QSI 
can be attributed to the fact that four of the 14 flights 
involved 3 stops while three flights even had four stops. 
The QSI decreased to 5.55 because of reducing the number 
of flights to three which however were nonstop services. 
Singapore Airlines started serving the market in 1979 
with a DC 10 flying four times a week and making two stops. 
In 1979, Pan Am introduced seven nonstop flights which 
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resulted in an increase of the QSI t 12.95, thereby 
bringing the service quality above the QSI average of 
7.68. Pan Am did not alter this frequency until 1985. 
Singapore Airlines on the other hand changed its 
equipment and replaced its DC 10 with a B747 flying 
four flights a week with one stop. In 1984, Singapore 
stepped up the frequencies to seven a week resulting in an 
increase of the QSI to 7.12. Although Singapore Airlines 
performed below the QSI average until 1984, it must be 
pointed out that it continuously increased its quality 
throughout the entire study period. 
In 1981, Japan Airlines began offering services between 
San Francisco and Hong Kong. From the very beginning, Japan 
Airlines had a relatively high QSI of 7.12 due to its seven 
weekly flights making one stop. 
The flag carrier of Hong Kong - Cathay Pacific entered 
the San Francisco - Hong Kong market in 1987. It offered 
seven B747 weekly flights making one intermediate stop in 
Vancouver, Canada. Correspondingly, its QSI was 7.12, a 
relatively high value considering that 1987 was the first 
year of operation for Cathay Pacific. 
Although a total of four carriers offered services on 
this route, only Pan Am (later United Airlines) flew 
nonstop flights during the entire study period. Despite the 
availability of long-range aircraft, competing carriers 
like Singapore Airlines, Japan Airlines, and Cathay Pacific 
decided to make at least one enroute stop on their way to 
Hong Kong. 
Several reasons could be responsible for this. First, 
due to payload/range considerations, a techncial stop in 
Honolulu is still neceassary. 
Second, the low traffic volume does not justify a non-
stop service between the two cities. In particular the 
deployment of B747 equipment on this route might make "fill 
-up" stops necessary. 
Third, Hong Kong is served as an extension of another 
high-yield city pair market. For example, many airlines 
offer flights from San Francisco to Hong Kong via Tokyo 
because they can realize a much higher yield on their 
flights to Tokyo. 
The average QSI improved over the study period due to an 
increase in flight frequencies of airlines like Singapore 
Airlines and United Airlines. 
Singapore Airlines' QSI steadily increased and might 
have been also part of a strategy to capture a larger 
proportion of the passengers traveling on US flag carriers. 
From 1979 to 1987, the share of US carriers was above 80 
perent in this market. 
Honolulu - Sydney 
The Australian flag carrier Qantas (QT) was the only 
one offering nonstop services between Honolulu and Sydney 
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in 1977. Figure 3.15 reveals that it accounted for a 100 
percent market share. This dominance diminished in 1980 
when Pan Am began offering nonstop flights and captured a 
share of around 15 percent. 
In 1981, Continental Airlines was added to the 
market which further contributed to Qantas' declining share. 
Both Pan Am and Continental continued building up their 
market shares at the cost of Qantas. In 1982, Pan Am had a 
30 percent share which was its highest within the 1977-1985 
period. Qantas with roughly 60 percent had its lowest share. 
The only airline which steadily built up its passenger 
market share was Continental which gained a share of 17 
percent in 1985. Figure 3.15 shows that Continental's 
gains were made at the cost of Pan Am which started losing 
share from 1982 onwards. 
The role of Canadian Pacific in the Honolulu - Sydney 
market was rather small since it captured only marginal 
shares over the years. 
United Airlines, when starting offering services between 
Honolulu and Sydney built up its market share and carried 
around 12 and 17 percent in 1986 and 1987, respectively. 
Qantas continued losing market shares mainly to Pan 
Am and Continental. 
Qantas had the highest QSI in the entire period. Figure 
3.16 indicates that starting with 8.6 in 1977, Qantas 
continuously increased its QSI and had 11.1 in 1978 and 
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FIGURE 3.16 
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18.5 in 1980. All Qantas flights were nonstop and were 
performed with B747 equipment so that a change in the QSI 
stemmed from increasing the flight frequency. 
In 1980, Qantas had 10 weekly flights between Honolulu 
and Sydney. In 1981, it curtailed the number of weekly 
flights to seven most likely as a response to a decline 
in passenger volume in the wake of the 1980 recession. 
The airline with the second highest QSI continuously 
changed. While Pan Am was second from 1977 to 1981 -
primarily as a result of its high number of weekly flights 
- Air New Zealand (TE) took over the role as the second 
highest QSI airline in 1982 when its QSI increased to 6.57 
which was equal to the average QSI that year. Air New 
Zealand offered a total of seven flights with five flights 
making one stop and the remaining two flights making two 
stops on their way to Sydney. Nevertheless, Continental 
increased its QSI by stepping up the number of weekly 
DC 10 flights and accounted for the second highest QSI 
in both 1984 and 1985. 
Canadian Pacific had the lowest QSI because of its low 
frequency. From 1977 to 1985, Canadian Pacific increased 
its QSI from 1.65 to 2.04. 
After starting flying to Sydney in 1986, United Airlines 
increased the number of flight frequencies and reduced 
the number of intermediate stops thereby having a QSI of 
9.62 which was above the average QSI of 8.24. 
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A unique characteristics of this city pair market is 
its fast growth in passenger volume which almost quadrupled 
within four years from 44,886 passengers in 1977 to 153,078 
passengers in 1981. Correspondingly, the number of carriers 
attracted to Honolulu - Sydney went up. While Qantas was 
the only airline flying this route on a nonstop basis in 
1977, there was a total of four airlines offering their 
nonstop services in 1981. 
The number of carriers remained unchanged for the rest 
of the time frame studied which is an indication of the 
restrictive bilateral agreement between the USA and 
Australia. 
The passenger growth in 1980 and 1981 was absorbed by 
the new market entrants which suggests that they had a 
higher quality of service and/or were more aggressive in 
their fare pricing than Qantas. 
Fare pricing on routes to Australia is a particularly 
important factor in an airline's marketing mix when taking 
into account that price sensitive US leisure travelers are 
largely responsible for the traffic growth. 
The relatively high proportion of leisure travelers 
makes this market also more responsive to fluctuations in 
the state of the world economy. Considering that disposable 
income during a recession shrinks and people could less 
afford to travel overseas for vacation purposes, the 
number of passengers traveling to Sydney declined from 
153,078 in 1981 to 118,540 and 93,954 in 1982 and 1983, 
respectively. 
During these two years, however, Continental was able 
to carry a larger number of passengers and therefore built 
up its market share. 
In 1984, the market recovered and the passenger volume 
went up. Qantas this time participated in the market growth 
and carried a larger number of passengers. Nevertheless, 
the fact that it continued losing market shares until 
1987 is a clear sign of fare aggressive competitors. 
Los Angeles - Sydney 
The Los Angeles -Sydney market was served by the two 
nonstop carriers Pan Am and Qantas. These services, 
however, did not start until 1982. Pan Am as shown in 
Figure 3.17 held 100 percent of the nonstop passenger 
market until 1984 when Qantas inaugurated nonstop flights. 
Pan Am lost around 40 percent of the market to Qantas 
which continued building up its share. In 1985, both 
carriers almost equally shared the market. 
In 1986, United Airlines started serving its operation 
in this market. Although it continued losing passengers to 
Qantas during that year, United Airlines regained market 
share and claimed around 50 percent of the market. 
The QSI of Pan Am was one of the highest among all 
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airlines serving this market. Beginning with 4.44 in 
1977, Pan Am built up its QSI to a high of 8.42 in 1984. 
During that period, Pan Am was topped once by Continental 
which had a QSI of 4.95 in 1981 (versus 4.07 of Pan Am). 
Qantas did not serve the market until 1981 and had a QSI 
of 3.05 that year. This QSI was increased through the 
introduction of more flights. In 1983, Qantas had five one 
stop flights to Sydney which was the equivalent to a QSI 
of 5.08. The growth in the QSI of Qantas in 1984 and 1985 
was the result of having a total of six flights of which 
three were nonstop services. Due to an increase in the 
weekly flight frequency, Qantas' QSI grew further and 
achieved 11.66 and 12.68 in 1986 and 1987, respectively. 
Continental also increased its QSI which was 2.4 in 1980 
and 6 in 1982. Again, responsible for this was the 
increase in the number of weekly flights combined with a 
reduction in the number of enroute stops. From 1983 to 
1987, Continental's QSI stabilized around a value of 4. 
Air New Zealand's QSI showed a rather volatile picture 
due to a change in aircraft equipment, the number of weekly 
frequencies, and the number of stops. It had a QSI of 4.2 
in 1980, 1.48 in 1981, 0 in 1982, and a high of 5.18 in 
1983. 
The development of nonstop services on the Los Angeles -
Sydney route was a question of having adequate long range 
equipment with a sufficient enough payload capability. 
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Although the B747 SP was available in the mid 1970s, 
Pan Am and Qantas did not start utilizing this aircraft 
type on this route until 1982 and 1983, respectively. 
Possible explanation could be that both carriers did not 
think that there would be a high demand for this service. 
However, with the addition of Continental to this city 
pair market, both Pan Am and Qantas might have been forced 
to distinguish their services from that of Continental. 
The growth from 756 passengers in 1982 to 63,286 
passengers in 1987 exhibits the success of the nonstop 
services. 
This success must be put into perspective since carriers 
Continental and Canadian Pacific route their flights 
through Honolulu to make a fuel stop and still increase 
their market share. 
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The Sale of the Pan Am Pacific Division to 
United Airlines in 1985 
The announcement of the sale of Pan Am's Pacific 
division to United Airlines on April 22, 1985, constituted 
the climax of Pan Am's assets sale in the 1980s. The asset 
sale began with the liquidation of the New York head-
quarters (Pan Am Building) for $294 million in 1980 which 
was followed by the sale of the Intercontinental Hotel 
chain for $222 million in 1981. Eventually, after obtaining 
approval by the Department of Transportation (DOT) on 
December 2, 1985, Pan Am handed over all Pacific routes and 
related assets to United Airlines in February 1986. 
Specifically, this transaction included the transfer of 
Pacific route authorities (Figure 3.19) contained in three 
certificates (6), the purchase of four B747 SP, six L1011-
500, and one DC 10, the acquisition of seven B747 SP leased 
by Pan Am from various sources, the purchase of an L1011 
flight simulator, spare engines and spare parts for the 
abovementioned aircraft types, and other ground assets and 
real property in the Pacific except for Hawaii (7). United 
agreed on hiring the approximately 2,700 employees who 
were needed to continue Pan Am's Pacific operation. 
(6) The certificates include that for route 115, 
authorizing service to specified points in the South 
Pacific; for route 130 authorizing service to the 
Pacific and Asia; and for route 246 authorizing 
service between the New York/Los Angeles, Los 
Angeles/San Francisco/Honolulu and the People's 
Republic of China. 
(7)Pacific Transfer Case, 14,668-14,669. 
FIGURE 3.19 
UNITED AIRLINES' PACIFIC NETWORK WHEN TAKEN 
OVER FROM PAN AM IN 1986 
SOURCE: "United Flies Into Trouble In Pacific", 
International Herald Tribune, 19 February 1987. 
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This figure included 410 pilots and qualified flight 
engineers, 1202 flight attendants, 100 supervisory and 
management employees, and all of Pan Am's non-US payroll 
ground employees. The value of this transaction was a total 
of some $750 million. 
The objective of selling assets was to raise cash 
so that Pan Am could continue as a going concern. Figure 
3.20 gives an indication of the financial situation Pan Am 
experienced from 1966 to 1985. 
As of December 31, 1984, Pan Am had long-term debt of 
over $1.2 billion and a debt-equity ratio of 5.5:1 (8). 
FIGURE 3.20 
PAN AM'S OPERATING INCOME (AIRLINE) AND 
NET INCOME (CORPORATION) FROM 1966 TO 1985 
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SOURCE: "Deep rooted causes for current crisis".Lloyd's 
Aviation Economist(June 1986), 27. 
(8)"Deep rooted causes for current crisis", 28. 
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The following factors contributed to Pan Am's strong 
need for raising cash. 
First, Pan Am was subject to unfavorable government 
regulation and to increasing competition. Until domestic 
deregulation in 1978, Pan Am was denied access to domestic 
routes. Also, many years ago, Pan Am was denied the status 
as the only international US flag carrier. US international 
routes were served by a growing number of US domestic 
carriers which had the advantage of feeding their own 
flights. 
Second, the two fuel oil crises in 1973 and 1979 hurt 
Pan Am more than other carriers because it purchased most 
of its fuel overseas. 
Third, when the US dollar was high, Pan Am suffered from 
severe exchange losses while when the US dollar was low, 
US travel abroad declined. 
Fourth, Pan Am exercised bad timing decisions such as 
ordering the B747 when demand on transatlantic routes 
slackened, merging with National Airlines just when 
domestic route authority ceased to have any value, and, 
finally, selling its Pacific network and focusing on 
transatlantic services when international terrorism 
devastated US travel overseas (9). 
United Airlines benefited from the acquisition of the 
Pan Am Pacific Division in several ways. 
(9)Ibid., 29. 
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First, considering that it took United Airlines some 16 
years to obtain transpacific routes (in 1983, it was 
allowed to fly from Seattle/Portland to Hong Kong and 
Tokyo), the acquisition secured a much faster access to 
multiple countries in a region which is the world's 
fastest growing airline market. 
Second, United Airlines quickly realized that its 
growth opportunities were rather limited because of 
restrictions on its operating authorities. Under the then 
existing bilateral agreement between the USA and Japan, 
for example, only the three carriers Pan Am, Northwest, 
and Japan Airlines were free of tight regulatory 
restrictions with respect to market entry and capacity 
expansion (10). 
By acquiring the Pan Am Pacific Division, United 
Airlines secured itself a higher degree of operational 
freedom which would allow it to maintain and expand 
its competitive position in the Asia/Pacific region. 
(10)Pacific Transfer Case. 14,675. 
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United Airlines' Performance in Selected Transpacific 
Markets Since the Takeover of the Pan Am Pacific 
Division in 1985 
Market Share Analysis 
This section compares the performance of Pan Am in 
selected international transpacific markets with that of 
United Airlines. 
An analysis of the nine selected transpacific markets 
as of 1985 (Pan Am's last year of international transpacif 
operations) and 1987 (United Airlines' first full year of 
transpacific operations) reveals that United Airlines' 
market shares marginally increased in six city pair 
markets, remained unchanged in one market, and declined 
in two markets (Table 3.4, Table 3.5, and Table 3.6). 
TABLE 3.4 
CITY PAIR MARKETS WITH GROWING UNITED 
AIRLINES MARKET SHARES 
San Francisco - Tokyo 
1985 1987 
Carrier* Passenger Percent Passenger Percent Change 
PA/UA 
NW 
JL 
CA 
72,436 
62,402 
111,026 
NR 
29.0 % 
25.0 % 
44.6 % 
99,158 
81,705 
110,358 
NR 
34.0 % 
28.0 % 
38.9 % 
+4.0 % 
+3.0 % 
-5.7 % 
Total** 249,963 100 % 291,221 100 % +16.5 % 
TABLE 3.4 - Continued 
Chicago - Tokyo 
1985 
Carrier* Passenger 
UA 0 
NW 79,622 
JL 0 
Total** 79,622 
Percent 
0 % 
100 % 
0 % 
100 % 
Honolulu 
1985 
Carrier* Passenger Percent 
1987 
Passenger 
2,314 
74,096 
34,704 
Percent 
2.1 % 
66.8 % 
31.3 % 
110,878 100 % 
- Tokyo 
1987 
Passenger Percent 
Change 
+2.1 % 
-33.2 % 
+31.3 % 
+39.3 % 
Change 
PA/UA 
NW 
JL 
KE 
MH 
CI 
95,924 
105,940 
304,579 
68,070 
0 
NR 
16.7 
18.4 
53.0 
11.8 
-
-
% 
% 
% 
% 
140,688 
130,399 
355,091 
66,856 
5,956 
NR 
20.1 
18.7 
50.8 
9.6 
0.9 
-
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
+3.4 
+0.3 
-2.2 
-2.2 
+0.9 
-
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
Total** 574,513 100 % 698,990 100 % +21.6 % 
Honolulu - Hong Kong 
1985 1987 
Carrier Passenger Percent Passenger Percent Change 
PA/UA 
SQ 
0 
114,294 
0 % 
100 % 
2,969 
118,263 
2.4 % 
97.6 % 
+2.4 % 
-2.4 % 
Total 114,294 100 % 121,232 100 % . +6.0 % 
Table 3.4 - Continued 
Los Angeles - Sydney 
Carrier* 
PA/UA 
QT 
Total** 
1985 
Passenger 
21,010 
22,193 
43,203 
Percent 
48.6 % 
51.4 % 
100 % 
1987 
Passenger 
32,102 
32,134 
63,286 
Percent 
51 % 
51 % 
100 % 
Change 
+2.1 % 
0 % 
+46.5 % 
Honolulu - Sydney 
Carrier* 
1985 
Passenger Percent 
1987 
Passenger Percent Change 
PA/UA 8,711 8.2 % 27,637 15.2 % -1-7.0 % 
CO 16,449 15.5 % 49,789 27.6 % +12.1 % 
CP 870 0.8 % 10,706 5.9 % +5.1 % 
QT 80,044 75.4 % 92,534 51.2 % -24.2 % 
Total** 106,074 100 % 180,666 100 % +70.3 % 
* Key for carrier abbreviations: 
CA = Civil Aviation Administration of China (People's 
Republic) 
CI = China Airlines (Taiwan) 
CO = Continental 
CP = Canadian Pacific 
JL = Japan Airlines 
KE = Korean Air 
MH = Malaysian Airline System 
NW = Northwest Airlines 
PA = Pan Am 
QT = Qantas 
SQ = Singapore Airlines 
UA = United Airlines 
** Total does not equal 100 % due to rounding. 
NR = Not reported by carrier. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1985 and 1987. 
Table 3.5 
CITY PAIR MARKETS WITH UNCHANGING 
UNITED AIRLINES MARKET SHARES 
San Francisco -
1985 
Carrier* Passenger Percent 
PA/UA 48,444 100 % 
Total 48,444 100 % 
Hong Kong 
1987 
Passenger 
45,863 
45,863 
Percent 
100 % 
100 % 
Change 
0 % 
-
* Key for carrier abbreviations: 
PA = Pan Am 
UA = United Airlines 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1985 and 1987. 
Table 3.6 
CITY PAIR MARKETS WITH DECLINING 
UNITED AIRLINES MARKET SHARES 
New York - Tokyo 
Carrier* 
PA/UA 
NW 
JL 
CI 
Total** 
1985 
t Passenger 
95,000 
43,528 
73,029 
NR 
211,55 
Percent 
45.0 % 
20.6 % 
34.5 % 
100 % 
1987 
Passenger 
80,092 
75,332 
94,596 
NR 
250,020 
Percent 
32.0 % 
30.0 % 
37.8 % 
100 % 
Change 
-13.0 % 
+10.0 % 
+3.3 % 
+18.2 % 
Los Angeles - Tokyo 
1985 
Carrier* Passenger 
PA/UA 
NW 
JL 
SQ 
RG 
MH 
NH 
KE 
Total** 
78,344 
104,109 
161,763 
52,601 
23,155 
0 
NR 
NR 
419,972 
Percent 
18.7 % 
24.8 % 
38.5 % 
12.5 % 
5.5 % 
0 % 
100 % 
1987 
Passenger 
68,210 
118,082 
173,621 
83,016 
23,403 
23,836 
NR 
NR 
490,186 
Percent 
13.9 % 
24.1 % 
35.4 % 
16.9 % 
4.9 % 
4.9 % 
100 % 
Change 
-4.8 % 
-0.7 % 
-3.1 % 
+4.4 % 
-0.6 % 
+4.9 % 
+16.7 % 
* Key for carrier abbreviations: 
CI = China Airlines 
JL = Japan Airlines 
KE = Korean Air 
MH = Malaysian Airline System 
NH = All Nippon Airways 
NW = Northwest Airlines 
PA = Pan Am 
RG = Varig 
SQ = Singapore Airlines 
UA = United Airlines 
** Total does not equal 100 % due to rounding. 
NR = Not reported by carrier. 
SOURCE: Calculations based on Traffic by Flight Stage, 
1985 and 1987. 
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Table 3.4 shows that United Airlines improved its 
market shares in the Honolulu - Sydney, San Francisco -
Tokyo, Honolulu - Tokyo, Honolulu - Hong Kong, Chicago -
Tokyo, and Los Angeles - Tokyo market. Market share 
increases ranged between 2 and 7 percent and indicated 
marginal gains by United Airlines. 
The largest passenger market share increase of United 
Airlines occurred in the Honolulu - Sydney market. When 
compared with Pan Am's market of 8.2 percent in 1985, 
United improved its market share by 7 percentage points 
to 15.2 percent. 
However, when compared with competing airlines like 
Continental which captured an additional 12 percent, 
United Airlines' gain seemed modest. Partially responsible 
for United Airlines' increase was certainly the growth 
trend in passenger traffic in this market. 
Within only 2 years, the number of passengers flying 
between Honolulu and Sydney grew by around 75,000 passengers 
which was equivalent to a 70 percent increase. This 
impressive growth, as discussed in Chapter II, was mostly 
the result of Australia's increasing popularity as a 
tourist destination among US leisure travelers. 
The growth of market shares of US/Canadian carriers 
occurred at the expense of Qantas which posted a decrease 
of 24 percent. Considering Honolulu's lack of importance as 
a commercial/industrial center and small population base of 
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1.2 million, it must be emphasized, that the passenger 
volume growth was partially a reflection of airlines' 
decision to route more flights from the US mainland 
through Honolulu. The actual passenger growth therefore 
probably took place in other US cities. 
The increase in the San Francisco - Tokyo market was 
4 percent and the second largest gain in all markets 
analyzed. This proved that United Airlines' efforts to 
develop San Francisco as a major transpacific hub paid 
off. During 1986, United Airlines improved facilities at 
that airport and also increased the number of daily 
flights from 123 to 145 so that international transpacific 
passengers would have better connections (11). 
The increase in frequency share on routes between San 
Francisco and other US domestic points probably contributed 
the most to United Airlines' passenger share increase in 
the San Francisco - Tokyo market and could be a side-effect 
of the S-curve relationship between market share and 
frequency share. 
The S-curve relationship is a phenomenon which was 
found in the late 1960s by several airline analysts 
including N. Taneja and D. Bibault (12). It states that on 
a competitive route served by two carriers, an airline 
in a minority position (e.g. that of providing 30 percent 
(11)"United Airlines Annual Report 1986", 21 
(12)William E.Fruehan, Jr.,The Fight for Competitive 
Advantage(Boston:Harvard University, 1972), 127. 
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of the available flights on the route) will often get a 
substantially smaller share of the total passengers flown 
on the route (e.g. little more than 20 percent). The 
carrier offering 70 percent of the flights and therefore 
being in the majority position will obtain a dis-
proportionally higher passenger share of 80 percent or 
more (Figure 3.21). Partially responsible for this 
imbalance is most likely the fact that travelers in search 
of a reservation prefer an airline offering departure 
times which are the closest to their times desired. It is 
reasonable to assume that passengers who begin their trip 
at some US interior point and, in order to catch a trans-
Figure 3.21 
MARKET SHARE VERSUS FREQUENCY SHARE 
ON A TWO-CARRIER ROUTE 
• SHAKCOr SEATS FLOWN ON ROUTE t%) 
Source: William E.Fruehan, Jr., The Fight for Competitive 
Advantage(Boston:Harvard University, 1972), 128. 
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pacific flight, have to transfer at a gateway airport, and 
want to spend the least amount of time possible at the 
transfer point (this is in true for business travelers who 
are usually more interested in the shortest total travel 
time than visiting friends and relatives and leisure 
travelers). A carrier with a higher frequency such as United 
Airlines which had a 20.8 percent frequency share at San 
Francisco (13) is, therefore, more likely to meet a 
passenger's time preference. 
As pointed out earlier, the increase in United 
Airlines' passenger market share was only a marginal 
4 percent and considering that Northwest was able to 
increase its share by 3 percent without going through 
the same efforts as United Airlines suggests the 
contribution of other factors to its share increase. 
One aspect could involve pricing of passenger fares. 
Although United Airlines stated in 1986 that a low fare 
strategy would not be applied to Pacific routes 
between the USA and Japan but rather would focus on 
increasing capacity, it is known that airlines in this 
market buy volume business with rebates to travel agents 
and wholesalers who in turn sell cheap tickets (14). 
United Airlines might have applied this strategy to 
capture additional market share. 
(13)"United Airlines Fact Book 1988", 12. 
(14)Carol Jouzaitis, "United works to make new Pacific 
routes pay".Journal of Commerce (March 1986). 
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In the Chicago - Tokyo market, United Airlines, after 
introducing nonstop flights, gained an initial market share 
of only 2 percent. This development is even more surprising 
when one takes into account that Chicago is United Airlines1 
main hub in the USA. 
From Chicago, United Airlines offered 393 daily 
departures and carried some 30,000 passengers a day to 
almost 100 cities in 1987. Its frequency share was 38.1 
percent versus 26.9 percent of American Airlines (15). 
The feeding potential for United Airlines'transpacific 
flights to Tokyo was, therefore, large and should have led 
to a higher market share of United Airlines in this 
market. It is interesting to note that a disproportionate 
share increase was actually obtained by Japan Airlines 
which claimed a share of 31 percent in 1987. A possible 
explanation for United Airlines' marginal share increase 
could be the fact that despite the enormous feeding 
capability at Chicago O'Hare Airport, United Airlines -
in application of the S-curve relationship - did not offer 
a high enough frequency on the Chicago - Tokyo route to 
capture a substantial market share. However, even this 
statement has to be put into perspective when one takes 
into account that Japan Airlines which started services on 
this route like United Airlines in 1983 had always a lower 
frequency that United Airlines. In 1983, Japan Airlines 
(15)"United Airlines Fact Book 1988", 10. 
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offered three weekly flights versus seven of United Airlines. 
In 1987, Japan Airlines had four weekly flights versus 
seven of United Airlines. Reasons for Japan Airlines' 
gain could include the flag carrier loyalty of Asian 
travelers. 
The emphasis on United Airlines' feeding and on-line 
capability, however, ignores that price is another important 
factor in choosing an airline for an international flight. 
In particular, the relatively price-elastic visiting friends 
and relatives, and leisure traveler who pays for the air 
fare himself tends to prefer an interlining flight if its 
fare price is lower than that for an on-line flight. 
United Airlines' share decreased by 5 percentage 
points in the Los Angeles - Tokyo market. Although other 
carriers including Northwest and Japan Airlines lost 
market shares as well, United Airlines' decline was the 
largest among all 3 airlines. Taking into account United 
Airlines' lack of experience of serving international 
markets in the Asia/Pacific region, it most likely was 
extremely difficult for United Airlines to differentiate 
its service from that of the large number of competitors 
(7 of which 5 were Asian airlines) of which in particular 
Singapore Airlines, Malaysian Airline System, and All 
Nippon Airways were known for their aggressive fare pricing 
and high quality of service. 
United Airlines' largest decline in passenger market 
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share took place in the New York - Tokyo market where 
it lost a market share of 13 percent. Gains were made 
by Northwest and Japan Airlines which captured 10 and 
3 percent, respectively. An explanation of this 
development could not be the lower frequency of United 
Airlines in this market (while Pan Am offered eleven 
nonstop flights in 1985, United Airlines had seven 
nonstop flights and one one-stop flight in 1987) since 
United Airlines' competitor Northwest with the lowest 
frequency of seven flights gained the largest market 
share. 
It is most likely that United Airlines' poor market 
share performance not only in this city pair market but 
also in other markets can be attributed to difficulties 
at United Airlines in delivering a quality of service 
expected by international transpacific passengers. 
It must be kept in mind that United Airlines at the 
time of taking over the Pacific Division had very little 
experience as an international carrier since it served 
only a few destinations in Canada and Mexico. 
United Airlines' lack of experience to compete against 
international high quality service carriers from Asia 
probably resulted in losing passengers to competing 
carriers. The lack of acknowledging cultural differences of 
the various Asian countries and accommodating them in its 
service, for example, became clear on United Airlines' 
inaugural flight from Hong Kong to the USA which carried 
mostly Chinese business travelers. First class flight 
attendants wore a white carnation for the flight - a well 
known Chinese symbol for bad luck (16). 
Additionally, United Airlines incurred mechanical 
problems since the aircraft it acquired from Pan Am had 
more deferred maintenance that its entire own fleet. All 
engines of the LlOlls and most aircraft floor had to be 
built. The mechanical problems resulted in flight delays 
and cancellations and were reflected in United Airlines' 
on-time performance (actual departures within 30 minutes 
of published departure time) which was only 30 percent (17). 
On routes to Tokyo, for example, United Airlines, in 
the first months after the takeover of the Pacific 
Division, canceled around 10 percent of its flights 
compared with less than 1 percent for other carriers in 
that market (18). Flight delays and cancellations resulted 
in declining United Airlines market shares because it was 
required to book passengers on competing carriers. 
Simultaneously, United Airlines'tour business, the second 
most important passenger source after business travelers 
was also affected. Japan's tours are generally very short 
(16)Marl Lyon, "Rapid Capacity Growth On Pacific Routes 
Could Reduce Yield", Airlines Executive(January 1988), 
26. 
(17)"United Pacific Division Accomplishments 1987". 
(18)"United Flies Into Trouble In Pacific".International 
Herald Tribuyne(Paris), 19 February 1987. 
so that cancellations can severely disrupt them (19). 
Mechanical problems were obviously not the only source 
of flight delays and cancellations. United Airlines also 
had trouble figuring out the right mix of passenger, cargo, 
and fuel load. As a result, nonstop flight from Los Angeles 
to Sydney, for example, ended up landing in Fiji to refuel 
(20). 
Finally, United Airlines' approach to managing the 
Pacific Division might have also contributed to decreasing 
market shares. United Airlines was run by a centralized 
staff in Chicago. Thus, its cockpit, maintenance, and base 
crews were not used to operating in the Pacific where 
communication between headquarters and outlying airports 
is difficult and aircraft captains often make major 
decisions themselves. Whereas Pan Am crews became used to 
flying with a number of maintenance problems which were 
not safety related and therefore were deferred, United 
Airlines crews were used to having the repairs made 
overnight (21). Also, the Japanese staff of United Airlines 
could not make its own decisions with respect to fare 
discounting, a complex system in the Asia/Pacific region. 
Business in most cases had to be delayed until management 
in Chicago could act (22). 
Taking the above-described deficiencies into account, 
(19)Ibid. 
(20)Ibid. 
(21)Ibid. 
(22)Ibid. 
it is not too surprising that United Airlines did not 
report an operating profit on its Pacific Division 
(it is estimated that United had a $100 million loss) (23) 
and performed relatively poorly in the nine city pair 
markets analyzed. 
In 1987, United Airlines embarked on a major service 
improvement program aimed at regaining lost passenger 
market share. Part of this program was the training of 
flight attendants with an emphasis on cultural 
sensitivities and a more professional approach when 
delivering inflight service. Further improvements of 
the inflight service included the addition of one flight 
attendant to the business class, the change of food 
entrees every 60 days, the provision of inflight currency 
exchange service, the placement of Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean translators on board, and the total redecoration of 
the cabin interior. 
The improvement of the ground service included the 
introduction of a concierge service. The concierges 
assist VIP and first class passengers in 13 international 
airports and five US gateways in special needs such as 
hotel/dinner reservations or in processing through 
customs and immigration (24). 
(23)Richard Whitaker, "United We Stand?".Airline Business 
(July 1987), 25. 
(24)"United Pacific Division Accomplishment 1987". 
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The Impact of the Pacific Division Transfer on the 
Quality of Air Service on Transpacific Flights 
Most discussions dealing with the large scale 
entrance of United Airlines in former Pan Am transpacific 
markets focus on the impact of its domestic network 
and APOLLO CRS on the competitive environment. 
According to the researcher's knowledge, there is no public 
study which evaluated the implications of United Airlines1 
market entrance in terms of quality of air service. 
In its evaluation of the Pacific Division Transfer, 
the US DOT briefly mentioned that service in terms of 
on-line service would improve as a result of United 
Airlines' domestic network (25). In 1986, when United 
Airlines operationally took over the Pacific Division 
from Pan Am, it contended that it would offer "a high 
quality product which is distinguishable from that 
of other Asian competitors but competitive" (26). 
United Airlines was keen to promote the image of a 
"quality airline with a quality product" and further 
stated that "it would not copy another carrier's product 
but offer an authentical American product" (27). 
The aforementioned quotations indicate that the 
concept of quality is rather vague and needs some further 
(25)"Pacific Division Transfer Case", 14,673. 
(26)"US Carrier will in wenigen Jahren Nummer 1 auf Trans-
pazifik werdenrus carrier wants to be number one on trans-
pacific in a few years], Handelsblatt (Duesseldorf), 
22 April 1986. 
(27)"United targets growth in South Pacific".Journal of 
Commerce (June 1986). 
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explanation. In order to determine the quality of a product 
or service, quality has to be defined operationally. The 
variety of factors one could consider for evaluating an 
airline product was already introduced in the method 
section of this chapter and suggests that quality, as Max 
Wernet, head of the Strategic Planning Department at 
Lufthansa Airlines puts it, "is always relative and 
subjective for the customer. He [the customer] compares the 
product offered with others and evaluates its quality 
according to a subjective benefit"(28). The researcher has 
used the CAB's QSI as a measure of quality. 
It is conventional wisdom to assume that a company's 
market share increases as the quality of its products 
improves because higher quality delivers higher 
satisfaction to the consumer. In the context of this 
study, one would expect an increasing passenger market 
share of a transpacific airline which improves its QSI. 
An analysis of the QSI reveals that the QSI of United 
Airlines from 1985 to 1987 increased in four markets, 
remained unchanged in three markets, and declined in 
two markets (Table 3.7, Table 3.8, and Table 3.9). 
(28)Max Wernet, "Oualitaet im Luftverkehr - Bedeutungs-
wandel durch Wettbewerb"[Quality in aviation - a change 
in meaning by competition].Lufthansa Yearbook 1988 
(Cologne: Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 1988), 31. 
Table 3.8 
CITY PAIR MARKETS WITH A GROWING UNITED AIRLINES 
QUALITY SERVICE INDEX 
Carrier 
SAN FRANCISCO - TOKYO 
1985 1987 Change 
PanAm/United 12.95 
Northwest 12.95 
Japan AL. 12.95 
China AL. 3.7 
23.45 
12.95 
14.8 
0 
+ 10.5 
0 
+ 1.85 
- 3.7 
SAN FRANCISCO - HONG KONG 
Carrier 1985 1987 Change 
PanAm/United 12.95 
Continental 0.06 
Singapore 7.12 
Japan AL. 7.12 
Cathay P. 0 
16. .0 
0 
7. 
7. 
7. 
.12 
.12 
.12 
+ 
-
+ 
3.05 
0.06 
0 
0 
7.12 
HONOLULU -
Carrier 1985 
PanAm/United 0 
Northwest 3.05 
Singapore 12.95 
HONOLULU 
Carrier 1985 
HONG KONG 
1987 
7.12 
0 
12.95 
- SYDNEY 
1987 
Change 
+ 7.12 
- 3.05 
0 
Change 
PanAm/United 
Continental 
Qantas 
Canadian P. 
Air New 
Zealand 
4.9 
7.95 
12.95 
2.04 
5.55 
9.62 
11.57 
11.84 
2.33 
5.83 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
4.72 
3.62 
1.11 
0.29 
0.28 
SOURCE: Calculation based on OAG. Worldwide 
Edition. July, 1985 and 1987. 
TABLE 3.8 
CITY PAIR MARKETS WITH A STABLE UNITED AIRLINES 
QUALITY SERVICE INDEX 
Carrier 
United 
Northwest 
Japan AL. 
Chicago 
1985 
7.12 
12.95 
3.05 
- Tokyo 
1987 
7.12 
12.95 
7.4 
Change 
0 
0 
+ 4.35 
LOS ANGELES - TOKYO 
Carrier 1985 1987 Change 
PanAm/United 
Northwest 
Japan AL. 
Korean 
Varig 
Singapore 
Malaysian 
12.95 
12.95 
22.2 
2.04 
0 
9.25 
0 
12.95 
18.5 
20.35 
4.07 
5.55 
12.95 
7.4 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
5.55 
1.85 
2.03 
5.55 
3.7 
7.4 
HONOLULU - TOKYO 
Carrier 1985 1987 Change 
PanAm/United 12.95 
Northwest 12.95 
Japan AL. 29.6 
Korean 7.4 
China AL. 3.7 
12.95 
16.65 
31.45 
7.4 
9.25 
0 
+ 3.7 
+ 1.85 
0 
5.55 
SOURCE: Calculations based on OAG. Worldwide 
Edition. July, 1985 and 1987. 
TABLE 3.9 
CITY PAIR MARKETS WITH DECLINING UNITED 
AIRLINES QUALITY SERVICE INDEX 
LOS ANGELES - SYDNEY 
Carrier 1985 1987 Change 
PanAm/United 8.79 8.51 - 0.28 
Continental 4.05 7.12 +3.12 
Qantas 8.6 12.67 +4.07 
Air New 
Zealand 5.18 4.44 - 0.74 
NEW YORK - TOKYO 
Carrier 1985 1987 Change 
PanAm/United 20.35 12.95 - 7.4 
Northwest 12.95 12.95 0 
Japan AL. 12.95 18.5 +5.55 
CAAC* 0 1.85 +1.85 
* Civil Aviation Administration of China (People's 
Republic). 
SOURCE: Calculations based on OAG, Worldwide 
Edition, July, 1985 and 1987. 
It is interesting to note that United Airlines' QSI 
improvements in some cases occurred in the same markets 
where it experienced market share increases. This was 
true for the Honolulu - Sydney, Honolulu - Hong Kong, 
and San Francisco - Tokyo market (Table 3.10). The only 
market with a QSI improvement but no corresponding 
market share increase was San Francisco - Hong Kong. 
Conversely, the New York - Tokyo market was the city pair 
market where United Airlines experienced the sharpest 
decline in both QSI value and passenger market share. 
TABLE 3.10 
CHANGES OF QUALITY OF AIR SERVICE AND MARKET SHARES 
IN SELECTED MARKETS FROM 1985 TO 1987 
San Francisco - Tokyo 
Carrier QSI 
PanAm/United + 10.5 
Japan AL. + 1.85 
Northwest 0 
China AL. - 3.7 
New York -
Carrier QSI 
PanAm/United - 7.4 
Japan AL. + 5.5 
Northwest 0 
China AL. + 1.85 
Market 
+ 4 % 
- 6 % 
+ 3 % 
NR 
- Tokyo 
Market 
- 13 
+ 3 
+ 10 
NR 
Share 
Share 
% 
% 
% 
Carrier 
Los Angeles - Tokyo 
QSI Market Share 
PanAm/United 
Northwest 
Japan AL. 
Korean 
Varig 
Singapore 
Malaysian 
0 
+ 5.55 
- 1.85 
+ 2.03 
+ 5.55 
+ 3.7 
+ 7.4 
SOURCE: Ca1culations 
- 5 % 
- 1 % 
- 4 % 
NR 
- 1 % 
- 4 % 
+ 5 % 
based on OAG, Worldwide 
Edition, July, 1985 and 1987. 
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Although the data on United Airlines in both the 
San Francisco - Tokyo and Los Angeles - Tokyo markets 
seem to suggest a positive correlation between QSI and 
market share, an analysis of other carriers' data show 
a negative or even no correlation at all between QSI 
and market share. Northwest, for example, increased 
its market share by 10 percent although its QSI did 
not change. In the Los Angeles - Tokyo market, most 
carriers which increased their service quality 
experienced even a declining market share. 
Figure 3.22 displays a scatter diagram where QSI and 
market share data of all carriers in all 9 markets for 
the 1977-1987 study period were plotted. The scatter 
diagram seems to suggest a positive correlation between 
QSI and market shares. 
In order to determine the coefficient of correlation, 
the researcher applied a formula devised by Karl Pearson: 
R , HIXY-GW&r) 
Since the interpretation of the correlation coefficient is 
not as precise as the interpretation of the coefficient of 
determination, the researcher also determined R for the 
city pair markets analyzed. 
The analysis showed that R = .20 indicating that only 
20 percent of the variation in market shares is explained 
by the linear relation with the QSI values. Considering 
Plgure 3.22 
Quality Service Index versus market share In 
9 transpacific markets (1977-1987) 
Market Share 
0 10 20 30 
Quality Service Index 
40 
SOURCBi Calculations based on "Traffic by Plight Stage",.,1977-1997, 
and "03 International Air Travel Statistics", 1977-1907. 
50 
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that an R of .60 to .90 is usually satisfactory in 
business studies, an R^= .20 displays a low degree of 
association between the 2 variables (29). 
However, this result has to be put into perspective 
when one takes into account the various measurement 
limitations resulting from applying the QSI. 
First, QSI and market share data measure different time 
frames. While the QSI was determined for the month of July 
only, market share values were computed on an annual basis. 
It is possible that the computations of an annual QSI 
might deliver a higher degree of correlation. 
Second, another reason might be the inherent limitations 
of the QSI. It measures only the three parameters type of 
aircraft equipment, number of enroute stops, and weekly 
flight frequency and therefore neglects important variables 
which also influence the development of passenger market 
shares. These unmeasured variables could be important 
factors such as flag carrier loyalty, quality of in-flight 
service,and on-time performance. Flag carrier loyalty 
could be important since most of the transpacific routes 
analyzed have a high percentage of Asian travelers who 
prefer flying their home carrier. 
Similarly important is the high quality of in-flight 
service which was largely responsible for the success of 
carrierrs like Singapore Airlines. On-time performance is 
(29)Howard Balsley,Basic Statistics for Business and 
Economics(Columbus, Ohio: Grid Inc., 1978), 395. 
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an important indictor of an airline's performance and 
severely affected United Airline's competitive position 
when starting its transpacific operations with an 
on-time performance of only 30 percent. 
An analysis of a correlation between passenger 
market shares and one single parameter of the QSI -
"weekly flight frequency" suggests that frequency is a 
main factor in influencing an airline's market shares. 
The coefficient of correlation was .78 and considered 
significant when tested at a p = .05 level. The 
coefficient of determination R was .61 and indicated 
a higher degree of correlation than between market 
shares and QSI. 
Figure 3.23, Figure 3.24, and Figure 3.25, seem to show 
that transpacific carriers' market shares increase more than 
proportionally with an increase in frequency shares. The 
New York - Tokyo market, however, also shows that frequency 
increases do not result in proportionally higher market 
shares which in turn might be a reflection of other important 
service variables by which an airline gains market share. 
The following section investigates the impact of United 
Airlines on the QSI in nine city pair markets analyzed. 
The parameters used in determining the QSI from 1977 to 
1987 were affected by factors such as general economic 
conditions, bilateral agreements, and advancement in 
aircraft technology. Although it is difficult to single 
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out the impact of United Airlines1 market entrance, the 
researcher thinks that a comparison of the QSI value in 
the 1986-1987 interval with those in earlier two-year time 
intervals gives an indication of United Airlines1 impact 
on the quality of air service in particular markets. 
For the 1986-1987 interval, Table 3.11 shows that the 
QSI values increased in all markets except for New York -
Tokyo and Los Angeles - Tokyo. By the late 1980s, basically 
all carriers used B747 equipment so that it can be assumed 
that changes in the QSI were the direct result of changing 
flight frequencies and/or the number of enroute stops. 
Since United Airlines announced that it would attempt 
to capture market share by expanding capacity strategy 
(30), competing carriers such as Northwest and Japan 
Airlines in turn responded with stepping up flight 
frequencies and introducing more nonstop flights (31). 
This is reflected in the QSI of Northwest, for example, 
which increased its QSI in the Honolulu - Tokyo and Los 
Angeles - Tokyo markets while Japan Airlines increased 
its QSI by increasing flight frequencies and reducing the 
number of enroute stops in the New York - Tokyo and Chicago 
- Tokyo markets. 
(30)"Low Fare Strategy Not On The Cards",Tokyo Business 
Today, 5 June 1986. 
(31)Northwest Annual Report 1986, 34. 
TABLE 3 . 1 1 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF THE AVERAGE Q S I I N 
NINE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPACIFIC MARKETS 
C m PAIR\ YEAR 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 
CHICAGO- 0 % - 1 3 . 6 - 4 0 . 5 % 0 % +7.3 % 
TOKYO 
HONOLULU- - 1 . 7 9 % - 5 . 1 % +2.6 % +2.86 % +10.5 \ 
TOKYO 
NEW YORK- 0 \ +7 .1 % - 8 . 1 % +0.8 % - 3 5 . 4 % 
TOKYO 
LOS ANGELES- +20.2 % +3.6 % 0 % +40.6 °* - 1 4 . 3 % 
TOKYO 
SAN FRANCISCO- +7.9 % 0 % +2.0 % - 7 . 4 % +12.1 ?. 
TOKYO 
HONOLULU- 0 % +22.7 % 0 % - 5 . 0 % +14.7 *• 
HONG KONG 
SAN FRANCISCO- +38.4 % +20.2 % 0 % 0 % +3.1 % 
HONG KONG 
HONOLULU- - 2 6 . 5 I - 1 0 . 2 % +5.6 % +2.5 * +11.4 % 
SYDNEY 
LOS ANGELES- - 6 6 . 6 % - 1 7 . 5 % - 7 . 2 % - 9 . 6 % +4.4 % 
SYDNEY 
SOURCE: C a l c u l a t i o n s b a s e d on OAG. W o r l d w i d e E d i t i o n . 
J u l y , 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 7 . 
170 
The Impact of United Airlines' Domestic Network 
on its Transpacific Passenger Market Shares 
One of the opponents of the Pacific Division Transfer 
was Northwest (NW) which urged an outright disapproval 
by the Department of Transportation (DOT). Northwest 
which has a similarly long tradition of serving 
destinations in the Asia/Pacific region (its first 
scheduled transpacific flight was inaugurated in 1947) 
offered scheduled passenger transpacific services to 10 
cities in 7 foreign countries in the Northeastern/Central 
subregion and competed head on with Pan Am on most of its 
transpacific routes. It was, therefore, the US carrier most 
affected by the replacement of Pan Am by United Airlines. 
Northwest's rationale for opposing the large-scale 
entrance of United Airlines became clear by analyzing 
the arguments it presented before DOT. Among other 
arguments, Northwest claimed that the transfer would 
make United Airlines so strong over the long term that 
no other US flag carrier, not even Northwest, would be 
able to compete over the North/Central Pacific (32). 
According to Northwest, United Airlines' strength 
would come from its "overwhelming domestic feed strength 
which would allow it to siphon substantial numbers of 
passengers away from Northwest, or other carriers, not on 
the basis of price competition but because it can provide 
(32)"Pacific Transfer Case", 14,672. 
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on-line service that Northwest cannot match" (33). 
In order to understand the issues of "domestic feed 
strength" and "on-line service", an analysis of the US 
domestic networks of United Airlines and Northwest is 
necessary. Figure 3.26 shows the domestic network of 
United Airlines as of 1987. It flew to a total of 165 
cities and was the only US carrier serving all 50 US 
states. Major hubs were Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, 
and Washington, D.C.(34). Since United Airlines' domestic 
network of 1987 insignificantly changed over 1985, it can 
be compared with that of Northwest in 1985. Northwest 
served 74 cities in 27 states and had Minneapolis as a 
hub (35)(Figure 3.27). The comparison shows that United 
Airlines has a larger network. 
Research by the Public Counsel suggests that around 
30 percent of the passenger volume in the US-Japan market 
is non-gateway traffic, that is traffic that does not 
originate at one of the US transpacific gateway airports 
such as Chicago, Honolulu, New York, Los Angeles, Portland, 
San Francisco, and Seattle. 
By serving more domestic points, United Airlines could, 
therefore, theoretically capture a larger share of the 
non-gateway transpacific passenger market than Northwest 
(33)Ibid., 14,672. 
(34)"United Airlines Annual Report 1985", 14. 
(35)Northwest Airlines,Northwest Annual Report 1985 
(Minneapolis, 1985). 
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FIGURE 3.26 
UNITED AIRLINES' US DOMESTIC NETWORK IN 1987 
SOURCE: United Airlines Fact Book 1988, 15. 
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FIGURE 3.27 
NORTHWEST AIRLINES' US DOMESTIC NETWORK IN 1985 
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SOURCE: Northwest Airlines Annual Report 1985, 1. 
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serving fewer domestic points. At the same time, by feeding 
international transpacific flights on its own rather than 
depending on other carriers, United Airlines could offer 
on-line service. This means that passengers could transfer 
from one United Airlines flight to another United Airlines 
flight which is more convenient than interlining where 
passengers change airlines during their trip. This 
improvement in passenger service could translate into 
carrying a disproportionally higher share of the trans-
pacific passenger market. 
The discussion of the market share showed that United 
Airlines seemed to be able to improve its market share in 
several markets as a result of having better on-line 
connections. In the case of San Francisco, for example, 
United Airlines increased its market share by 4 percent due 
to stepping up connection flights at that airport. However, 
this marginal increase could surly not be considered "dis-
proportional" as Northwest argued before the DOT in 1985. 
How wrong Northwest's rationale was with respect to 
United Airlines' feeding capability as a result of its 
large domestic network became especially obvious in the 
case of the Chicago - Tokyo market. As previously pointed 
out, Chicago is United Airlines' main US domestic hub 
offering 393 daily departures to almost 100 cities a day. 
United Airlines therefore had an enormous feeding potential 
which nevertheless did not materialize as indicated by the 
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marginal percentage point increase of 2 percent. The 
conclusion of this development is that Northwest's 
concern about United Airlines gaining a disproportionate 
transpacific passenger market share was unjustified. 
The impact of United Airlines was limited for a 
variety of reasons. First, although around 30 percent 
of the passenger traffic on US - Japan routes might be 
non-gateway traffic, it can be conversely stated that 
around 70 percent of passenger traffic on these routes 
is gateway traffic, therefore, indicating that passenger 
traffic to Japan is relatively concentrated at a few 
cities in the USA. As a result a large domestic feeder 
network does not necessarily represent a major competitive 
advantage (36). The high degree of traffic concentration 
at US gateways also becomes obvious by the fact that new 
US gateways developed very slowly and so far were not 
attractive to transpacific carriers. Partially responsible 
for this development were payload/range considerations due 
to the unavailabilty of long-range aircraft. 
Minneapolis opened as a transpacific gateway in 1983 and 
still is served only by Northwest. Similarly, Washington,D.C. 
(36) However, Northwest saw this differently. 
During the hearing before the DOT in 1985, Northwest, as a 
result of its concern of United Airlines competitive 
advantage was in the process of acquiring Republic Airlines. 
The merger of the 2 carriers' domestic networks 
strengthened Northwest's feed of international flights so 
that it was in a position of gaining a disproportionate 
share of the US - Asia/Pacific passenger market. 
which was also available for quite some time is so 
is so far only served by All Nippon Airways. United 
Airlines did not use domestic hubs like Denver and 
Washington, D.C, as a gateway for fligts across the 
Pacific which in turn is an indication of the limited 
opportunities to exploit a domestic feeder network for 
transpacific flights. 
Second, the emphasis on on-line service seems to ignore 
the fact that price sensitive passengers base their 
decision to fly with an airline on a variety of service 
factors among which on-line service could be of minor 
relevance. In general, fare pricing is of particular 
concern to the relatively price-elastic visiting friends 
and relatives or leisure traveler who usually pays for 
himself as opposed to the business traveler, for example, 
whose ticket expenses are borne by the company. One can 
reasonably assume that the visiting friends and relatives, 
and leisure traffic which accounts for a substantial 
proportion of the total traffic to the Central and South-
eastern subregion, respectively, would prefer an interline 
flight to an on-line flight if the former was priced lower. 
Even the relatively price-inelastic business traffic which 
makes up most of the traffic to the Northeastern subregion 
might discount the importance of on-line service since 
other service features such as on-time performance and the 
quality of inflight service are also of relevance. 
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The aforementioned fact that United Airlines did not 
have any experience in international markets served by high 
quality service oriented airlines contributed to United 
Airlines' modest impact on international transpacific 
competition. 
The Impact of United Airlines' Apollo CRS on 
its Transpacific Passenger Market Shares 
A second major argument of Northwest against the 
transfer of the Pan Am Pacific Division was United 
Airlines' dominating APOLLO computer reservation system 
(CRS) which would allow it to divert a disproportionate 
share of the passenger volume to its international 
transpacific flights by "interfering with other carriers' 
travel agents and by making favorable arrangements with 
Japan Airlines' CRS JALCOM, Japan's dominant CRS"(37). 
In order to understand the rationale of this 
argument, it is necessary to discuss the distribution 
channels of an airline for its products. A distribution 
channel of fundamental importance to the airlines 
are travel agents. The world average is that between 
75 and 85 percent of all airline tickets are sold through 
(37)"Pacific Transfer Case", 14,672. 
travel agents (38). United Airlines estimates that travel 
agents accounted for some 80 percent of all airline tickets 
sold in the USA in 1987 (39). Research by the DOT suggests 
that in 1986 approximately 95 percent or 24,693 US travel 
agents were automated and did their ticket bookings through 
one or more of the five major CRSs SABRE, APOLLO, SYSTEMONE, 
DATAS II, and PARS (40). 
These systems are completely or for the most part owned 
by US airlines. In 1986, the two main systems were SABRE 
and APOLLO. While SABRE was installed in 35.1 percent of 
all automated travel agencies and accounted for 42.9 percent 
of all revenues of tickets booked through a CRS, APOLLO was 
installed in 26.4 percent of all automated travel agencies 
and accounted for 32.4 percent of all CRS revenues in the 
USA (41). Figure 3.28 exhibits that United Airlines' APOLLO 
system was a significant force and controlled in some cases 
between 30 and 50 percent of the market in US cities which 
serve as international transpacific gateways. 
(38)Stephen Shaw, Airline Marketing and Management, 
2nd ed. (London: Pitman Publishing LTD., 1985; reprint 
ed., Malabar, Florida: Robert Krieger Publishing Co., 
Inc., 1988), 201. 
(39)"United Airlines Fact Book 1988", 27. 
(40)US Department of Transportation, Study Of Airline 
Computer Reservation Systems (Washington, D.C: 
Goverenment Printing Office, May 1988), 20. 
(41)Ibid., 43. 
FIGURE 3.28 
MARKET SHARES OF THE TOP TWO CRS VENDORS IN TERMS 
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SOURCE:"Study on Airline CRSs", 159-163. 
The dominance of APOLLO presented so far, however, has 
to be put into perspective when United Airlines' trans-
pacific markets are discussed. Data exhibited in Figure 
3.28 are aggregated and based on the total revenues 
CRS vendors realized by selling tickets through their 
reservation systems. The proportion of United Airlines 
transpacific tickets sold by travel agents in a 
particular city through APOLLO cannot be determined 
with these data. Data reporting how many transpacific 
passenger tickets are booked through a particular CRS 
are kept confidential by the airlines for competitive 
reasons. Therefore, the establishment of a quantitative 
relationship between CRS market shares and passenger 
shares is not possible in this thesis. 
After discussing the dominant market position of 
United Airlines' APOLLO system in the USA in general 
and in selected US gateway cities in particular, the 
question arises why this dominance which had existed 
for years before the Pacific Division Transfer suddenly 
became a source of concern for Northwest. The answer 
most likely lies in the fact that Northwest feared that 
a combination of APOLLO's dominance in the USA and 
United Airlines' significant air transportation 
presence in international transpacific markets would 
result in favoring flights of United Airlines owning 
the APOLLO system over those of competitors 
participating in the CRS. The concern of Northwest 
seemed justified when considering that CRS hosts 
practiced various forms of discrimination against 
airlines using the system for selling their tickets. 
The CAB promulgated rules to govern the operation 
of airline-owned CRSs which became effective in 1984. 
Prior to that year, some CRSs ranked and displayed 
flights in response to a travel agent's inquiry according 
to a procedure which favored those by the airline owners. 
In addition, the maintenance of good business relation-
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ships between CRS vendors and their travel agent subscribers 
might have induced some agents to book a larger proportion 
of their customers on flights operated by the CRS vendor 
than it would otherwise be the case (this phenomenon is 
referred to as the "halo" effect). Even though the CAB 
rules were supposed to alleviate unfair competitive 
practices as mentioned above, the CRS designs after 1984 
still left enough room for various forms of discrimination 
which favored the flights of a CRS vendor. The "halo" 
effect, for instance, still accounted for almost 14 percent 
of APOLLO's domestic passenger revenues in 1985 and 1986 
(42). Also, CRSs provided more comprehensive services and 
more reliable information on a vendors's airline than on 
that of a competitor (43). 
Despite the lack of adequate data to quantitatively 
evaluate the relationship between CRS dominance and 
passenger market shares, a qualitative assessment of this 
relationship should be done. 
The afore-discussed impact of discrimination against 
of non CRS vendors leads to the assumption that United 
Airlines combining the dominance of its CRS with a 
significantly large number of flights in certain 
markets could theoretically capture a larger share 
of the passenger market than a carrier like Northwest 
(42)Ibid., 153. 
(43)Ibid., 84. 
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lacking such combintion. 
The combination of United Airlines' CRS dominance and 
significant presence in international transpacific market 
could also lead to attracting additional travel agents 
(either newly established ones who have not decided on 
their CRS yet or existing ones who decide to switch 
over to a new CRS) for two main reasons. First, 
a vendor airline with a significant number of flights 
in a certain market is in a position to offer travel 
agents in that market more valuable inducements -
free travel on the vendor airline, class-of-service 
upgrades, bonuses for the vendor airline's frequent 
flyer program, cooperative advertising, or greater 
commissions. 
Second, in markets where the CRS vendor is the dominant 
airline and where travelers - particularly business 
travelers - regard the airline as the first choice, it may 
make good business sense for the agent to decide for that 
airline's CRS (44). 
The attraction of additional travel agents - this 
is probably Northwest's hint at "interfering with 
other carriers' travel agents" - could further increase 
the dominance of APOLLO in certain markets which in turn 
could theoretically result in an increasing passenger 
market share of United Airlines. 
(44)Ibid., 108. 
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When the theoretical impact of United Airlines' CRS 
is compared with the actual development,it becomes clear 
that Northwest's concern of United Airlines gaining a 
disproportionate share of the transpacific passenger volume 
is unjustified. Similar to the marginal impact of the 
domestic network of United Airlines on its transpacific 
market shares, the effect of APOLLO in terms of increasing 
United Airlines' passenger market shares in transpacific 
markets was insignificant. 
As previously pointed out, United Airlines marginally 
increased its market shares in 6 out of 9 transpacific 
markets analyzed. These markets included gateways such 
as Chicago, Honolulu, and San Francisco, where United 
Airlines also had CRS dominance so that it might be 
assumed that part of the growth was the result of 
combining its CRS dominance with a large number of 
international transpacific flights. Also, it is 
possible that United Airlines attracted additional 
travel agents who contributed to additional sales. 
However, taking into account the fact that Northwest 
does not own a CRS but "only" participates in the 
five CRSs but was still able to increase its market 
share indicates that CRS dominance does not automatically 
translate into larger passenger shares. 
The same is true by looking at the markets where United 
Airlines experienced stationary or declining market shares 
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although APOLLO had a strong market position. This might 
again suggest that United Airlines' CRS was unable to 
translate its market position into a corresponding passenger 
share. The only exception to this was the New York - Tokyo 
market where United Airlines' passenger share declined by 
13 percent and its CRS share was 11.89 percent. Responsible 
for United Airlines' inability to use its dominant APOLLO 
CRS again might be an indication of United Airlines' poor 
service performance on most of its transpacific flights. 
The aforementioned lack of serving international markets 
and a multitude of mechanical and organizational problems 
might have had a stronger impact on United Airlines' market 
performance than expected by opposing carrier Northwest. 
United Airlines' marketing efforts so far turned out to 
be inadequate for the development of substantial market 
shares in US-Pacific markets. The marketing tactics of 
US competitor Northwest with its 40 year long tradition 
of serving markets in the Asia/Pacific region and various 
foreign competitors known for their outstanding service 
certainly contributed to United Airlines' modest market 
share performance. 
Main conclusion of the study is that in spite of its 
enormous domestic system and feed potential and its US 
market strength with the APOLLO CRS, United Airlines has 
not yet been able to use these comnpetitive advantages 
to increase market shares in US-Pacific markets. 
Chapter IV 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 
FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Overall Market Trends in Scheduled Passenger Traffic 
One purpose of this study is to identify overall 
market trends in scheduled air passenger services between 
the USA and selected countries in the Asia/Pacific region. 
A historical research method was applied to determine 
the magnitude and direction of changes from 1977 to 1987 
in passenger volume and passenger structure (US citizens 
versus non US citizens). Analyzed were also trends in the 
number of transpacific airlines and number of city pairs 
served. In order to account for the diversity among 
Asia/Pacific region countries in terms of demographic, 
geographic, political, and economic factors, this region 
was analyzed in terms of its subregions as defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The 
researcher chose countries in the three subregions 
according to their political and economic importance to 
the Asia/Pacific region and the USA. 
This study shows that the passenger traffic volumes 
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between the USA and selected Pacific rim countries 
increased from 2.5 million passengers in 1979 to 5 million 
passengers in 1987. 
The Northeastern subregion with Hong Kong, Japan, 
People's Republic of China, South Korea, and Taiwan was the 
largest passenger market and grew by an average annual rate 
of 14 percent. It accounted for 1.8 million passengers and 
3.7 million passengers in 1979 and 1987, respectively. This 
was equivalent to around three quarters of the total trans-
pacific traffic volume in both 1979 and 1987. 
In 1979, approximately 1.5 million passengers traveled 
to Japan making it the largest traffic point in the North-
eastern subregion. The large traffic volume between the USA 
and Japan is largely a reflection of the substantial 
economic ties between the two countries. Consistent with 
growing trade, the passenger traffic to Japan also grew and 
had a volume of 3.75 million passengers in 1987. Despite 
Japan's importance as a major traffic point, the analysis 
also reveals that the growth rate of passenger traffic to 
Japan was lower than that to other countries in the North-
eastern subregion. Growing trade links between the USA and 
these countries, relaxation of overseas travel restrictions, 
and the introduction of new long-range aircraft equipment, 
making an intermediate stop at one of Japan's increasingly 
congested airports unnecessary, contributed to this trend. 
The share of non-US citizens to the Northeastern sub-
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region was the highest of all subregions. In 1979, 73 
percent of all passengers traveling to the Northeastern 
subregion were non-US citizens. Although this share 
decreased over the years, it was still 65 percent in 1987. 
The share of US citizens went up because of a growing 
interest of US tourists in countries like South Korea and 
the People's Republic of China. 
Up to what extent the share of non-US citizens continues 
to decline remains to be seen. The aforementioned lifting 
of international travel restrictions in Taiwan and South 
Korea, and the intention of the Japanese government to 
reduce the country's trade deficit by promoting more travel 
by Japanese citizens could result in a higher share of 
non-US citizens on US-Northeastern routes. 
The share of non-US flag carriers was above 50 percent 
throughout the time period studied and is mainly a 
reflection of the strong flag carrier loyalty Asian 
travelers have for their home airlines. 
The Southeastern subregion was the second largest market 
in the Asia/Pacific region. It was comprised of Australia, 
New Zealand, Fiji, and Tahiti. 
In 1979, a total of 450,000 passengers traveled to this 
subregion and accounted for 16 percent of the transpacific 
passenger total. The passenger volume increased at an 
average annual rate of 10.4 percent and by 1987, reached 
815,000 passengers which was equivalent to 18 percent of 
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the passenger total. 
The growth in passenger volume was mainly the result of 
the subregion's growing attractiveness as a tourist 
destination among US leisure travelers. This in turn led to 
an increase of the US citizen share to the Southeastern 
subregion from 41 percent in 1979 to 55 percent in 1987. 
The traffic growth in the US - Southeastern market was 
mainly absorbed by non US flag carriers as indicated by 
their continuously high share of above 60 percent. 
The Central subregion with Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand was the smallest 
market and grew by an annual average rate of 8.7 percent. 
In 1979, a total of around 150,000 passengers traveled 
from the USA to this subregion which was equivalent to 5 
percent of the total transpacific passenger volume. This 
share slightly increased to 6 percent in 1987 when some 
250,000 passengers traveled to the Central subregion. 
A relatively small trade volume with the USA and the 
lack of substantial US tourism to the Central subregion due 
to high cost and long distances are largely responsible for 
the small size of this market. 
Passenger traffic to this subregion is mainly visiting 
friends and relatives (VFR) traffic which is the result of 
both significant US military presence and substantial 
emigration from this subregion to the USA. 
The share of US citizens to the Central subregion was 
the highest of all subregions and increased from 58 percent 
in 1979 to 69 percent in 1987. 
The high share of US citizens did not translate into a 
correspondingly high share for US flag carriers. Non-US 
flag carriers continuously increased their market share 
from 56 percent in 1979 to 79 percent in 1987 suggesting 
that US citizens preferred traveling on airlines like 
Malaysian, Singapore Airlines, and Thai International 
which are known for their aggressive fare pricing and high 
quality service. 
Changes in the Number of International Airlines 
Serving the Market 
The analysis of the number of international airlines 
offering services between the US and countries in the Asia/ 
Pacific region displays that the number increased from 
11 in 1977 to 22 in 1987. At the same time, the number of 
Asia/Pacific destinations served from US gateways on a non-
stop basis grew from 10 to 16. 
This trend suggests that transpacific airline service 
became more competitive through multiple carrier 
designations rather than through increasing the number of 
city pairs served. Reasons for this development could be 
the lack of cities with characteristics which would make 
them gateways for direct air services. These 
characteristics include a business community maintaining 
commercial and political relationships with people in the 
Asia/Pacific region, an ethnic community generating 
visiting friends and relatives traffic, and tourist 
attractions which are of primary interest to the leisure 
traveler. Not too many cities combine these characteristics 
with a large enough population base to justify a nonstop 
airline service. 
Traffic Supply and Demand at US Gateways 
The US gateways were analyzed in terms of the number of 
passenger seats offered by and revenue passengers carried 
by the international transpacific airlines from these US 
airports. 
The ten-year analysis from 1977 to 1987 shows a growth 
trend at all gateways except for Anchorage which 
experienced a slight decline in available passenger seats. 
The growth pattern varied from gateway to gateway, and 
in terms of available passenger seats, ranges from an 
average annual percentage change of plus 8 percent at 
Honolulu to plus 35 percent at Los Angeles. Similarly, in 
terms of revenue passengers carried, the average annual 
change ranges from plus 2 percent at Anchorage to plus 
51 percent at Los Angeles. 
Responsible for the growth trend at the gateway airports 
are the increase in passenger traffic between the USA and 
the Asia/Pacific region and changes in flight operations 
as a result of the introduction of long-range aircraft 
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equipment. 
The study also exhibits that Honolulu is the major gate-
way to destinations in the Asia/Pacific region. In 1977, it 
accounted for 53 percent of all seats supplied and for 55 
percent of all passengers carried. When compared with 1987, 
however, the analysis shows that Honolulu's dominance 
declined. In 1987, it had a 26 percent share of the 
passenger seats available and a 35 percent share of the 
passengers carried. 
The reason for this decrease is mainly the introduction 
of long-range aircraft which make a technical stopover in 
Honolulu unnecessary. 
Los Angeles International Airport seems to have 
benefited the most from the advent of new long-range 
aircraft. It increased its share of passenger seats 
available from 10 percent in 1977 to 26 percent in 1987. 
Simultaneously, its share of passenger carried grew from 
10 percent to 24 percent in the same time frame. 
The number of new gateways offering nonstop services 
to destinations in the Asia/Pacific region did not 
significantly increase during the 1977-1987 time period. 
Minneapolis and Portland became gateways in 1982 and 1983, 
respectively. 
However, both airports have not captured a substantial 
proportion of the total transpacific supply and demand. 
While Portland accounted for around 1 percent of both the 
total available passenger seats and revenue passengers 
carried in 1987, Minneapolis' share was less than 1 
percent in the same year. 
Main reason for this very marginal impact are the 
difficulty to attract transpacific traffic from other 
firmly established gateway airports and the lack of 
characteristics which are essential to become a gateway 
for nonstop services to cities in the Asia/Pacific region. 
Market Share and Quality of Air Service 
from 1977 to 1985 
A second purpose of this study is to investigate nine 
selected transpacific air services of Pan Am in terms of 
market share and quality of air service from 1977 to 1985 
when Pan Am sold its Pacific Division to United Airlines. 
The analysis reveals that Pan Am's share of transpacific 
passengers gradually declined in five out of the nine 
markets. 
One reason for Pan Am's deteriorating market share 
performance is the addition of new competitors to trans-
pacific city pair markets as a partial result of 
increasingly liberal bilateral agreements between the USA 
and countries in the Asia/Pacific region. The new 
competitors are mainly Asian airlines which are known for 
their agressive fare pricing and high quality of service. 
In order to compete effectively against these market 
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entrants, Pan Am would have been required to allocate 
substantial amounts of marketing resources to the region. 
Considering the poor financial performance of Pan Am 
in the 1977-1985 time period, Pan Am may have not allocated 
sufficient resources necessary to maintain or improve its 
market share position in an increasingly competitive 
environment. For examle, the replacement of the Pacific 
aircraft equipment by new long-range, large payload air-
planes would have cost several billion dollars which Pan 
Am could not afford. 
The quality of service was measured by using a quality 
service index (QSI) developed by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) in the late 1960s. 
An analysis of the QSI in the nine markets shows a 
rather fluctuating picture and no consistent trend. 
Pan Am's QSI improved in three markets, remained unchanged 
in four markets and declined in one market. 
In the markets analyzed, Pan Am exclusively used B747 
equipment on its transpacific routes. Most B747 airplanes 
were long-range SP versions enabling Pan Am to offer non-
stop flights on many routes which were served by competing 
airlines on a multiple stop basis. 
Therefore, changes in the QSI were largely the result of 
changes in the weekly flight frequency. 
The average QSI in all markets improved over the ten 
year period from 1977 to 1987 and is an indication of the 
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the fact that international transpacific airlines increased 
the number of weekly flight frequencies and introduced more 
nonstop flights. 
Although the growth in weekly flight frequencies was 
most likely one respone of airlines to cope with the 
passenger traffic increase across the Pacific, the decision 
to offer a larger number of weekly flights might have been 
also taken in order to gain a competitve advantage over 
another carrier having fewer weekly flights between two 
cities. 
Similarly, the availability of long-range aircraft 
equipment enables airlines to increase the number of 
nonstop flights which can improve their competitive 
position by offering a shorter travel time than airlines 
with multiple stop flights. 
Impact of United Airlines' Market Entry 
A third purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
impact of United Airlines' large scale entrance in the Asia/ 
Pacific. It was modest in terms of market shares and quality 
of air services. 
In the nine markets analyzed, United Airlines increased 
its market shares in six markets only on a very marginal 
basis and market share increases ranged from 2 to 8 percent. 
In the remaining three markets, United Airlines either did 
not increase its market shares or showed a decline. 
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Although the researcher attempted to select city pair 
markets which were representative for United Airlines' 
performance in other transpacific markets between the USA 
and the Asia/Pacific region, it is not clear whether or not 
United Airlines' overall transpacific performance developed 
as indicated in the nine markets analyzed. A more 
comprehensive study which would analyze all former Pan Am 
markets including intra-Asian city pair markets now served 
by United Airlines could give an answer to this question. 
The analysis in this study suggests that United 
Airlines' modest performance could be mainly attributed 
to its lack of experience in serving a variety of 
international markets with distinguished cultural 
characteristics. 
Mechanical problems with airplanes and a centralized 
organizational structure which is inadequate in a vast 
geographic region which requires a flexible and fast 
decision-making process, further contributed to United 
Airlines' modest performance. 
Future investigation could determine whether United 
Airlines, after incorporating a new organizational 
structure and a large number of inflight and on-ground 
service improvements for its Pacific Division in 1987, was 
able to improve its performance in transpacific markets. 
An analysis of United Airlines' QSI shows that it 
improved its quality of service in four of the nine markets 
evaluated. This was the result of stepping up flight 
frequencies and introducing more nonstop flights. United 
Airlines' large scale market entrance also impacted other 
transpacific competitors which in turn increased their QSI. 
A correlation analysis between QSI and market share 
suggests that an improvement in the QSI did not result in 
a correspondingly higher passenger market share. 
However, there seems to be a high correlation between 
the QSI parameter flight frequency and market share. 
Carriers offering a higher flight frequency than their 
competitors seem to gain an overproportional market share. 
This study also shows that the opposition and concern of 
the US carrier Northwest, which opposed the transfer of the 
Pan Am Pacific Division is so far unjustified. 
It argued that United Airlines would gain a 
disproportionate share of the transpacific passenger volume 
because of its domestic network strength and APOLLO 
computer reservation system. 
In the markets analyzed, United Airlines was not able to 
to translate its domestic feed strength and dominant APOLLO 
system into a correspondingly high passenger share in 
transpacific markets. 
Future studies in this area could show whether or not 
United Airlines has been able to use these competitive 
advantages to improve its market share position in US-
Pacific markets in the long-run. 
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The analysis seems to indicate that competition among 
transpacific carriers was carried out more in service areas 
other than on-line service and computer reservation 
system. Important competitive factors most likely 
included fare pricing and the quality of inflight and 
on-ground service. 
Other important factors contributing to United 
Airlines' poor performance in the transpacific markets 
analyzed could be the insufficient allocation of 
marketing resources to the Asia/Pacific region. 
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A p p e n d i x 1 
SHARES OF US/NON-US CITIZENS AND US/NON-US FLAG 
CARRIERS ON SELECTED TRANSPACIFIC ROUTES 
Year 
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73,403 
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Total 
ssszsssssss: 
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71X 29X 100X OX 
63X 37X 98X 2X 
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62X 38X 65X 35X 
Honolulu - Tokyo 
US Hon US US Flag Hon US Flag 
Citizen (X) Citizen (X) Carrier (X) Carrier (X) 
13X 87X 36X 64X 
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Year Total Ci 
1979 65,545 
1982 85,841 
1985 233,786 
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12X 88X 
15X 85X 
12X 88X 
Hee York - Tokyo 
Hon US 
:izen (X) Citizen 
S8X 42 
551 45X 
56X 44X 
49X 51X 
(X) 
34X 
33X 
34X 
US Flag 
Carrier (X) 
100X 
100X 
67X 
59X 
66X 
67X 
66X 
Hon US Fl»o 
Carrier (X) 
OX 
OX 
33X 
41X 
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Year Total 
ssssssrsssssssssrssss: 
1979 163,826 
1982 301,033 
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scssrssssssssssssssrss: 
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s:sssssssssss3sssss:sSSSs:sssss:s. 
34X u% 
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ssszzsssszsszsssssszssssrxsssssrssssr 
39X 61X 
37X 
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63X 
59X 
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EZZSSSSSSZS 
Year 
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Total 
San Francisco -
US 
Citizen (X) 
38X 
461 
52X 
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Tokyo 
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54X 
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXZXZXSXXX3SSXXS B833S3SSSSSSSSS3S3 
Tear 
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Total 
US 
Citizen (X) 
Hon US 
Citizen <» 
OS Flag 
Carrier (X) 
Hon OS Flag 
Carrier (X) 
1979 23,148 
1982 46,920 
1985 112,758 
1987 121,344 
581 
SIX 
62X 
63X 
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381 
371 
Sll 
OX 
OX 
01 
m m M i m i w i 
49X 
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I00X 
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r3333S33SS3 
Sii Francisco * Hong Kong 
Year 
1979 
1982 
1915 
1987 
Passenger 
Total 
58,244 
57,489 
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OS 
Citizen (X) 
78X 
76X 
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Hon OS 
Citizen (X) 
22X 
241 
201 
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DSFlag 
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99X 
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Non OS Flag 
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IX 
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IX 
XXX3XX*«3XXB^3«XX3333eXXXX3X3XXXZXCa8S3XXXXXXXXSSSXS88r33XSS833S3SXSSSX33X3Xi exssssssssssssssssssss 
Honolulu - Sydney 
Passenger OS Hon US- US Flag Hon US Flag 
Year Total Citizen (X) Citizen-(X) Carrier (X) Carrier (X) 
1979 147,649 31X 69X 47X 53X 
1982 182,383 
1985 107,910 
1987 181,415 
sssssssssssssssscssss: SSS3SS3 
34X 
47X 
54X 
:ssssssss ssssssssss: 
66X 
53X 
46X 
:sszss: esrssssssa 
38X 
31X 
47X 
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 X 3 3 3 : 
62X 
*9X 
53X 
3 8 S 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 X 3 X S S 3 : 
Los Angeles - Sydney 
Passenger US Hon US OS Flag Hon IIS Flag 
Year Total Citizen (X) Citizen (X) Carrier <X) Carrier (I) 
3 3 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 SX3XSXX33X3XXXXXX3XXXXSX33XS3SX3XXXX333T3X3XXX 3 3 I M I H C ^ X X X T T C f f g r X B a i H 3 3 8 3 3 3 * 3 X 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 X 3 3 3 
1979 *29,699 42X 58X M00X OX 
1982 3,057 54X 46X 261 74X 
1985 51,317 54X 46X 361 64X 
1987 53,640 59X 41X 39X M X 
X^XX333333XXS3SS333g33X33333333XXXXX33XX3SX8333X3rXXXXXX3XX3XX 3X3333X3 3XX3g33X3XXr3XX3XrXZrSSXXXX 
SOURCE: OS International Air Travel Statistics 
(Cankridgc, Hassacknssetts: 1979-1987) 
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Appendix 2 
NONSTOP SERVICES BETWEEN US GATEWAYS AND POINTS IN 
THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 
northeastern 
1971 
Southeastern Central 
•o 
c 
Total 
SOURCt: ICAO, Traffic by Flight Staoe(Hontra8lt ICAO, 
August i-77 ) . 
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NONSTOP SCKVICCS BETWEEN US GATEWAYS ANO POINTS 
IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC KECICN 
1987 
Northeaattrn Southeastern lentral 
1 
ASIA/ 
. PACIFIC 
us N . 
GATEWAY ^ s ^ 
Anchorage 
Chicago 
Dallas 
Honolulu 
los 
Angeles 
Minneapolis 
c 
9m 
X 
41 
J f 0 9 
J0 9 
^ 1 
New York I 
Portland 1 
San B ^y 
Francisco | ^ 
Seattle I x ' 
Total 1 3 l « > 
A 
» O 
09* 
m 
• 
X 
> \ 
A 
> 
m 
c 
I 
*«. 
I1 
4 | 
4 * 
z 
X * 
Nt 
< 
•J? 
9 O 
«» 
4 * 
• 
X 
X. 
* 
< 
X 
X 
i 
4* 
a 
4» 
X 
>c 
3* 
. X 
X 
i" 
o 
n» 
4V • O 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
K 
x* 
< 
< 
X 
li! 
il 
•> 
c 
A 
X 
•4 
• 
)t> 
c ^ 
9 C 
! ! 
* < 
_ 
Y 
| 
... 
"
x 1 
C « 
4J 
X 
4. 
•A 
: x 
> 
5 f 
4» 
C 
l» 
• 
c 
« 
w 
9 
X 
U 
00 
m 
c 
X 
u 
-X 
I1 
9m 
m 
a 
4 , 
w 
X 
u 
X 
. 
•..'. 
1 
f 
m 
9 
A> 
P 
O 
4. 9 
• 
X 
—' 
l» 
00 
c 
u 9 O X 
X 
• 
.... 
0 
mm 
• 
X 
X 
V 
A. 
H 
• 
m* 
a 9 
o 
X 
m 
m» 
t» O X 
•» 
o 
* > 
X I 
C 
X 
•H 
. 
» c 
• 
c 
o 
4 * 
4> 
w 
«• 
9t 
.... 
1° 
4» 
c 
X 
* 
—• 
J 
-I 
f i 
O 4» 
I 
To ta l 
H 
™ 2 . " 
1 / 
M /3 IS"7 1 I ' J 1 ' 1 1 ' 
\o 
I I 7 
11 r 
1\ 1\*3 
SevtCE: ICAO, Traffic by Flight SttgetHontrtaIt ICAO, 
August iggi). — — 
2 1 2 
A p p e n d i x 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PASSENGER SEATS AVAILABLE FROM US 
GATEWAYS TO A S I A / P A C I F I C DESTINATIONS FROM 1 9 7 7 TO 1 9 8 7 
US (ATEVAYXYEAR 
csssssssssssssss: 
Anchorite 
Clicajo 
HoKcitfli 
Los Aiftlts 
Ritjeapolis 
He« York 
Porting 
S n FriBcisco 
Seitttt 
xxrsxxxsxsxssssxx 
Total 
xs&xssssxssssssss 
1977 
:ssssssssss 
335964 
43950 
1343718 
266658 
0 
95736 
0 
324450 
127980 
ssssssssss: 
2538456 
1978 
sssssssss 
181746 
56313 
1198419 
286782 
0 
94368 
0 
306816 
127890 
!97? 
sssssssss 
444546 
68676 
1779534 
436008 
0 
90384 
0 
337260 
162912 
1980 
sssssszs: 
314202 
66252 
1736256 
440862 
0 
99504 
0 
244600 
231204 
1981 
489192 
79164 
1886782 
, 637404 
0 
109752 
0 
341228 
242496 
1982 
xssssssss: 
513527 
102678 
1836040 
796557 
1038 
137003 
0 
356070 
265770 
sssssssssxKssssssxssssxggBsssssssssssgxxxxxxxi 
2252334 3319320 3132888 
sssssssssxssssssxssssxxssssssssssxssx; 
3786018 
sssssxxxx: 
4008483 
SSSSSSXSX1 
1983 
SSSSSSSSS 
448400 
125867 
1786064 
690887 
660 
202906 
15048 
374757 
407901 
4051990 
1984 
sssssssss 
446066 
119133 
2085496 
87557? 
1890 
770771 
18723 
410177 
551974 
1985 
SSSSSSSSS 
546011 
117400 
2174266 
980974 
1311 
79784? 
17935 
485116 
485883 
1986 1987 
ssszsssszssssssss: 
434708 
167864 
2208509 
11412R2 
0 
349654 
19814 
575325 
616991 
313912 
19848? 
2433718 
121301? 
732 
362848 
63966 
724448 
577774 
Ksxxsxxsxxxssxxssxsssssxsxxssxxxxcs: 
4779952 5101738 5509147 5888892 
KXXXX«XXXSSSSXSXXSgBB8?SrgESSSSSXXSSSSSSXSXXSa 
t 0 indicates that there nis no service ny in airline 
SOURCE: ICAO, Traffic iy Flight Stage (ICAO: Montreal, 1977-1987). 
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A p p e n d i x 4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVENUE PASSENGERS CARRIED FROM US 
GATEWAYS TO ASIA/PACIFIC DESTINATIONS FROM 1977 TO 1987 
US CATEVAYUEAR 1977 1978 1979 
srsssss:sssss:srzssrssrssssssssssssssr::s::s: 
Anchorage 190632 116838 276384 
Chicago 
Honolsli 
Lot Angeles 
Minneapolis 
Hen Tort 
Portland 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
24246 37890 51534 
784074 851004 1253488 
135814 183888 2370S2 
0 0 0 
44172 74556 60114 
0 0 0 
171540 180960 204966 
54654 64044 88242 
1980 
197838 
52336 
1104876 
273108 
0 
56118 
0 
156996 
139332 
1981 
5SSSSSSSS 
319494 
60630 
1289724 
389592 
0 
70428 
0 
164988 
192480 
tsxsssssxssssxxssxxsxxxxxsxrxxsxssxi 
Total 1405132 1509180 2171980 
SSSSZMSCSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSCSSSSSSSUSSSCZSS: 
1980604 
xssssssss 
2487336 
1982 
353449 
69266 
1179644 
477585 
433 
82442 
0 
199769 
169708 
BXXSSSSXXS 
2532296 
tXXXSSXXXX 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
:ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssxs 
311444 331507 407630 307886 236641 
8301R 8441? 85807 170078 126315 
1144828 1394342 1512702 1535346 1215464 
452543 558653 701297 722865 828443 
350 1020 660 0 303 
137573 194736 711557 231923 250020 
3531 7119 7071 7007 22724 
225047 123669 299862 376816 469982 
224498 328628 334941 348427 341636 
tSSSSSSXXSXSSSXXSXXSXXXXXXSSSSSSXXXXSXSSXSSSS: 
2582832 3023586 3561527 3650348 3491528 
tXXSSXSSXXSXXXXXSXXXSSSXSSXSXSSSXSCXSSSSSSSSS: 
t 0 indicates that tlere «as to service by aa airlift*. 
SOURCE: ICAO, Traffic k? Flifbt Staff (ICAO: Hontrtil, 1977-1987). 
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A p p e n d i x 5 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDIVIDUAL US GATEWAYS OF TOTAL 
TRANSPACIFIC SEATS AVAILABLE FROM 1977 TO 1987 
OS CATEVAYNYEAR 
XSSXSSSSSSSSSSSSSSXXt 
Atekoriff 
Ciieijp 
HOBOIIII 
los Aogeles 
Riofteapelis t 
Nee York 
Portias! 
Sat Fratcisco 
Seattle 
Total tt 
sxxxxxxxsxxxxxxxxxxsa 
1977 1978 1979 
13.2 
1.7 
53 
10.5 
0 
3.8 
0 -
12.8 
5 
100 
8.1 
2.5 
53.2 
12.7 
0 
4.2 
0 
13.6 
5.6 
100 
13.4 
2.1 
53.6 
13.1 
0 
2.7 
0 
10.1 
4.9 
1M 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 .1986 
10 
2.1 
55.4 
14.1 
0 
3.2 
0 
7.8 
7.3 
m 
12.9 
2.1 
49.8 
16.8 
0 
2.9 
0 
9 
6.4 
1M 
12.8 
2.6 
45.8 
19.9 
0 
3.4 
0 
8.9 
6.6 
100 
rxsiixxsxj 
u.i 
3.1 
44.1 
17.1 
0 
5 
1.2 
9.? 
10.1 
9.3 
2.5 
43.6 
1t.3 
0 
5.7 
t.S 
1.6 
11.5 
100 100 
im*mmmMM*w*9mmm*M**M 
12.2 
2.5 
34.5 
22 
0 
6.7 
1.4 
M.9 
10.9 
100 
9 
3.4 
31.8 
23.6 
0 
7.2 
1.4 
11.9 
12.8 
1987 
ESXXSXl 
6.7 
4.7 
26.6 
25.B 
0 
7.7 
1.4 
15.4 
12.3 
100 100 
KSXXXMSSSSSSSXXSI 
t Hiaeeapolis hecaiie a fiteeif i i 1912. Its share is »ot listed 
siice i t is less thai 1 •freest. 
t t Total tfoes eot e^ial 100 die to roiti iej, 
SOORCE: Calcilatioos k m . oo Traffic hy Flifht Stiff, 1977-1987. 
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A p p e n d i x 6 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDIVIDUAL US GATEWAYS OF TOTAL 
REVENUE PASSENGERS CARRIED FROM 1977 TO 1987 
_ 1977 197B 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
xxssxsxxx-.ssssssxxxssssssssxsxsrxsxssxxssxssxrxrxxxxsxssssssxxxssxxxxsxxxxxxxxsxxxxxxsxxxsxxxxxxxxsxx.xxxssxxxxxxxxx 
13.5 7.7 12.7 10 12.8 14 12.1 11 11.4 8.4 6.8 
1-7 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.7 7.8 7.4 3.9 3.6 
55.8 56.4 57.7 55.8 51.9 46.6 44.3 46.1 42.5 42.1 34.8 
'•? 12.2 11 13.8 15.7 18.9 17.5 18.5 70 20 23.7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.1 4.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 5.3 6.4 5.9 6.3 7.7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12.2 12 9.4 7.9 6.6 7.9 8.7 4.1 8.4 10.3 13.5 
3.9 4.2 4.1 7 7.7 6.7 8.7 10.9 9.4 9.5 9.8 
:8XSZSSSSSX33SrSS£CSSSS*«S*SSSXXSXSnxXXSSXSSXSX3SSSXSCSSSXSSXXSSSSXS 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
:»xx»xgxxxxxx«s«««xc«»««««»XTrrx««xx«««»xexg»»x»xg«x««c«gx««»«»«««««»«»«««x«rx»«xgsrx«c»rr»««rT«rsr»e«rx 
t Hiiteapolis hecane gateaay in 1983. Since its share is less than 1 percent 
it is notlistei. 
tt Total iocs not een*l 100 ioe to roaniing. 
SOORCE: Catenations hasei Traffic hy Flight Stage, 1977-1987. 
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